Transatlantic bipolarity and the end of multilateralism

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 120, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-32

  Van Oudenaren, John ^a,b  

^a LIBRARY OF CONGRESS   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17544368200     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/j.1538-165X.2005.tb00536.x     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. See Bush's Whitehall Palace speech in London, 19 November 2003; "Effective Multilateralism to Build a Better World: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair," 20 November 2003; and European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003.
2. See Bush's Whitehall Palace speech in London, 19 November 2003; "Effective Multilateralism to Build a Better World: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair," 20 November 2003; and European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003.
3. See Bush's Whitehall Palace speech in London, 19 November 2003; "Effective Multilateralism to Build a Better World: Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair," 20 November 2003; and European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003.
4. See Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 9, 10, 117-161.
5. See, for example, Chris Patten's speech at Oxford, 13 February 2004; for a typical defense of partnership, see William Wallace, "Europe, the Necessary Partner," Foreign Affairs 80 (May-June 2001): 16-34.
6. For a general discussion of postwar multilateralism, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution" in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press. 1993), 3-48.
7. For universalism, see Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction of Multilateral Trade (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), 6, 7, 12.
8. William Diebold, The Schuman Plan (New York: Praeger, 1959), 523-532.
9. On this point, see John Gillingham, European Integration 1950-2003 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press), 49-52; 492-493. Formally, the United States was neutral on intra-OEEC deliberations, but it clearly leaned away from the British proposal. See Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 254.
10. On this point, see John Gillingham, European Integration 1950-2003 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press), 49-52; 492-493. Formally, the United States was neutral on intra-OEEC deliberations, but it clearly leaned away from the British proposal. See Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 254.
11. For an overall analysis of "organized discrimination" in transatlantic trade, see Otto Hieronymi, Economic Discrimination against the United States in Western Europe (1945-1958): Dollar Shortage and the Rise of Regionalism (Geneva: Droz. 1973).
12. Quoted in Youri Devuyst, "European Unity in Transatlantic Commercial Diplomacy" in Eric Philippart and Pascaline Winand, eds., Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 290.
13. Isaiah Frank, The European Common Market (New York: Praeger, 1961), 162.
14. Herman Walker, "Dispute Settlement: The Chicken War," American Journal of International Law 58 (July 1964): 671-685.
15. See the excellent analysis by Ronald A. Brand, "Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European Union," Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 17 (Winter/Spring 1996/97): 556-608. For an interesting recent development, see the May 2003 opinion of Advocate General Siegbert Alber, Biret International SA and Etablissements Biret et Cie. SA v. Council of the European Union, Cases C-93/02 and C-94/02, 15 May 2003, recognizing a claim for private party damages arising from the EU's failure to comply with a WTO judgement in the beef hormone case.
16. See the excellent analysis by Ronald A. Brand, "Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United States and the European Union," Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 17 (Winter/Spring 1996/97): 556-608. For an interesting recent development, see the May 2003 opinion of Advocate General Siegbert Alber, Biret International SA and Etablissements Biret et Cie. SA v. Council of the European Union, Cases C-93/02 and C-94/02, 15 May 2003, recognizing a claim for private party damages arising from the EU's failure to comply with a WTO judgement in the beef hormone case.
17. Commission v. Belgium, C-170/98, ruling that Belgium's failure to denounce a bilateral maritime agreement with Zaire was a breach of Council Regulation 4055/86 relating to establishment of the single market in maritime services. See also Commission v. Portugal. C-62/98, and Commission v. Portugal, C-84/98, concerning Portugal's failure to denounce similar agreements with Yugoslavia and Angola. See also Pietro Manzini, "The Priority of Pre-Existing Treaties of EC Member States within the Framework of International Law," European Journal of International Law 12 (2001): 781-792.
18. Commission v. Belgium, C-170/98, ruling that Belgium's failure to denounce a bilateral maritime agreement with Zaire was a breach of Council Regulation 4055/86 relating to establishment of the single market in maritime services. See also Commission v. Portugal. C-62/98, and Commission v. Portugal, C-84/98, concerning Portugal's failure to denounce similar agreements with Yugoslavia and Angola. See also Pietro Manzini, "The Priority of Pre-Existing Treaties of EC Member States within the Framework of International Law," European Journal of International Law 12 (2001): 781-792.
