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Volumn 82, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 634-645

Optimal mix of penalties in a principal-agent model under different institutional arrangements

(1)  Earnhart, Dietrich a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0034358665     PISSN: 00346535     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/003465300558975     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (14)
  • 2
    • 84936433585 scopus 로고
    • Optimal enforcement strategy to prevent oil spills: An application of a principal-agent model with moral hazard
    • Cohen, Mark, "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics 30:1 (1987), 23-51.
    • (1987) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.30 , Issue.1 , pp. 23-51
    • Cohen, M.1
  • 4
    • 0040130821 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Multiple penalty mechanisms in a principal-agent model under different institutional arrangements
    • Earnhart, Dietrich, "Multiple Penalty Mechanisms in a Principal-Agent Model Under Different Institutional Arrangements," Journal of Comparative Economics 21:1 (1999), 168-189.
    • (1999) Journal of Comparative Economics , vol.21 , Issue.1 , pp. 168-189
    • Earnhart, D.1
  • 5
    • 0009568169 scopus 로고
    • The 'second economy' and resource allocation under central planning
    • Ericson, Richard, "The 'Second Economy' and Resource Allocation Under Central Planning," Journal of Comparative Economics 8:1 (1989), 1-24.
    • (1989) Journal of Comparative Economics , vol.8 , Issue.1 , pp. 1-24
    • Ericson, R.1
  • 6
    • 0002717483 scopus 로고
    • The second economy of USSR
    • Grossman, G., "The Second Economy of USSR," Problems of Commu-nism 26:5 (1977), 25-40.
    • (1977) Problems of Commu-nism , vol.26 , Issue.5 , pp. 25-40
    • Grossman, G.1
  • 7
    • 85050840323 scopus 로고
    • The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud
    • Karpoff, Jonathan, and John R. Lott, Jr., "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics 36:2 (1993), 757-802.
    • (1993) Journal of Law and Economics , vol.36 , Issue.2 , pp. 757-802
    • Karpoff, J.1    John R.L., Jr.2
  • 8
    • 0003129060 scopus 로고
    • Legality and market reform in soviet-type economies
    • Litwack, John, "Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:4 (1991), 77-89.
    • (1991) Journal of Economic Perspectives , vol.5 , Issue.4 , pp. 77-89
    • Litwack, J.1
  • 12
    • 0002717838 scopus 로고
    • Risk-sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship
    • Shavell, Steven, "Risk-Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics 10:1 (1979), 55-73.
    • (1979) Bell Journal of Economics , vol.10 , Issue.1 , pp. 55-73
    • Shavell, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.