Dynamic pricing and learning in electricity markets

Operations Research

Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 231-241

  Garcia, Alfredo ^a   Campos Nañez, Enrique ^b   Reitzes, James ^c  

^a University of Virginia   (United States)

^b The George Washington University   (United States)

^c THE BRATTLE GROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic auctions; Economics; Games: stochastic, noncooperative; Natural resources: energy, water resources; Restructured electricity markets

Indexed keywords

DYNAMIC PRICING; ELECTRICITY MARKETS; MARKOV PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE-FORMATION;

ALGORITHMS; COMPETITION; DECISION MAKING; HYDROELECTRIC GENERATORS; MARKETING; MARKOV PROCESSES; PLANNING;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 18744362466     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1040.0159     Document Type: Review

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