Alliance Fatigue amid Asymmetrical Interdependence: Sino-North Korean Relations in Flux

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Man, Sukhee ^a  

^a Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842712628     PISSN: 10163271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10163270409464060     Document Type: Review

References (63)

1. For a full text of the treaty in English, see Appendix at the end of this paper. The source of the appendix is Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28 (July 1961), p. 5. For a detailed background of the conclusion of the treaty, see Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1996), pp. 55-68.
2. For a full text of the treaty in English, see Appendix at the end of this paper. The source of the appendix is Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28 (July 1961), p. 5. For a detailed background of the conclusion of the treaty, see Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1996), pp. 55-68.
3. For a recent analysis of the Sino-North Korean relationship, see You Ji, "China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 28 (2001), pp. 387-98.
4. For an in-depth theoretical analysis of the alliance, see G. H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neo-realist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs, No. 44 (1990), pp. 104-105.
5. As for the requirements for the formation of the alliance, see Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance: for the Next Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 11.
6. Regarding the qualitative changes in the alliance among the allies on the basis of costs and benefits, see Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neo-realist First Cut," pp. 109-110.
7. Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," in Henry D. Sokolsky, ed., Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), pp. 131-36.
8. Interviews with Chinese international relations experts and scholars, December 2002.
9. In the past, and especially in the 1960s and 1970s when the Chinese economy was devastated by successive bad economic policies during its experiences with the Great Leap Forward Movement and Cultural Revolution, North Korea "proved to be an important trade partner (to China)." Hong Yung Lee, "China's Changing Relationship with North Korea," in Doug Joon Kim, ed., Foreign Relations of North Korea: During Kim Il Sung's Last Days (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994), p. 277.
10. According to a Korean scholar's finding, while North Korea received both grants (US$ 330.6 million) and credit assistance (US$ 172.5 million) from China in the 1950s, in the 1960s North Korea did not receive grants but credit assistance of US$ 105 million from China. See Cheon-ki Eun, North Korea's Foreign Policy toward China, and the Soviet Union (Seoul: Namji Press Company, 1994), p. 164, Table 5-1.
11. For a detailed list of reciprocal visits by the leaders, delegations, and military personnel of China and North Korea from 1949 to 1985, see the Appendix in Eun, Cheon-ki, North Korea's Foreign Policy on China and the Soviet Union (Seoul: Namji Press Company, 1994), pp. 307-35.
12. For the first time, on Feb. 13, 2003 when the general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held to vote on a resolution on North Korea's nuclear crisis for the United Nations Security Council, China did not abstain nor veto, and voted for the resolution. Moonhwa Ilbo [Moonhwa Daily], Feb.13, 2003. However, in 1993 during the course of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not support sanctions against North Korea and it consequently prevented the United States from taking North Korea noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council for action. Alvin Y. So, "Prospects for North Korea-China Relations," Asia Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), p. 55; Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), fn. 3, p. 93. For China's consistent verbal support for North Korea during the first nuclear crisis in 1993-94, see Yongho Kim, "Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Alliance: Beijing's Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagonning with Washington," Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April, 2001), p. 166, Table 4.
13. For the first time, on Feb. 13, 2003 when the general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held to vote on a resolution on North Korea's nuclear crisis for the United Nations Security Council, China did not abstain nor veto, and voted for the resolution. Moonhwa Ilbo [Moonhwa Daily], Feb.13, 2003. However, in 1993 during the course of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not support sanctions against North Korea and it consequently prevented the United States from taking North Korea noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council for action. Alvin Y. So, "Prospects for North Korea-China Relations," Asia Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), p. 55; Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), fn. 3, p. 93. For China's consistent verbal support for North Korea during the first nuclear crisis in 1993-94, see Yongho Kim, "Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Alliance: Beijing's Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagonning with Washington," Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April, 2001), p. 166, Table 4.
14. For the first time, on Feb. 13, 2003 when the general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held to vote on a resolution on North Korea's nuclear crisis for the United Nations Security Council, China did not abstain nor veto, and voted for the resolution. Moonhwa Ilbo [Moonhwa Daily], Feb.13, 2003. However, in 1993 during the course of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not support sanctions against North Korea and it consequently prevented the United States from taking North Korea noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council for action. Alvin Y. So, "Prospects for North Korea-China Relations," Asia Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), p. 55; Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), fn. 3, p. 93. For China's consistent verbal support for North Korea during the first nuclear crisis in 1993-94, see Yongho Kim, "Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Alliance: Beijing's Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagonning with Washington," Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April, 2001), p. 166, Table 4.
15. For the first time, on Feb. 13, 2003 when the general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held to vote on a resolution on North Korea's nuclear crisis for the United Nations Security Council, China did not abstain nor veto, and voted for the resolution. Moonhwa Ilbo [Moonhwa Daily], Feb.13, 2003. However, in 1993 during the course of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not support sanctions against North Korea and it consequently prevented the United States from taking North Korea noncompliance to the United Nations Security Council for action. Alvin Y. So, "Prospects for North Korea-China Relations," Asia Perspective, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2001), p. 55; Victor D. Cha, "Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Detente and Korean Security," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), fn. 3, p. 93. For China's consistent verbal support for North Korea during the first nuclear crisis in 1993-94, see Yongho Kim, "Forty Years of the Sino-North Korean Alliance: Beijing's Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagonning with Washington," Issues & Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March/April, 2001), p. 166, Table 4.
