Computing Equilibria for Congestion Games with (Im)perfect Information

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 15, Issue , 2004, Pages 739-748

  Beier, Rene ^a   Czumaj, Artur ^b   Krysta, Piotr ^c   Vöcking, Berthold ^c  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATICS   (Germany)

^b University Heights   (United States)

^c TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES; RISKS;

CONGESTION GAMES; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 1842435021     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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