Probabilistic graphs and power indices: An application to the Spanish parliament

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 477-501

  Calvo, Emilio ^a   Lasaga, J Javier ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY UPV EHU   (Spain)

Author keywords

Graph; Power index; Stability; Voting game

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031287334     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009004003     Document Type: Article

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