Eliciting truthful feedback for binary reputation mechanisms

Proceedings - IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence, WI 2004

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 214-220

  Jurca, Radu ^a   Faltings, Boi ^a  

^a SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BINARY REPUTATION MECHANISMS; ONLINE AUCTIONS; ONLINE TRANSACTION; TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES (TTP);

FEEDBACK; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION RETRIEVAL; INTERFACES (COMPUTER); ONLINE CONFERENCING; PERSONNEL TRAINING; POPULATION STATISTICS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 15544374431     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/WI.2004.10137     Document Type: Conference Paper

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