19. Commission v. Belgium, C-170/98, ruling that Belgium's failure to denounce a bilateral maritime agreement with Zaire was a breach of Council Regulation 4055/86 relating to establishment of the single market in maritime services. See also Commission v. Portugal. C-62/98, and Commission v. Portugal, C-84/98, concerning Portugal's failure to denounce similar agreements with Yugoslavia and Angola. See also Pietro Manzini, "The Priority of Pre-Existing Treaties of EC Member States within the Framework of International Law," European Journal of International Law 12 (2001): 781-792.
20. The Commission's role in wrecking the 1995 OECD multilateral investment negotiations, ostensibly in the name of increased representation for the developing world, but, in fact, because it much preferred to address this issue in the WTO, is the best example of this attitude at work.
21. For the WEU's role in the 1990s as a bridge between NATO and the EU, see Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996): 1-39.
22. For an insider account of how these institutions functioned, see Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World's Money and the Threat to American Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992), 18-47.
23. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics 16 (April 1964): 393. "The pluralistic model asserts that the amplifying feedback tendency is strengthened, and the negative feedback tendency is weakened, to the extent that conflict positions are superimposed or reinforcing. Thus, if all clashes and incompatibilities in the system produce the same divisions and coalitions - if all members in class Blue line up with one another and against all or most of those in class Red - the line of cleavage will be wide and deep, with positive feedback operating both within and between the two classes or clusters."
24. For the sharp disagreements in the Nixon administration between the State Department and the National Security Council, on the one hand, and the economic agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Treasury), on the other, about the discriminatory aspects of the first enlargement and implications for U.S. interests, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), 425-429. In the Reagan administration, Alexander Haig resigned from the State Department in reaction to the Pentagon-inspired pipeline embargo of the early 1980s, reflecting the long-standing tendency, underpinned by internal bureaucratic arrangements that mirrored the external compartmentalization of U.S.-European relations, to separate economic from security issues.
25. th-Century International System: Changes in Structure," World Politics 39 (October 1986): 17-25.
26. See Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture," International Affairs 77 (July 2001): 587-604 for a discussion; the quotation is from the 19-20 June 2000 Santa Maria da Feira European Council Presidency Conclusions, 590.
27. See European Commission, Green Paper on European Space Policy, 2003; and Stefano Silvestri. Rapporteur, Space and Security Policy in Europe, EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 48 (December 2003). On the European Armaments and Research Capabilities Agency, see draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Articles 1-40(3) and III-212.
28. See European Commission, Green Paper on European Space Policy, 2003; and Stefano Silvestri. Rapporteur, Space and Security Policy in Europe, EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 48 (December 2003). On the European Armaments and Research Capabilities Agency, see draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Articles 1-40(3) and III-212.
29. For the role of Hungary in the Cairns group and of Sweden, Finland, and Austria in the Australian-led De La Paix group, see Hugo Paemen and Alexandra Bensch, From the GATT to the WTO: The European Community in the Uruguay Round (Leuven: University of Leuven Press, 1995), 98-100.
30. For an early (but positive) recognition of bipolarity. see Andrew Moravcsik, "The World is Bipolar After All," Newsweek International. 5 May 2003, 26.
31. For the EU and the United States as "hyperactive" users of the dispute settlement mechanism, see Patrick A. Messerlin, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), 239-242.
32. The appeal appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Liberation on 31 May 2003: for a full English text, see J. Habermas and J. Derrida. "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe." Constellations 10 (September 2003): 291-297.
33. The appeal appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Liberation on 31 May 2003: for a full English text, see J. Habermas and J. Derrida. "February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe." Constellations 10 (September 2003): 291-297.
34. For European influence on U.S. policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), esp. 194-226.
35. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters. See the various contributions, especially those of Ruggie, Anne-Marie Burley. and Peter F. Cowhey, 3-48, 125-156, 157-200.
36. G. John Ikenberry. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), esp. 29-49 on constitutional order.
37. Separation of powers, the dispersion of responsibilities among different levels of government, and the ready access of special interests to power would come to mind.
38. For a self-critical European view, see European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper. COM (2001) 428, 25 July 2001: and White Paper on Governance, Working Group No. 5, Strengthening Europe's Contribution to World Governance, R. Madelin, Pilot. Brussels, May 2001.
39. For a self-critical European view, see European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper. COM (2001) 428, 25 July 2001: and White Paper on Governance, Working Group No. 5, Strengthening Europe's Contribution to World Governance, R. Madelin, Pilot. Brussels, May 2001.
40. Giandomenico Majone, "The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation," Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (June 2000): 273-302.
