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Volumn 29, Issue 8, 2005, Pages 10-15

Preliminary analysis of tacit collusion among generation companies in electricity markets

Author keywords

Collusion; Electricity market; Market power; Tacit collusion

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 19144362442     PISSN: 10001026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (6)

References (18)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.