Forty years of the Sino-North Korean alliance: Beijing's declining credibility and Pyongyang's bandwagoning with Washington

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 147-176

  Kim, Yongho ^a  

^a Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

China; Foreign policy; North Korea; Northeast Asia; Sino North Korean relations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041736555     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (102)

1. Stephen M. Walt suggested several standard for explaining why alliances end or persist. He suggested as reasons for ending alliances: changing perceptions of threat, declining credibility, and domestic politics (such as ideological divisions and domestic competition). As for the reasons why alliances persist, he named hegemonic leadership, preserving credibility, domestic politics and elite manipulation, the impact of institutionalization, and shared identities (such as ideological solidarity). This paper will employ much of the standards suggested by Walt. For details, see Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 158-70.
2. For the secondary alliance dilemma, see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 466.
3. See Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China's Quest for National Identity (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993), xi.
4. Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," Security Studies 8, no. 2/3 (Winter1998/99-Spring 1999): 107-8.
5. For details, see A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), 193-200.
6. Renmin ribao (People's Daily) (Beijing), March 1, 1972, 1.
7. Barnett, China and the Major Powers, 192.
8. Renmin ribao, May 6, 1978, 2; Rodong Sinmun (Labor Daily) (Pyongyang), May 6, 1978, 3.
9. Renmin ribao, May 6, 1978, 2; Rodong Sinmun (Labor Daily) (Pyongyang), May 6, 1978, 3.
10. Trends in Communist Media, October 3, 1979, 8.
11. Rodong Sinmun, October 6, 1979, 1.
12. Ibid., October 25, 1979, 1.
13. June Teufel Dreyer, "U.S.-China Security Relations: Past, Present, and Future," Issues & Studies 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 44-48.
14. Rodong Sinmun, May 29, 1991, 3.
15. Ibid., September 19, 1991, 1.
16. Kim Il Sung, "On Current Political Situations and the Task of Our Party" (Report at the Conference of Delegates of the KWP, October 5, 1966), in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung Chô jakjip (Writings of Kim Il Sung), vol. 20 (Pyongyang: The KWP Press, 1982), 378.
17. Kim Il Sung, "For Thoroughly Implementing Decisions of the Conference of Party Delegates" (Speech at the conference of party activist members of Hamkyong Namdo and the city of Hamhung, June 20, 1967), in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung Chôjakjip, vol. 21 (Pyongyang: The KWP Press, 1983), 348.
18. For detail, see Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1999), 122-41.
19. Rodong Sinmun, March 4, 1972, 1.
20. Kim Il Sung, "Let Us Welcome Victorious Revolutionary Changes by Promoting Construction of Socialism through Strengthening the Party, Political Organizations, and the People's Army" (Conclusion drawn at the Tenth Plenum of the KWP's Fifth Central Committee, February 17, 1975), in Kim Il Sung, Kim Il Sung Chôjakjip, vol. 30 (Pyongyang: The KWP Press, 1985), 46-47.
21. Kim Jong Il, "Let Us Make a New Conversion in Socialist Construction through Upgrading the Combat Capability of the Party" (Speech at a cadre conference of the organization/guidance and propaganda departments of the KWP Central Committee, December 25, 1978), in Kim Jong Il, Juche Hyôkmyông Uiupui Wansông'ul Uihayô (For the completion of glorious Juche revolutionary tasks), vol. 4 (Pyongyang: The KWP Press, 1987), 122-44.
22. Kim Jong Il, "Let Us Make a Revolutionary Turning Point for the Implementation of the Party's Mission in Accordance with the Current Political Situation" (Speech at a meeting of leading cadres of the KWP Central Committee, January 14, 1983), in Kim Jong Il, Juche Hyôkmyông Uiupui Wansông'ul Uihayô, vol. 5 (Pyongyang: The KWP Press, 1988), 1.
23. Chosun Central Broadcasting, August 24, 1992; Naewoe Press (Seoul; in Korean), vol. 46 (October-December 1992): 172.
24. Rodong Sinmun, May 29, 1991, 3.