41. See the controversies within ICAO over aircraft noise, in "Admissibility of U.S.-EU 'Hushkits' Dispute Before ICAO," American Journal of International Law 95 (April 2001 ): 410-412; for spillover regarding the "precautionary principle" from the WTO to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see Robert Paarlberg, "The Global Food Fight," Foreign Affairs 79 (May-June 2000): 24-38. Also noteworthy is the creeping politicization of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the UN body that helps to set world food safety standards.
42. See the controversies within ICAO over aircraft noise, in "Admissibility of U.S.-EU 'Hushkits' Dispute Before ICAO," American Journal of International Law 95 (April 2001 ): 410-412; for spillover regarding the "precautionary principle" from the WTO to the Convention on Biological Diversity, see Robert Paarlberg, "The Global Food Fight," Foreign Affairs 79 (May-June 2000): 24-38. Also noteworthy is the creeping politicization of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the UN body that helps to set world food safety standards.
43. For example, Canada became a de facto member of the European Space Agency at a time when opportunities for cooperation with NASA were limited.
44. For a more detailed discussion, see John Van Oudenaren, "The Missing Atlantic Dimension" in Graham Walker, ed., Independence in an Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and Multilateralism (Halifax: Dalhousie University Press, 2004), 90-98.
45. The author is grateful for this point to Professor John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton.
46. For the IMF, see Leo Van Houten, Governance of the IMF: Decision Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency, and Accountability, IMF Pamphlet No. 53 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2002).
47. For this position, see Fraser Cameron, "After Iraq: The EU and Global Governance," Global Governance 10 (2002): 157-163.
48. Jan Martin Witte, A "Single European Voice" in International Standardization? American Perceptions, European Realities. American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Working Paper Series, No. 2 (Washington. DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2004.)
49. The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying these arguments.
50. For reification in international politics, see Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of International Politics," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992): 410.
51. David W. Leebron, "Linkages," American Journal of International Law 96 (January 2002): 17.
52. James H. Mathis, "The Community's External Regional Policy in the WTO" in Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber, eds., The External Economic Dimension of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 129. For an analysis of EU trade preference policies, see Messerlin, Measuring the Costs, 197-248.
53. James H. Mathis, "The Community's External Regional Policy in the WTO" in Pitou van Dijck and Gerrit Faber, eds., The External Economic Dimension of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 129. For an analysis of EU trade preference policies, see Messerlin, Measuring the Costs, 197-248.
54. Christopher Stevens, "EU Policy for the Banana Market: The External Impact of Internal Policies" in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 325-351.
55. G. Porter Elliott, "Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of United States and European Union Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector," George Washington University Journal of International Law and Economics 31 (1997-1998): 215-222.
56. Julie M. Grimes, "Conflicts between EC Law and International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German Telecommunications Dispute," Harvard International Law Journal 35 (1994): 535-564.
57. Martin Banks and Peter Chapman, "Prodi Tells Bush: 'Stay Out of EU Affairs,'" European Voice, 19 December 2002, 1.
58. Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh T. Patrick, eds., Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 113.
59. Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003): 365-388.
60. For a more detailed analysis of recent trends, see John Van Oudenaren, "What Is 'Multilateral'?" Policy Review 117 (February-March 2003): 33-41; John Van Oudenaren, "Unipolar versus Unilateral," Policy Review 124 (April-May 2004): 63-74.
61. For a more detailed analysis of recent trends, see John Van Oudenaren, "What Is 'Multilateral'?" Policy Review 117 (February-March 2003): 33-41; John Van Oudenaren, "Unipolar versus Unilateral," Policy Review 124 (April-May 2004): 63-74.
62. For background, see Kenneth R. Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Mines," World Politics 53 (October 2000): 74-114; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998): 613-644; and David J. Scheffer, "The United States and the International Criminal Court," American Journal of International Law 93 (January 1999): 12-22.
63. For background, see Kenneth R. Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Mines," World Politics 53 (October 2000): 74-114; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998): 613-644; and David J. Scheffer, "The United States and the International Criminal Court," American Journal of International Law 93 (January 1999): 12-22.
64. For background, see Kenneth R. Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Mines," World Politics 53 (October 2000): 74-114; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52 (Summer 1998): 613-644; and David J. Scheffer, "The United States and the International Criminal Court," American Journal of International Law 93 (January 1999): 12-22.
