Natural-resource exploitation with costly enforcement of property rights

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 497-521

  Hotte, Louis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; LAW ENFORCEMENT; PROPERTY RIGHTS; RESOURCE USE; WAGE;

EID: 17744385290     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpi020     Document Type: Article

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