Policy makers' preferences, party ideology, and the political business cycle

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 752-767

  Krause, Stefan ^a   Méndez, Fabio ^b  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 18144424815     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20062078     Document Type: Article

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