16. Dong Sung Kim, "North Korea's China Policy," in Yang Seong Chul and Kang Sung Hak, eds., North Korea's Foreign Policy (Seoul: Seoul Press, 1995), p. 248.
17. Such views are now shared by both American and Chinese observers of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian affairs. See, for examples, Fei-Ling Wang, "Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing's Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Monograph (Carlise: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 4-5 and pp. 8-12; Fei-Ling Wang, "China and Korean Unification: A Policy of Status Quo," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 22. No. 2 (1998), pp. 189-190; Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," pp. 170-172 and 183-185.
18. Such views are now shared by both American and Chinese observers of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian affairs. See, for examples, Fei-Ling Wang, "Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing's Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Monograph (Carlise: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 4-5 and pp. 8-12; Fei-Ling Wang, "China and Korean Unification: A Policy of Status Quo," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 22. No. 2 (1998), pp. 189-190; Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," pp. 170-172 and 183-185.
19. Such views are now shared by both American and Chinese observers of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian affairs. See, for examples, Fei-Ling Wang, "Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes: Beijing's Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance," Monograph (Carlise: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 4-5 and pp. 8-12; Fei-Ling Wang, "China and Korean Unification: A Policy of Status Quo," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 22. No. 2 (1998), pp. 189-190; Eric A. McVadon, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula," pp. 170-172 and 183-185.
20. Chinese assistance and aid to North Korea throughout the 1990s ranged from crude oil, rice, fertilizer, food, and coal. For details, please refer to Larry M. Wortzel, "China's Goals and Strategies for the Korean Peninsula: A Critical Assessment," Planning for a Peaceful Korea, pp. 217-19.
21. One salient example was China's demand for conditional payment of 25 percent for its total supply of grain, crude oil, and coal in hard currency, which was made in July 1996. China insisted on payment, and warned that it would cut off the supply of goods. Maeil Shinmun, July 18, 1996.
22. Hong Yung Lee, "China and the Two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle," in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 97-98.
23. For a brief background explanation of the 1960 U.S.-Japanese treaty, see Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 113-15.
24. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Disputes, see John W Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 32-69. For a detailed analysis of the Sino-Soviet disputes and its impact on North Korea, see Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978). Hong Yung Lee ascribed the major rationale for the conclusion of the Sino-North Korea treaty to the Sino-Soviet rift. See his "Chin and the Two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle," p. 99.
25. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Disputes, see John W Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 32-69. For a detailed analysis of the Sino-Soviet disputes and its impact on North Korea, see Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978). Hong Yung Lee ascribed the major rationale for the conclusion of the Sino-North Korea treaty to the Sino-Soviet rift. See his "Chin and the Two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle," p. 99.
26. Regarding the Sino-Soviet Disputes, see John W Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 32-69. For a detailed analysis of the Sino-Soviet disputes and its impact on North Korea, see Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978). Hong Yung Lee ascribed the major rationale for the conclusion of the Sino-North Korea treaty to the Sino-Soviet rift. See his "Chin and the Two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle," p. 99.
27. See the Appendix.
28. See Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, p. 59.
29. For the definition of alliance, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1, footnote 1; Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neo-realist First Cut," pp. 103-123.
30. For the definition of alliance, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 1, footnote 1; Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neo-realist First Cut," pp. 103-123.
31. The statement says, "In order to foster the forces of Japanese militarism and turn them into a 'shock brigade' for its aggression in Asia, U.S. imperialism is pressing for an early conclusion of the 'ROK-Japan talks' and knocking together an aggressive Northeast Asia military alliance.... The U.S. imperialists are incessantly carrying out criminal schemes in southern Korea to provoke a new war and thereby aggravate the tension, and are intensifying their barbarous fascist suppression of the people there." See the text of the joint statement in Peking Review, June 28, 1963, pp. 8-12.
32. See Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, p. 61.
33. See the Appendix for treaty text.
34. For a detailed analysis of Beijing's decision to normalize relations with South Korea and its impact on Sino-North Korean relations, see Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," in David M. Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 371-408.
35. Article VII says, "The present Treaty will remain in force until the Contracting Parties agree on its amendment or termination." See Appendix in this paper.
36. See Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations, p. 60.
37. From this perspective, the Korean Peninsula is categorized as the core problem (hexin wenti) in China's foreign policy community. See Song Dexing, "Lengzhan hou Dongbeiya anquan xingshe de bianhua [Changes in the Northeast Asian Security Situation after the Cold War]," Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], No. 9 (1998), p. 35.
38. For a detailed analysis of China's North Korean policy, see David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 43-56.
