The value information of financing decisions and corporate governance during and after the Japanese deregulation

Journal of Business

Volumn 78, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 243-280

  Wu, Xueping ^a   Xu, Lily Li ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b FUDAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17644366866     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/426525     Document Type: Article

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