On the political economy of environmental policy

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 369-396

  Kirchgässner, Gebhard ^a   Schneider, Friedrich ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

^b JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1642500082     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1024289627887     Document Type: Conference Paper

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