The Jeffords switch and public support for divided government

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 343-356

  Nicholson, Stephen P ^a  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 16644385304     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000189     Document Type: Article

References (99)

1. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
2. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
3. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
4. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
5. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
6. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
7. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
8. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
9. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
10. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
11. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
12. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
13. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
14. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
15. For background studies, see Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting', American Politics Quarterly, 21 (1993), 410-38; Richard Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994), 95-115; Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 533-44, and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Morris Fiorina, Divided Government, 2nd edn (Needham Heights, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); Paul Frymer, Thomas Paul Kim and Terri S. Bimes, 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22 (1997), 195-216; James C. Garand and Marci Glascock Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States: Testing an Intentional Model of Split-Ticket Voting', British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 173-91 ; Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Michael P. McDonald and Thomas L. Brunell, 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President: The Comparative Midpoints Model', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 34-50; Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990); Dean Lacy, 'Back from Intermission: The 1994 Elections and the Return to Divided Government', in Herbert F. Weisberg and Samuel C. Patterson, eds, Great Theatre: The American Congress in the 1990s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Dean Lacy and Philip Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', American Journal of Political Science, 421 (1998), 180-99; Walter R. Mebane Jr, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections', American Political Science Review, 94 (2000), 37-58; Bruce I. Oppenheimer, 'Split Party Control of Congress, 1981-86: Exploring Electoral and Apportionment Explanations', American Journal of Political Science, 33 (1989), 653-69; Charles E. Smith, Robert D. Brown, John M. Bruce and L. Marvin Overby, 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election', American Journal of Political Science, 43(1999), 737-64.
16. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
17. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
18. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
19. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
20. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
21. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
22. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Robert S. Erikson, 'The Puzzle of Midterm Loss', Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 1011-29; Fiorina, Divided Government; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Everett C. Ladd, 'Public Opinion and the "Congress Problem" ', The Public Interest, 100 (Summer), 57-67; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
23. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
24. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
25. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
26. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
27. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
28. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
29. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
30. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
31. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Paul Allen Beck, Lawrence Baum, Aage R. Clausen and Charles E. Smith Jr, 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 916-28; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al.,'A. New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; John R. Petrocik, 'Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?', in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds, The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik and Joseph Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government: Paved without Intention' in Peter F. Galderisi, ed., Divided Government: Change, Uncertainty, and the Constitutional Order (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
32. Petrocik and Doherty, "The Road to Divided Government'.
33. Lee Sigelman, Paul J. Wahlbeck and Emmett H. Buell Jr, 'Vote Choice and the Preference for Divided Government: Lessons of 1992', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 879-94.
34. Fiorina, Divided Government.
35. For more information, see Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
36. Fiorina, Divided Government.
37. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy.
38. Fiorina, Divided Government, p.81.
39. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
40. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
41. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
42. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
43. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
44. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
45. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
46. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
47. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Frymer et al., 'Party Elites, Ideological Voters, and Divided Party Government' ; Grofman et al., 'A New Look at Split Ticket Outcomes for House and President' ; Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government' ; Gary M. Segura and Stephen P. Nicholson, 'Sequential Choices and Partisan Transitions in U.S. Senate Delegations', Journal of Politics, 57 (1995), 86-100; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
48. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 239-258; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections' ; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
49. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45
50. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 239-258; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections' ; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
51. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 239-258; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections' ; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
52. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 239-258; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections' ; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
53. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Fiorina, Divided Government; Dean Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 239-258; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Mebane, 'Coordination, Moderation, and Institutional Balancing in American Presidential and House Elections' ; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
54. Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses'; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
55. Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses'; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
56. Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses'; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
57. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
58. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
59. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
60. Alvarez and Shousen, 'Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations?' ; Born, 'Split-Ticket Voters, Divided Government, and Fiorina's Policy-Balancing Model'; Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting'; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
61. Bruce Cain, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
62. Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Garand and Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States' ; Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 293-312; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
63. Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Garand and Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States' ; Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 293-312; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
64. Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Garand and Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States' ; Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 293-312; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
65. Beck et al., 'Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting'; Garand and Lichtl, 'Explaining Divided Government in the United States' ; Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting', American Political Science Review, 51 (1957), 293-312; Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government'.
66. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960).
67. For presidential, see Petrocik, 'Divided Government', for congressional, see Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government'.
68. For presidential, see Petrocik, 'Divided Government', for congressional, see Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government'.
69. I would have liked to test Jacobson's thesis, but neither poll contained appropriate items.
70. For presidential, see Petrocik, 'Divided Government', for congressional, see Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government'.
71. For presidential, see Petrocik, 'Divided Government', for congressional, see Petrocik and Doherty, 'The Road to Divided Government'.
72. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
73. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
74. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
75. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
76. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
77. CBS News, 2002; CBS News Monthly Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor] and CBS News, 2002. CBS News Vermont State Poll, August 2001 [Computer File]. ICPSR version. New York, NY: CBS News [producer], 2001. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor].
78. The question also does not inform respondents about party control of the House of Representatives. Yet, this should not be a problem because policy-balancing takes place across branches, not within (e.g., House and Senate). Ideologically moderate balancers who thought the Democrats controlled the House would still prefer the Senate be in the hands of the opposite party of the president. Thus, because these models feature a president of one party balanced against a Congress controlled by the other party, not knowing a respondent's knowledge of control of the House should not stack the deck against intentionalist approaches. Furthermore, this should not be troublesome for testing unintentional explanations since they do not depend on this distinction. Partisans, for instance, will always want their party in control, regardless of who is currently in control.
79. Fiorina, Divided Government, p. 64.
80. Nor should it matter if control switched from divided to unified - cognitive Madisonians would disapprove just as they would approve party control going from unified to divided. Similarly, unintentional explanations should not be at a comparative advantage or disadvantage. If Al Gore had won the 2000 presidential election with a Democratic Congress, Republican citizens would surely have approved a Democratic Senator such as Zell Miller of Georgia switching sides and creating divided government. Furthermore, given Miller's popularity in Georgia, many of his constituents would likely have approved (in much the same way as Jeffords' constituents approved). In short, although more cases with different politicians and circumstances would be helpful, the specifics of the Jeffords case should not help or hinder any of the competing explanations for citizens' opinions of divided government.
81. Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers', p. 1196.
82. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Erikson, The Puzzle of Midterm Loss'.
83. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy; Erikson, The Puzzle of Midterm Loss'.
84. Alesina and Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy.
85. Sigelman et al., 'Vote Choice and Preference for Divided Government', p. 891.
86. Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'.
87. Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers, p. 1196.
88. Lacy, 'Back from Intermission' ; Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses' ; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
89. Lacy, 'Back from Intermission' ; Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses' ; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
90. Lacy, 'Back from Intermission' ; Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses' ; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
91. Lacy, 'Back from Intermission' ; Lacy, 'A Theory of Nonseparable Preferences in Survey Responses' ; Lacy and Paolino, 'Downsian Voting and the Separation of Powers'; Smith et al., 'Party Balancing and Voting for Congress in the 1996 National Election'.
92. All analyses are weighted using CBS News' 'final' weight.
93. z = 0.569 (p - 0.5693) comparing moderates who see a difference between the parties to all citizens and z = - 0.821 (p = 0.4116) when comparing moderates who see a difference between the parties to moderates who see no difference between the parties.
94. It is likely that approval of Jeffords' job as senator is an endogenous variable. In other words, not only does approval of Jeffords' job as senator affect approval of his party switch but also the reverse should be true. Unfortunately, the limitations of the data preclude a two-stage estimation of this potential endogeneity. Although the CBS News poll includes additional items concerning opinions of Jeffords (e.g., vote to re-elect) that might serve as instrumental variables, these variables correlate highly with both the endogenous regresser and the dependent variable, approval of the party switch. Accordingly, using these instruments would produce estimates that are biased. Given that any potential instruments in the data are themselves endogenous to the dependent variable and thus the error term, it appears unwise to proceed with an instrumental variables approach. For a discussion of this point, see Larry M. Bartels, 'Instrumental and "Quasi-Instrumental" Variables', American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 777-800. Despite this limitation of the data, it seems unlikely that the effect of approval of the Jeffords switch on approval of Jeffords' job as senator is a more powerful cause than feelings about Jeffords' job as senator on opinions of Jeffords' party switch. The general orientation towards Jeffords, approval of his job performance, is likely to affect opinions of an action, his party switch, since the former is a general disposition and the latter is a specific action. Furthermore, in the context of the survey, the question on approval of Senator Jeffords job as senator was asked third following standard questions about presidential and congressional approval, respectively. The question about approval of Jeffords' party switch, the dependent variable, was Question 7. Thus, there were no cues in the survey about Jeffords' party switch to affect opinion of his job as senator. Coupled with the fact that the poll was conducted more than three months after Jeffords' party switch and media attention had shifted elsewhere, it is unlikely that respondents were thinking about it at the beginning of the survey when asked about his job approval.
95. To evaluate the robustness of this finding, I dropped the variable Independent from the model to evaluate whether its presence affected the results for Moderate. This variable still did not obtain statistical significance nor did its sign change.
96. To evaluate the robustness of this finding, I also ran this model excluding Independents. The coefficients for Party Difference and the interaction term remain insignificant. However, Moderate obtains statistical significance (p < 0.05) but its sign remains negative, contrary to the expectations of the policy-balancing model.
97. Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
98. Burden and Kimball, 'A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting' and Why Americans Split Their Tickets; Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government.
99. Walter De Vries and Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1972).