Independence, cantons, or bantustans: Whither the Palestinian state?

Middle East Journal

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 230-245

  Farsakh, Leila ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPARATIVE STUDY; INDEPENDENCE; INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; STATE BUILDING;

AFRICA; ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; MIDDLE EAST; PALESTINE; SOUTH AFRICA; SOUTHERN AFRICA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WORLD;

EID: 19344369450     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/59.2.13     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. See Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 2003/20062.htm.
2. See www.betselem.org.
3. World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis, An Assessment (World Bank, Washington, DC, May 2003).
4. See, for example, Roane Carey, The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid (London: Vintage Press, 2001);
5. Hanan Ashrawi, Critique of the Road Map in www.muftah.org, (October 28, 2002);
6. Uri Davis, Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2003);
7. and LAW Apartheid, Bantustans and Cantons: The ABC of the Oslo Accords (Jerusalem, 1998). The Palestinian NGO community, during the World Conference against Racism in Durban South Africa, August/ September 2001, was unanimous in presenting a position paper calling for ending Israel's brand of apartheid (see www.lawsociety.org/apartheid/ palngo.html).
8. Quoted by Akiva Eldar "People and Politics: Sharon's Bantustans are far from Copenhagen's Hope" Haaretz, May 13, 2000.
9. Rema Hamammi and Salim Tamari, "The Second Intifada: an End or a Beginning?," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, Winter 2003, pp. 2-35.
10. Robert Stevens, "Israel and South Africa: A Comparative Study in Racism and Settler Colonialism" in Abdel-Wahab Kayyali, Zionism, Imperialism and Racism (London: Croon Helm, 1979);
11. Daniel Lieberfeld, Talking with the Enemy: Negotiation and Threat Perception in South Africa and Israel/Palestine (Westport: Praeger, 1999),
12. Ran Greenstein, Genealogies of Conflict: Class Identity and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa (Hanover: New England University Press, 1995),
13. Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1987);
14. and Davis, Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within.
15. Although official Israeli scholars were often reluctant to admit the colonial basis of the Israeli Zionist project in Palestine, arguing that the Zionist endeavor did not seek to dominate the Palestinians but rather to ingather the Jews escaping persecution, the new Israeli historians and sociologists showed the contrary. The work of Ilan Pappe and Gershon Shafir, among others, has been particularly important in demonstrating that the non-colonialist motivations of Jewish immigration to Palestine does not free Zionism from its colonial essence, as exemplified in its aim to establish an exclusive Jewish State in a land already inhabited by others (see Ilan Pappe, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992);
16. Gershon Shafir, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1883-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989);
17. and Gershon Shafir "Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach" in Ilan Pappe (ed), The Israel/Palestine Question (London: Routledge, 1999).
18. Gershon Shafir, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p. xiii.
19. Shafir, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.xiii.
20. Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Economy (Cambridge MA: Schenkmen, 1983) p. 51.
21. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (1994), Statistical Abstract of Israel, Table 16.15.
22. Guy Standing, John Sender and John Weeks, Restructuring the Labor Market: The South African Challenge (Geneva: International Labor Organisation, 1996) pp. 10-15.
23. See Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Palestinians: the Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1984, (Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1991), pp. 1-5.
24. These are the Bantu Authorities Act 1951, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act 1959, and the Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act 1970 which was amended in 1974.
25. Quoted in Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans (London: International Defence and Aid Fund, 1976), p. 21.
26. See Anthony Marx, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, USA and Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
27. and Rogers, Divide and Rule, pp. 59-76.
28. In 1960, the government abolished all African voting rights of white representatives in the South African parliament (Rogers, Divide and Rule, p. 56).
29. These include the Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981).
30. See Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Employment in Israel, 1967-1997: A Review (Ramallah: MAS Publications, November 1998), p. 45.
31. Israel had a different interpretation of UNSC resolution 242, as it maintained that its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was sui generis, resulting from a defensive, rather than an offensive, war and that the withdrawal was intended from some, and not all, the territories occupied in that war. Moreover, Israel argued that the land occupied was not "the territory of a high Contracting Party", and thus it was not obliged to comply with the 4th Geneva Convention (Israel, though, undertook to apply the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention.) Israel's interpretation, however, has been contested by various international organisations as well as Israeli legal experts (Betselem, Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank (Betselem: Tel Aviv, 2002).
32. Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP) Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Vol. 11/6, 2001, Table 1.
33. Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel, p. 110.
