Kant, Democracy, and History

Journal of Democracy

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 1996, Pages

  Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842431534     PISSN: 10455736     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/jod.1996.0064     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Kant's views on history and the growth of republicanism are discussed most directly in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent." See also his "Contest of Faculties" and section 3 of "On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice.'" The most relevant sections of all these writings can be found in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In "Idea for a Universal History" Kant states: "The otherwise praiseworthy detail in which each age now composes its history must naturally cause everyone concern as to how our remote descendants will manage to cope with the burden of history which we shall bequeath to them a few centuries from now. No doubt they will value the history of oldest times . . . only from the point of view of what interests them, i.e. the positive and negative achievements of nations and governments in relation to the cosmopolitan goal" (p. 53).
2. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37.
3. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7 (July 1996): 20-37.
4. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House, 1993).
5. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Random House, 1993).
6. See his "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Kant's Political Writings, 100-102. For a discussion of the distinction between formal and liberal democracy, see Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?"
7. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-69; Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1985 and subsequent years).
8. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-69; Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 1985 and subsequent years).
9. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 100-102. Kant does state that it is possible for an autocracy or an aristocracy to approximate "the spirit" of a representative system.
10. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 50.
11. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 174.
12. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 114; Pierre Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 584-85.
13. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 114; Pierre Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 584-85.
14. Kenneth Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," American Political Science Review 56 (June 1962): 335.
15. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Parts 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer and Fall 1983): 205-35, 323-53; and "Liberalism and World Politics."
16. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 130.
17. See David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992): 24-37.
18. It should be emphasized that what is being compared here is growth in relative - not absolute - capabilities. Using the absolute components of the relative-capabilities measure from the Correlates of War Project would not give appreciably different results. Disaggregating the composite measures is similarly inconsequential. Focusing on the two principal components of the capabilities score - iron and steel production and military expenditures - yields just 10 states with higher average increases in iron and steel production under democratic regimes than under nondemocratic regimes, and just 13 states with higher military-expenditure growth under democratic regimes. Including any state with higher average annual growth in either of these two specific areas or in relative capability would yield 13 more states: Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
19. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 52; Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 335; Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 2.
20. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 52; Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 335; Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 2.
21. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," 52; Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," 335; Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 2.
22. Most of this work has focused on economic development as a cause of democratization rather than the other way around. See Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992): 450-99; and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 40. Some attempts have been made to examine directly the effects of democracy on economic growth. See, for example, Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (September 1989): 259-75; and Abbas Pourgerami and Djeto Assane, "Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: New Measurement and Evidence on the Effect of Political Freedom," Applied Economics 24 (January 1992); 129-36.
23. Most of this work has focused on economic development as a cause of democratization rather than the other way around. See Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992): 450-99; and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 40. Some attempts have been made to examine directly the effects of democracy on economic growth. See, for example, Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (September 1989): 259-75; and Abbas Pourgerami and Djeto Assane, "Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: New Measurement and Evidence on the Effect of Political Freedom," Applied Economics 24 (January 1992); 129-36.
24. Most of this work has focused on economic development as a cause of democratization rather than the other way around. See Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992): 450-99; and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 40. Some attempts have been made to examine directly the effects of democracy on economic growth. See, for example, Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (September 1989): 259-75; and Abbas Pourgerami and Djeto Assane, "Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: New Measurement and Evidence on the Effect of Political Freedom," Applied Economics 24 (January 1992); 129-36.
25. Most of this work has focused on economic development as a cause of democratization rather than the other way around. See Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist 35 (March-June 1992): 450-99; and Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy 7 (January 1996): 40. Some attempts have been made to examine directly the effects of democracy on economic growth. See, for example, Kevin Grier and Gordon Tullock, "An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth," Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (September 1989): 259-75; and Abbas Pourgerami and Djeto Assane, "Macroeconomic Determinants of Growth: New Measurement and Evidence on the Effect of Political Freedom," Applied Economics 24 (January 1992); 129-36.
26. Hassner, "Immanuel Kant," 575.
27. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have recently added to the problems of the consequentialist moral argument with their argument that the process of democratization creates instabilities that further increase the probability of war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38.
28. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 123-24. The concept of the "lawful state" can be found in Kant's essay "On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in Kant's Political Writings, 73-87.
29. Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," in Kant's Political Writings, 180.
30. George Shultz, "Meeting America's Foreign Policy Challenges," Current Policy (U.S. Department of State), 20 February 1987.
31. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 108-9.