Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-strait relations

China Journal

Volumn , Issue 53, 2005, Pages 35-60

  Wu, Yu Shan ^a,b  

^a INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE   (Taiwan)

^b NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS; NATIONAL POLITICS;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; FAR EAST; TAIWAN; WORLD;

EID: 16344381143     PISSN: 13249347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/20065991     Document Type: Article

References (60)

1. The fact that Chiang Ching-kuo announced his intention to lift Taiwan's martial law and the ban on forming new political parties when he was interviewed by Katharine Graham, the owner of The Washington Post, on 7 October 1986, suggests that Taiwan's democratization was aimed at the American audience, and not mainly for domestic consumption. See "Taipei Mayor Mourns Katharine Graham", Taiwan Headlines, 19 July 2001, at www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw.
2. It is interesting to note that these three elements of the triad fall squarely into the research agenda of political institution study, political psychology and political economy. For theoretical approaches designed to analyze cross-Strait relations from these three and other perspectives, see Bao Tzong-Ho and Wu Yu-Shan (eds), Zhengbian zhong de liang'an guanxi lilun (Contending Theories in the Study of Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1999).
3. Alan Wachman, Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994);
4. and Wen-chun Chen, "National Identity and Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: A Study of the Problem of Democratization in a Divided Country", Issues & Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 1-44.
5. Nai-teh Wu, "Convergence or Polarization? Ethnic Political Support in the Post-Liberalization State", in Chen Chung-min et al. (eds), Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), pp. 151-68.
6. Mau-kuei Chang, "Toward an Understanding of the Sheng-chi Wen-ti in Taiwan: Focusing on Changes after Political Liberalization", ibid., pp. 95-150.
7. One only has to take a look at the other "third-wave democracies" with ethnic cleavages, such as Russia, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Here and elsewhere, ethnic tensions were tapped by political forces in their competition for supremacy in national politics.
8. Szu-yin Ho and I-chou Liu, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990's", in Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang (eds), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era (Lanham: University Press of America, 2003), pp. 149-83.
9. G. Andy Chang and T. Y. Wang, "Taiwanese or Chinese? Independence or Unification? An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan", paper presented at the Conference on the 2002 Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, TEDS Committee, Taipei, November 2003.
10. Chia-lung Lin, "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism", in Stéphane Corcuff (ed.), Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 219-41.
11. Alan Wachman, "Competing Identities in Taiwan", in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 17-80.
12. Taiwan's overall trade with the mainland also surged, from 2 per cent of Taiwan's total trade in 1987 to 11 per cent in 1999.
13. Tse-Kang Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder: Westview, 1996).
14. Tourist visits are excluded from the "mainland experience" as defined here. The surveys were conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University between April 1995 and December 2003. The percentage of respondents with mainland experience rose from 20.9 per cent in 1995 to 32.3 per cent in 2003.
15. Yung Wei, "From 'Multi-System Nations' to 'Linkage Communities': A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations", Issues and Studies, Vol. 33, No. 10 (October 1997), pp. 1-19.
16. Chang Yachung, Liang'an tonghe lun (On Integration across the Taiwan Strait) (Taipei: Sheng Chih, 2000);
17. Chang Yachung, Quanqiuhua yu liang'an tonghe (Globalization and Integration across the Taiwan Strait) (Taipei: Linking, 2003);
18. Wu Hsin-hsing, Zhenghe lilun yu liang'an guanxi zhi yanjiu (A Study on Integration Theory and Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Wu-nan, 1995);
19. and Kao Lang, "Cong zhenghe lilun tansuo liang'an zhenghe de tiaojian yu kunjing" (On the Conditions and Dilemmas of Cross-Strait Integration from the Perspective of Integration Theory), in Bao Tzong-Ho and Wu Yu-Shan (eds), Zhengbian zhong de liang'an guanxi lilun, pp. 41-75.
