On the limits to speculation in centralized versus decentralized market regimes

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 378-408

  Zurita, Felipe ^a  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Centralized markets; Speculation

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242710628     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2003.10.002     Document Type: Article

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