25. For details, see Hongguang Wu, "The Practices of China's Economic Reform," in Economic Reforms in Socialist Countries (Seoul: National Institute for Economic System and Information, 1990), 43-44.
26. An interview with the Washington Times, see Rodong Sinmun, April 18, 1992, 2.
27. Rodong Sinmun, April 22, 1992, 1.
28. Kim Jong Il, "Prioritizing Tasks Regarding People's Thought Is an Indispensable Necessity in the Pursuit of Socialist Duty," ibid., June 21, 1995, 1.
29. Kim Jong Il, "In Defense of Juche and Nationalism in Revolution and Construction," ibid., June 21, 1997, 2.
30. Yonhap News (Seoul), July 4, 1997.
31. Rodong Sinmun, October 3, 2000, 3.
32. Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1999), 70.
33. James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 910-18.
34. Here, the concept of autonomy refers to that of external self-assertion by which a state determines its own policies. See Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 909.
35. Kim Jong Il, "Slander Against Socialism Cannot Be Allowed," Rodong Sinmun, March 4, 1993, 1-2.
36. Ibid., July 10, 1994, 1.
37. Ibid., July 11, 1994, 3; July 12, 1994, 4; and July 13, 1994, 3-4.
38. Ibid., July 11, 1994, 3; July 12, 1994, 4; and July 13, 1994, 3-4.
39. Ibid., July 11, 1994, 3; July 12, 1994, 4; and July 13, 1994, 3-4.
40. Ibid., August 31, 1994, 4 and September 4, 1994, 4.
41. Ibid., August 31, 1994, 4 and September 4, 1994, 4.
42. Chosun Central Broadcasting, September 3, 1994; Naewoe Press, vol. 53 (July-September 1994): 172.
43. Rodong Sinmun, August 11, 1994, 2.
44. Ibid., September 9, 1994, 1.
45. Renmin ribao, September 9, 1994, 1.
46. Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times) (Taipei), December 23, 1996; Yonhap News, December 23, 1996.
47. Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times) (Taipei), December 23, 1996; Yonhap News, December 23, 1996.
48. Zili wanbao (Independence Evening Post) (Taipei), January 12, 1997; Yonhap News, January 12, 1997.
49. Zili wanbao (Independence Evening Post) (Taipei), January 12, 1997; Yonhap News, January 12, 1997.
50. Yonhap News, January 21, 1997.
51. Taiwan Television (TTV) News Report, January 27, 1997; Yonhap News, January 27, 1997.
52. Taiwan Television (TTV) News Report, January 27, 1997; Yonhap News, January 27, 1997.
53. Yonhap News, January 29, 1997.
54. Ibid., January 30, 1997.
55. Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), March 4, 1997; Yonhap News, March 4, 1997.
56. Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), March 4, 1997; Yonhap News, March 4, 1997.
57. Gongshang shibao (Commercial Times) (Taipei), March 17, 1997; Yonhap News, March 17, 1997.
58. Gongshang shibao (Commercial Times) (Taipei), March 17, 1997; Yonhap News, March 17, 1997.
59. Yonhap News, March 20, 1997.
60. Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), March 29, 1997; Yonhap News, March 29, 1997.
61. Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), March 29, 1997; Yonhap News, March 29, 1997.
62. For example, see Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (East Asian Security Report 1998, November 1998), 31; The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997); Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (CRM-95-214), March 1996; Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, China and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Through 2010 (CRM-95-226), March 1996; William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 5.
63. For example, see Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (East Asian Security Report 1998, November 1998), 31; The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997); Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (CRM-95-214), March 1996; Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, China and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Through 2010 (CRM-95-226), March 1996; William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 5.
64. For example, see Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (East Asian Security Report 1998, November 1998), 31; The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997); Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (CRM-95-214), March 1996; Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, China and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Through 2010 (CRM-95-226), March 1996; William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 5.