20. For similar concepts and relevant arguments, see John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Chiefs, Staffs, Indians, and Others: How was Taiwan's mainland China Policy Made?" in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang and Samuel S. G. Wu (eds), Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 137-52;
21. and John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Taiwan's Mainland China Policy under Lee Teng-hui", in Wei-chin Lee and T. Y. Wang (eds), Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era, pp. 185-99.
22. Those who identify themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese have a strong tendency to favor the middle ground in the unification-independence spectrum.
23. The Lin-Hau ticket garnered 14.5 per cent of the popular vote, compared to the 54 per cent of Lee and Lien Chan. Both Lin and Hau lost their posts as KMT vice-chairs for breaking party discipline by running on a separate ticket.
24. The fringe Taiwan Independence Party, a staunchly pro-independence party, did not move away from its origin position, as can be seen from Figure 3.
25. Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations-Mainland Policy in Flux", Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 565-87.
26. Lien's "ten articles" called for a return to the Guideline for National Unification that had been cast aside in the last years of Lee's reign. Taipei would be willing to establish the three links and enter into official political dialogue geared towards unification with Beijing as long as the mainland showed good will, notwithstanding the conditions set in the Guideline ("peaceful solution of conflict" and "mutual respect in the international arena").
27. On 3 July 1999, Soong was interviewed by The Washington Post and expressed his support of the "three links" and political dialogue with China, and his opposition to Taiwan's "money diplomacy" and its bid to join the United Nations. Furthermore, he questioned the necessity and desirability of deploying the Theatre Missile Defense. Soong's remarks soon led to charges by Lien and Chen that the former governor of Taiwan was betraying the interests of Taiwan's people.
28. Prior to the passing of that resolution, the DPP's ostensible goal was to replace the Republic of China with an independent Republic of Taiwan, as stipulated in the party constitution. The change of tone in the Resolution was justified by claiming that Taiwan is already independent, and thus there is no need to declare independence a second time.
29. It is interesting to note that, even though the national identity of Taiwan's population has undergone sea changes, explicit attitudes on unification vs independence have not experienced a corresponding shift. The absolute majority still favor maintaining the status quo. The huge discrepancy between the large number of self-proclaimed "exclusively Taiwanese" and the much smaller number of those who are for independence is largely caused by the uncertainties associated with independence. Although the identity shift is not fully reflected in popular preferences on unification/independence, it nevertheless creates a reservoir of frustration that pro-independence politicians can always tap. See "Dalu zhengce yu liang'an guanxi: di si bo; di wu bo" (Mainland Policy and Cross-Strait Relations: Fourth Survey; Fifth Survey), Mainland Affairs Council Research Project, 1999, 2000;
30. Chen Yih-yan and Chen Lu-huei, "Moleng liangke de taidu haishi buqueding de weilai: Taiwan minzhong tongdu guan de jiexi" (Ambiguity or Uncertainty: Preference on the Taiwan Independence Issue Among the Electorate in Taiwan), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) [Taiwan], Vol. 46, No. 5 (September/October 2003), pp. 1-20;
31. and Yu-Shan Wu, "Liang'an guanxi zhong de Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi" (The Chinese/Taiwanese Identity in Cross-Strait Relations), Zhongguo shiwu (China Affairs Quarterly) [Taiwan], No. 4 (April 2001), pp. 71-89.
32. It is true that the constitutional structure of the Republic of China is in dire need of reform for practical reasons: for example, to make the president more accountable and to reduce the friction between the executive and the legislative branches when the two are not in the hands of the same political party. However, for the pro-independence activists, the purpose of a constitutional referendum is not to amend the ROC constitution, but to bring in a new and independent Republic of Taiwan.
33. Chen Shui-bian, "Chen Shui-bian yuandan zhuci quanwen" (Chen Shui-bian's 2001 New Year Address), at http://www.future-china.org.tw/ spcl_rpt/ncn/integ.htm.
