Tropic trust versus nordic trust: Experimental evidence from Tanzania and Sweden

Economic Journal

Volumn 115, Issue 503, 2005, Pages 505-532

  Holm, Håkan J ^a   Danielson, Anders ^a  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

AFRICA; EAST AFRICA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; NORTHERN EUROPE; SCANDINAVIA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; SWEDEN; TANZANIA; WORLD;

EID: 17744381954     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00998.x     Document Type: Article

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