The effects of a right to silence

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 593-614

  Seidmann, Daniel J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MODELING;

EID: 16344372142     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00344.x     Document Type: Article

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