Coalition governments versus minority governments: Bargaining power, cohesion and budgeting outcomes

Public Choice

Volumn 121, Issue 1-2, 2004, Pages 1-24

  Pech, Gerald ^a  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND   (Ireland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17544376150     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-004-4326-7     Document Type: Article

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