Bank capital regulation with random audits

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 26, Issue 7-8, 2002, Pages 1301-1321

  Bhattacharya, Sudipto ^a,b   Plank, Manfred ^c   Strobl, Günter ^d   Zechner, Josef ^b,e  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c Austrian National Bank   (Austria)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Excessive risks; Optimal bank closure rules; Poisson distributed audits; Underlying assets

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036199726     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00045-8     Document Type: Article

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