39. For an insightful analysis of North Korea's domestic predicaments, see Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
40. For a statistical analysis of Sino-North Korean trade, see Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, "Chinese-North Korea Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence," pp. 124-28.
41. For a comprehensive research study on North Korea's post-Cold War economic situation, see Nicholas Eberstadt, "Famine, Economy and Society in North Korea," in Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
42. See JoongAng Ilbo [Korea's Central Daily], Dec. 26, 2001; and The Economist, Dec. 5, 2002.
43. See JoongAng Ilbo [Korea's Central Daily], Dec. 26, 2001; and The Economist, Dec. 5, 2002.
44. Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Winter 2000/2001), pp. 529-31.
45. Regarding the inefficiency of China's leverage over North Korea, see John Tkacik, "China's Korea Conundrum," Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 2002; Philip Pan, "China Treads Carefully around North Korea," Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2003; Jasper Becker, "China's Influence is Limited," International Herald Tribune, Jan.10, 2003.
46. Regarding the inefficiency of China's leverage over North Korea, see John Tkacik, "China's Korea Conundrum," Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 2002; Philip Pan, "China Treads Carefully around North Korea," Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2003; Jasper Becker, "China's Influence is Limited," International Herald Tribune, Jan.10, 2003.
47. Regarding the inefficiency of China's leverage over North Korea, see John Tkacik, "China's Korea Conundrum," Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 2, 2002; Philip Pan, "China Treads Carefully around North Korea," Washington Post, Jan. 10, 2003; Jasper Becker, "China's Influence is Limited," International Herald Tribune, Jan.10, 2003.
48. Shambaugh classified the priority of China's policy calculus toward North Korea and first two are North Korea's regime survival and North Korea's regime reform. It is very interesting that he puts the issue of North Korea's comprehensive WMD programs at the bottom, see David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," pp. 44-45.
49. For recent research on North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship, see Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, "Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 7-18.
50. For a detailed analysis of North Korea's nuclear deals in the early and mid 1990s, see Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 150-55.
51. For the 1994 Agreed Framework, see Leon V. Sigal, "How to End the North Korean Missile Threat," in Chung-in Moon, Masao Okonogi, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Perry Report, the Missile Quagmire, and the North Korean Question: The Quest for New Alternatives (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2000), pp. 25-36.
52. An interview with a Korea expert in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, July 10-11, 2003.
53. Three messengers include Wang Yi and Dai Bingguo, deputy ministers of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Xu Caihou, Secretary of PLA's Commissions for Discipline.
54. JoongAng Ilbo (in subscription of CNN), Aug. 26, 2003. One impetus for Hu's attitudinal change toward North Korea is attributed to the generational changes in the Chinese leadership. With no personal bondage with North Korea's Kim Jung-il, Hu is freer than his predecessors in dealing with North Korea. For China's generational transition, see Joseph Fewsmith, "China's Generational Transition," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 23-35.
55. JoongAng Ilbo (in subscription of CNN), Aug. 26, 2003. One impetus for Hu's attitudinal change toward North Korea is attributed to the generational changes in the Chinese leadership. With no personal bondage with North Korea's Kim Jung-il, Hu is freer than his predecessors in dealing with North Korea. For China's generational transition, see Joseph Fewsmith, "China's Generational Transition," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 23-35.
56. You Ji pointed out the government restriction that Chinese officials should not comment on North Korean affairs in the presence of foreigners, see You Ji, "China and North Korea: A Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience," pp. 389-90.
57. Shi emphasized that China's military intervention in the Korean War in 1950 hardly contributed to China's subsequent development, not only in terms of economy, but also in terms of national unification. He ascribed both China's economic predicaments during the late 1950s and its delayed unification with Taiwan to China's relentless involvement in the Korean War. For his comment on North Korea, see his interview in South China Morning Post, Aug. 27, 2003.
58. Shen argues that the North Korean nuclear crisis should be resolved by peaceful measures. In his article, Shen emphasizes that the amendment of the Sino-North Korean treaty contributes to the peaceful resolution of the crisis and also urges that South Korea and Japan should dissuade the United States from using military force against North Korea. See Shen Jiru, "youhu dongbeiya anquande danwuzhiwei: zhizhi chaohewentishangde weixianboyi [Urgent Mission to maintain Northeast Asian Security: Control the risk from North Korean nuclear brinkmanship], Xhijiejingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics] No. 9 (2003), pp. 53-58.
59. The Economist, Sept. 18, 2003.
60. Washington Post, Sept. 16, 2003; JoongAng Ilbo, Sept. 16, 2003; and Daily Telegraph, Sept. 16, 2003.
61. Washington Post, Sept. 16, 2003; JoongAng Ilbo, Sept. 16, 2003; and Daily Telegraph, Sept. 16, 2003.
62. Washington Post, Sept. 16, 2003; JoongAng Ilbo, Sept. 16, 2003; and Daily Telegraph, Sept. 16, 2003.
63. New York Times, Sept. 16, 2003.