34. In the 1991 National Assembly elections the DPP received only 22.8 per cent of the vote, and in the 1996 presidential elections, the DPP's candidate Peng Ming-min garnered a meager 21.1 per cent of the popular vote. In both cases, the DPP ran a single-issue campaign for Taiwan independence. The votes the party received under those circumstances were significantly less than normal.
35. Lee has a strong sense of a nativist mission. However, as a consummate politician, having been dislodged from the KMT, Lee realized that to make a comeback the only possible route was to position himself as the leader of the independence movement. Lee could not assert himself in the middle of the identity spectrum, as that is overcrowded. As the first Taiwanese to become president, Lee is uniquely endowed to be the leader of the independence movement.
36. On 11 November Chen designated the date for his constitutional referendum as 10 December, World Human Rights Day, in 2006 and enactment on 20 May 2008.
37. Therese Shaheen, the Washington-based chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy, revealed that President Bush is the "secret guardian angel" of Taiwan at a high-profile reception for Chen that the AIT held in New York City during Chen's transit. On a different occasion, Shaheen also stressed that the Bush administration had never said it "opposes Taiwan independence". Chinese officials said Shaheen's statement and her effusive praise of Chen emboldened Chen to pursue his independence drive. John Pomfret, "China Warns Taiwan That Attack May Be 'Unavoidable"', Washington Post, 20 November 2003, p.A28.
38. This strategic retreat was forced on Lien by Wang and other KMT legislators from southern Taiwan where electorates are traditionally more pro-independence. Because mainlanders, Hakkas and aborigines are staunchly on the blue side, the Hok-los (Minnans) who constitute 75 per cent of the population become the critical vote bloc. Hok-los are the most pro-independence among all the ethnic and sub-ethnic groups in Taiwan. It boiled down to a strategic calculation that, in order to swing the Hok-lo votes, the Lien-Soong ticket needed to tilt more towards the independence end of the political spectrum.
39. In the second the television the two presidential candidates on 21 February 2004, Lien reasserted that if forced to clarify the meaning of "one China", he would insist that it is the Republic of China. However, in the same debate Lien distanced himself from the Guidelines for National Unification, suggesting that a complete overhaul of the document was in order.
40. Article 16 of the Referendum Law reads: "When the country is threatened by external forces (dan guojia zaoshou waili weixie), so that national sovereignty may be subject to change (zhi guojia zhuquan you gaibian zhi yu), the President may, through a resolution of the Executive Yuan, submit for referendum matters concerning national security."
41. This dates back to the DPP's 1987 Resolution of "four ifs" and Chen's 2000 inauguration speech of "four nos" in which Taiwan independence was used as a deterrent against specific contingencies. In the 1987 resolution it was stated that the DPP would advocate Taiwan's independence if the KMT conducts peace negotiations with the CCP, if the KMT betrays the interests of the Taiwanese people, if the CCP unifies Taiwan, or if the KMT fails to practice genuine constitutional democracy. Chen's 2000 inauguration speech promised that, as long as the CCP did not intend to use force against Taiwan, during his term he would not declare independence, would not change the name of the country, would not insert the "two-state theory" into the constitution, and would not initiate a referendum on the issue of unification/ independence, neither would there be any attempt to abrogate the Guidelines for National Unification or to abolish the National Unification Council.
42. See Ralph A. Cossa, "Taiwan Referendum: Waving Red Flag", PacNet 48, 3 December 2003.
43. Other questions suggested by the green camp were: whether Taiwan should join the WHO, whether the mainland should withdraw all its missiles targeting Taiwan, whether Taiwan should embrace the "one country, two systems" espoused by Beijing, whether Taiwan should have a nuclear-free homeland, and so on. These were all issues where the government's position coincided with mainstream public opinion.
44. Popular support for three links and direct transport stands at 60 to 70 per cent. See Executive Yuan, "Evaluation of the Impact of Cross-Strait 'Direct Transport'" (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 2003), p. 54.