65. The effects of the treaty on NATO can be seen in the various bilateral arrangements that followed its entry into force. The United States stores land mines on the territory of four NATO member states that are parties to the Ottawa treaty: Germany, Norway, the UK (on Diego Garcia), and Greece. Germany and the UK assert that these mine stockpiles are not under their jurisdiction or control. Norway, in contrast, concluded a bilateral agreement with the United States requiring that all U.S. mines be removed from Norwegian territory by 1 March 2003 in order to bring Norway into compliance with the treaty. France, Denmark, and Spain have declared that the transit of mines through their territory is prohibited by the treaty; Canada, Norway, and Germany indicate that the same treaty permits transport; other states are silent on the issue. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2001 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), 1-14 for various implementation issues.
66. On aviation, see Commission v. United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Cases C-466/98-476-98 (consolidated), Judgment of 5 November 2002; on oil stocks, Daniel Dombey and Kevin Morrison, "European Commission Assesses Threat to Oil Supplies," Financial Times, 27 May 2004. On Galileo, see Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini, The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications, EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 44 (April 2003). The Galileo issue was resolved at the June 2004 U.S.-EU summit.
67. On aviation, see Commission v. United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Cases C-466/98-476-98 (consolidated), Judgment of 5 November 2002; on oil stocks, Daniel Dombey and Kevin Morrison, "European Commission Assesses Threat to Oil Supplies," Financial Times, 27 May 2004. On Galileo, see Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini, The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications, EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 44 (April 2003). The Galileo issue was resolved at the June 2004 U.S.-EU summit.
68. On aviation, see Commission v. United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Cases C-466/98-476-98 (consolidated), Judgment of 5 November 2002; on oil stocks, Daniel Dombey and Kevin Morrison, "European Commission Assesses Threat to Oil Supplies," Financial Times, 27 May 2004. On Galileo, see Gustav Lindström with Giovanni Gasparini, The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications, EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper, No. 44 (April 2003). The Galileo issue was resolved at the June 2004 U.S.-EU summit.
69. See Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (New York: Oxford, 1995).
70. Jon Birger Skjærseth, "The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle?" Journal of Common Market Studies 32 (March 1994), 25-45.
71. See Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), esp. the summation of his argument on 446-447.
72. See William J. Diebold, "The History and the Issues" in William J. Diebold, ed., Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 1-36.
73. Marc Trachtenberg leans toward the Kennedy administration as a key turning point. See his A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); for a fascinating argument pointing to the failure of the December 1971 Azores summit of Pompidou and Nixon as a turning point, see Georges-Henri Soutou, "Georges Pompidou and U.S.-European Relations" in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 157-200.
74. Marc Trachtenberg leans toward the Kennedy administration as a key turning point. See his A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); for a fascinating argument pointing to the failure of the December 1971 Azores summit of Pompidou and Nixon as a turning point, see Georges-Henri Soutou, "Georges Pompidou and U.S.-European Relations" in Marc Trachtenberg, ed., Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 157-200.
75. Wendt, "Anarchy," 403-407; Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 77.
76. Wendt, "Anarchy," 403-407; Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 77.
77. Jean-Marie Guehenno, "Multipolarity and Multilateralism" in CERI/India International Centre, India and France in a Multipolar World (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 31.
78. Stephan de Spiegeliere notes that the EU applies this term with regard to the Mediterranean region, Russia, Latin America, Mercosur, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Turkey, India, and the Western Balkans. The one country for which the term is not used is the United States. Stephan de Spiegeliere, "The Implementation of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia" in Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev, eds., The EU Common Strategy and Russia: Learning the Grammar of CFSP (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 111.
79. See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," Foreign Affairs 82 (July/August 2003): 74-89; see also Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Random House, 2004).
80. See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," Foreign Affairs 82 (July/August 2003): 74-89; see also Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New York: Random House, 2004).
81. For an analysis of shifting concepts of national identity that might complicate the pursuit of such an outcome from the American side, see Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
82. This is especially the case with the countries of central and eastern Europe, which are losing many of the publicly and privately funded exchanges with the United States that followed the collapse of Communism, even as they are fully integrated into such EU-sponsored programs as TEMPUS and Erasmus.
83. It is perhaps telling that a recent Democratic manifesto calling for a U.S. strategy of revitalizing alliances and international institutions-including "refocus[ing] NATO on the challenge of transforming the greater Middle East" - does not contain a single reference to the EU. See Progressive Internationalism: A Democratic National Security Strategy, 30 October 2003, accessed at http://www.ppionline.org/specials/security_strategy, 22 December 2004.
84. It is worth noting that in the 1940s, Dean Acheson explicitly rejected a dumbbell structure for NATO. See Peter F. Cowhey, "Elect Locally-Order Globally: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation" in Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters, 163.