65. For example, see Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (East Asian Security Report 1998, November 1998), 31; The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997); Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (CRM-95-214), March 1996; Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, China and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Through 2010 (CRM-95-226), March 1996; William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 5.
66. For example, see Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (East Asian Security Report 1998, November 1998), 31; The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (May 1997); Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, People's War at Sea: Chinese Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (CRM-95-214), March 1996; Center for Naval Analyses, Department of Defense, China and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region Through 2010 (CRM-95-226), March 1996; William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), 5.
67. Craig R. Whitney, "Crisis in the Balkans; NATO Ties with Russia Soured Before Bombing," New York Times, June 19, 1999.
68. Rodong Sinmun, April 29, 1994, 3.
69. Chosun Chungang Yonkam (North Korea's central yearbook) (Pyongyang: Chosun Central News Agency, 1997), 463.
70. For example, David Johnson, deputy spokesperson for the White House, confirmed that the Chinese government played a very important and contributing role in the nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. See Yonhap News, April 16, 1996.
71. AFR, April 16, 1996; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China [hereafter FBIS-CHI]-96-075 (April 17, 1996): 2.
72. AFP, April 16, 1996; FBIS-CHI-96-074 (April 16, 1996): 3.
73. Yonhap News, April 18, 1996.
74. AFP, April 18, 1996; FBIS-CHI-96-076 (April 18, 1996): 3.
75. AFP, April 18, 1996; FBIS-CHI-96-017 (April 19, 1996): 2.
76. Yonhap News, April 20, 1996.
77. Ibid., April 23, 1996.
78. Ibid., November 20, 1996.
79. Rodong Sinmun, November 30, 1996, 6.
80. Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) (Shanghai), August 9, 1997; Yonhap News, August 9, 1997.
81. Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily) (Shanghai), August 9, 1997; Yonhap News, August 9, 1997.
82. Yonhap News, July 2, 1997.
83. Ibid., August 6, 1997.
84. Xinhua, November 24, 1997; Yonhap News, November 24, 1997.
85. Xinhua, November 24, 1997; Yonhap News, November 24, 1997.
86. Xinhua, September 1, 1998; Yonhap News, September 1, 1998.
87. Xinhua, September 1, 1998; Yonhap News, September 1, 1998.
88. Yonhap News, September 16, 1998.
89. AFP, September 22, 1998; Yonhap News, September 23, 1998.
90. AFP, September 22, 1998; Yonhap News, September 23, 1998.
91. Yonhap News, March 2, 1999.
92. Asahi Shimbun (Evening edition) (Tokyo), July 9, 1999, 1.
93. Minchu Chosun (Democratic Korea Daily) (Pyongyang), July 14, 1999, p. 4; Rodong Sinmun, July 16, 1999, 6.
94. Minchu Chosun (Democratic Korea Daily) (Pyongyang), July 14, 1999, p. 4; Rodong Sinmun, July 16, 1999, 6.
95. Ming Pao Daily (Hong Kong), July 28, 1999; Yonhap News, July 28, 1999.
96. Ming Pao Daily (Hong Kong), July 28, 1999; Yonhap News, July 28, 1999.
97. Instead, he asked U.S. decision to exclude North Korea from the list of countries supporting terrorism at his meeting with South Korean media CEOs. See Joongang Ilbo (Central Daily News) (Seoul), August 14, 2000, 14.
98. Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2000, 1.
99. For a detailed scenario of North Korea's path toward Chinese style reform, see Chung-in Moon and Yongho Kim, "The Future of the North Korean System," in The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Samuel S. Kim (New York: Palgrave, forthcoming), chap. 10.
100. Kyung-Ae Park, The Pattern of North Korea's Track-Two Foreign Contacts, North Pacific Policy Papers #5 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 2000).
101. Rodong Sinmun, January 4, 2001, 2.
102. Joshua S. Goldstein and John R. Freeman, Three-Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 33-34.