45. Maj. Gen. Wang Zaixi, deputy director of China's Taiwan Affairs Office, stated bluntly that "If the Taiwan authorities collude with all splittist forces to openly engage in pro-independence activities and challenge the mainland and the 'one-China' principle, the use of force may become unavoidable", This was the first such blatant warning issued by a Chinese official since former Premier Zhu Rongji's stern warning to Taiwan's voters on the eve of Taiwan's 2000 presidential elections, which Chen won by a narrow margin. Because Wang's remarks were not as publicized as Zhu's, they had a much lower effect on the island.
46. John Tkacik, "Whose One China? The Bush Administration Subtly Changes Tack", National Review Online, June 3, 2004, at www.nationalreview.com/comment/tkacik200406030908.asp.
47. Accompanying these periodic changes in Washington's China policy is a discernible long-term trend towards greater concern over China's rising power and a possible Sino-Us clash in the foreseeable future, probably over the Taiwan issue. See for example Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997);
48. Michael Swain and Ashley Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000);
49. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000);
50. Jonathan D. Pollack, "American Perceptions of Chinese Military Power", in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London-RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 43-64;
51. and Kao-cheng Wang, "The United States Military Security Policy Towards China", in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Defending Taiwan: The Future Version of Taiwan's Defence Policy and Military Strategy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 13-28.
52. Taiwan has played an important role in the development of the mainland's surging nationalism. See Lowell Dittmer, "Taiwan as a Factor in China's Quest for National Identity", paper presented at the Conference on the 2002 Taiwan's Election and Democratization Studies, TEDS Committee, Taipei, November 1, 2003.
53. For the possible conflict between the two nationalisms across the Taiwan Strait, see Wang Feiling, "Zhonghua beiju: Haixia liang'an jijiang lailin de minzuzhuyi da chongtu" (The Chinese Tragedy: The Coming Conflict between Nationalisms across the Taiwan Strait), in Lin Chia-lung and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Minzuzhuyi yu liang'an guanxi (Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Thirdnature, 2001), pp. 409-32.
54. See Parris Chang, "Beijing's Policy Toward Taiwan: An Elite Conflict Model", in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang and Samuel S. G. Wu (eds), Inherited Rivalry, pp. 65-79.
55. It is true that the outcome of the intra-party factional struggle is usually sealed before the party congress is held, and the congress only serves the function of ratifying the result of elite competition that took place beforehand. However, the regularly held Party congresses still provide a rough schedule for the power struggles in the upper echelons of the CCP.
56. Five days before the parliamentary elections, Chen pledged to remove the word "China" from the titles of Taiwan's state enterprises and missions abroad and to replace it with "Taiwan", a clear move toward further de-Sinification on the island. Two days later, the US State Department made it clear that it does not support such moves that "appear to unilaterally change Taiwan's status". Chen replied by telling a rally that he intended to go ahead with the name-change and cited the futility of previous US warnings against his March referendum.
57. Jih-wen Lin, "Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations", Issues and Studies, Vol. 36, No. 6 (November 2000), pp. 1-26.
58. For a discussion of the international triangular aspect of cross-Strait relations, see Bao Tzong-Ho, "Zhanlue sanjiao jiaose zhuanbian yu leixing bianhua fenxi-yi Meiguo han Tai-Hai liang'an sanjiao hudong weili" (An Analysis of Role Transition and Type Change in a Strategic Triangle: The Case of Triangular Interaction Between the US and the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait), in Bao Tzong-Ho and Wu Yu-Shan (eds), Zhengbian zhong de liang'an guanxi lilun, pp. 337-63;
59. and Yu-Shan Wu, "Does Chen's Election Make Any Difference? Domestic and International Constraints on Taipei, Washington, and Beijing," in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 155-92.
60. Obviously, Beijing also took initiatives towards Taiwan in the 1990s, such as Jiang Zemin's Eight Points of January 1995. However, those initiatives were rendered ineffective by Taiwan's drive towards greater assertiveness in the midst of severe domestic political competition. For an examination of the PRC's Taiwan policy shifts, see Michael Swain, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000", in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).