34. Israel does not consider its settlements illegal or prohibited by article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Israeli official position maintains that settlements "are not intended to displace Arab inhabitants, nor do they do so in practice." It further argues that the transfer of population is voluntary rather than forced, as it involves individuals returning "to towns and villages from which they or their ancestors bad been ousted." (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Settlements and International Law, May 2001, www.israel-mfa.gov.il.
35. See Carey, The New Intifada;
36. Mark Marshal, "Rethinking the Palestine Question: The Apartheid Paradigm," Journal of Balestine Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1998, pp. 15-22;
37. Law at www.lawsociety.org/apartheid/palngo.html.
38. Davis Apartheid Israel, pp.60-73,
39. and Marwan Bishara Israel/Palestine: Peace or Apartheid (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp. 1-5.
40. During the first months of the occupation, though, some key members of the Israeli cabinet tossed with the idea of creating a Palestinian State in the West Bank (without Gaza), but one that would be enclaved within Israel and under its control. By the end of 1967 this idea was abandoned and Israel opted for what became known as the Jordanian option. (For further details see Reuven Pedatzur, "Coming Back full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967," Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, No.2, Spring 1995, pp. 268-291).
41. In "Statements by Leaders at the Signing of the Middle East Pact," New York Times, September 14, 1993.
42. Allen Kerby, South Africa's Bantustans: What Independence for the Transkei, (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1987), p.10.
43. See Articles 1.1, 15.4 of Chapter 1 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28th September 1995, (Oslo-II).
44. See article V of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Authority (DOP or Oslo I), Washington, September 13, 1993.
45. See http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf.
46. Article VII in DOP and Article XIII in Chapter 2, Oslo II.
47. Articles IA, XVII, XVIH, in Protocol IV of Oslo II.
48. FMEP, Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Vol. 11/6, 2001, Vol. 12/1, 2002 and 13/6, 2003.
49. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel , 1995, 1998, 2002, Tables 2.7, 22.5, 22.12.
50. See Article II in Gaza-Jericho autonomy agreement (Cairo Agreement, May 4, 1994), and Article X, Chapter 2, Oslo II.
51. By establishing the Eretz checkpoint in Gaza and controlling all border crossing.
52. Work in the Israeli economy was key to keeping unemployment rates at less than 7% in the WBGS between 1970 and 1993, and for sustaining a labor force growing at more than 4% per annum. See Leila Farsakh, "Palestinian Labor Flows to Israel: A Finished Story?" Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Autumn, 2002, pp. 13-27.
53. UNSCO, The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of the Recent Confrontations, Mobility Restriction and Border Closures, (Jerusalem: UNSCO, 2002), pp. 3-15.
54. World Bank, Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), p. 15.
55. See World Bank, Twenty-Seven Months Intifada, Closure and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment, (Washington, DC: World Bank, July 2003) p. xi.
56. See projection of the Final Status Map presented by the Israelis at Camp David at http://www.fmep.org/maps/2001/Jaasherc2palstate.jpg.
57. Israeli and US media and policy circles have put most of the blame for the failure of the summit on Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat. This view however has been contested by Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors, New York Review of Books, August 9, 2001, pp.62-66.
58. See also Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision: What happened at Camp David and Taba?" International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2, Fall 2003, pp. 5-43.
59. See ARIJ, The Israeli Security Zone make up 45.25% of the West Bank, Including 158 Israeli Colonies, 2002, in www.poica.org/casestudies/ security-zones.
60. FMEP, Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, at www.fmep.org (December 10, 2004).
61. See www.stopthewall.org.
62. See United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities, UN, September 2004, p. 5.
63. The International Court of Justice has ruled that the "construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law." The Court "considers that the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a 'fait accompli'on the ground that it could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tanta-mount to de facto annexation" (ICJ, Legal Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 9 July 2004, Para. 163 (3)A, 121).
64. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled against the route of the separation fence because the humanitarian damage inflicted by it was disproportionate to the security it was supposed to provide. It calls on the Israeli government to find alternative less damaging routes but does not specify that the Wall is to be built on the 1967 borders. ( HCJ, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, HCJ 2056 /04, June 30, 2004, para.36.)
65. See, George Bush statement, July 26, 2003 considering the security fence as a problem, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3096609.stm
66. and see EU position in "EU's Solana criticises Israel for "bizarre" Arafat policy" at www.eubusiness.com/afp /031111123326.e93fq9ps.
67. It also proposes to incorporate the majority of settlers into Israel, but would provide the Palestinian State with territorial contiguity. It offers a solution to the refugee problems and Palestinian right of return based on UNGA resolution 181, but without putting in jeopardy the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, which the Palestinian state promises to respect. Moreover, the Geneva Initiative provides a role for the international community, both as a monitoring force for the implementation of the agreements, as well as a multinational force that would supervise the borders of the Palestinian State.
68. See US President George W. Bush's letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the Disengagement Plan, Washington 14 June 2004, in Special Document, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 132, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 88-90.