A model of foreign policy substitutability: Selecting the right tools for the job(s)

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 11-32

  Morgan, T Clifton ^a   Palmer, Glenn ^b  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22844455014     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044001002     Document Type: Article

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