Common value auctions with independent types

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 283-309

  Branco, Fernando ^a,b,c  

^a CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PORTUGAL   (Portugal)

^b BANCO DE PORTUGAL   (Portugal)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Common values; Rent extraction; Standard auctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011797273     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/bf02499137     Document Type: Article

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