When and why not to auction

Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 583-596

  Campbell, Colin M ^a   Levin, Dan ^b  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Auctions; Interdependencies; Posted prices

Indexed keywords

EID: 18244407746     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0558-5     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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4. Campbell, C.M., Levin, D.: Selling to buyers with interdependent valuations. Working paper (2003)
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7. Maskin, E.: Auctions and privatization. In: Siebert, H. (ed.) Privatization. Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universität Kiel, pp. 115-136 (1992)
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10. Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research. 6, 58-73 (1981)
11. Wang, R.: Auctions versus posted-price selling. American Economic Review 83, 838-851 (1993)