Explaining Mercosur's survival: Strategic sources of Argentine-Brazilian convergence

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 109-140

  Gomez Mera, Laura ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENCE; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; MERCOSUR; REGIONAL ECONOMY;

ARGENTINA; BRAZIL; SOUTH AMERICA; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 15044346393     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X04008570     Document Type: Review

References (118)

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14. See, for example, Kaltenthaler and Mora, 'Explaining Latin American Economic Integration'.
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36. The emergence of regional co-operation in the 1980s has been interpreted as a joint attempt to increase the two countries' bargaining power in international negotiations over debt, investment and trade issues, given the increasing centrality of the US in the region. Similarly, for Presidents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Melo, in the early 1990s, MERCOSUR was a defensive response to the challenges posed by a post-Cold War scenario characterised by growing economic globalisation, the emergence of regional blocs throughout the world (and particularly in North America), and the shift of international investors interest to Eastern European states. There was also growing frustration with the limited concrete results of the process of multilateral trade negotiations. See for example A. Hurrell, 'Latin America in the New World Order: A Regional Bloc of the Americas?,' International Affairs vol. 68, no. I (Jan 1992) pp. 121-39;
37. A. Hurrell, 'Regionalism in the Americas';
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47. For example, G. Garrett, 'International Co-operation and Institutional Choice: the European Community's Internal Market,' International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 269-99;
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49. See J. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,' World Politics, vol. 50, no. 1 (1998), pp. 324-48,
50. and J. Checkel, 'Social Construction and Integration,' Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1999), pp. 545-60.
51. See A. Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State,' The American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2. (June 1994), 384-96.
52. According to Wendt: 'Even if egoistic reasons were its starting point, the process of co-operating tends to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new inter-subjective understandings and commitments'. See A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,' International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (1992), p. 417.
53. For example, Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener have argued that: 'as a process, European integration has a transformative impact on the European state system and its constituents units. European integration itself has changed over the years and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agents' identity and subsequently their interests have equally changed'. See T. Christiansen, K. Jorgensen, and A. Wiener, 'The Social Construction of Europe,'Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1999), p. 529.
54. See, for example, R. Ruggiero, Address to the XII Meeting of the Common Market Council, Asunción, Paraguay (June 16, 1997).
55. See, for example, J. Cason, 'On the Road to Southern Cone Economic Integration,'Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Afairs, vol. 42 no.I (2000), pp. 23-42;
56. La Nación 14 June 1995;
57. Clarin 16 June 1995; etc.
58. The Brazilian devaluation exacerbated the impact of an external context characterised by the fall in international commodity prices, the deceleration in world trade and the contraction of foreign capital to developing countries following the East Asian and Russian currency crises in 1997 and 1998 respectively. See IDB/INTAL, MERCOSUR Report, no.6, 1999-2000.
59. D. Heymann, 'Regional Interdependencies and Macroeconomic Crises: Notes on MERCOSUR,' CEPAL, Serie Estudios y Perspectivas (Nov. 2001). The total value of Argentine exports to Brazil, which reached US$ 7,949 millions in 1998, fell to US$ 5,690 in 1999.
60. See MERCOSUR Statistics, Centro de Economía Internacional (CEI) website (www.cei.gov.ar/anexos/mercosur).
61. The value of total intra-MERCOSUR trade fell from US$ 40,826 million in 1998 to US$ 30,583 million in 1999. See MERCOSUR Statistics, CEI.
62. The most prominent among these series of measures were antidumping duties in the steel sector, quotas for textile imports, including those from MERCOSUR, and most significantly, the failed attempt to introduce the LAIA system of safeguards (Resolution no. 70) at the MERCOSUR level. Finally, during the second half of the year, the Argentine government introduced technical restrictions on footwear imports. See IDB/INTAL, MERCOSUR Report, no. 6, and R. Rozemberg and G. Svarzman, 'El proceso de integración Argentina-Brasil en perspectiva: el ciclo cambiario y la relación público-privada en Argentina,' INTAL, Documento de Divulgación, no. 17 (2002).
63. For a more detailed account of the different sectoral disputes, see Rozemberg and G. Svarzman, 'El proceso de integración Argentina-Brasil en perspectiva'.
64. See IDB/INTAL MERCOSUR Report, no. 8, 2001-02.
65. The changes affected 2700 tariff items, increasing customs tariffs for consumer goods from 12-30 % to 35 %, and eliminating aliquots on capital goods, as a way of fostering new investment in the country. See IDB/ INTAL, MERCOSUR Report, no.7, 2000-01.
66. In Brazil, the sector which opposed the measures more heatedly was the capital goods industry, which lost its preferential access to the Argentine market and now had to compete with capital goods from the rest of the world. According to ABIMAQ (Brazilian Association of Machinery Industries), the association representing the interests of this sector, the measures taken by the Argentine government would result in loses of around the US$ 800 million. See La Nación 23 March 2001.
67. La Nación 25 March 2001
68. Resolution no. 258/01 reduced tariffs on imports of IT and telecommunications products from non-MERCOSUR countries. In practice, the measure gave exporters from third countries the right to claim the refund of the 'convergence factor' established by Cavallo's competitiveness programme for foreign trade operations. This meant that products from third countries paid the CET but received a discount of about 8%, calculated on the basis of the impact on the peso of the fall of the dollar against the euro. The Resolution discriminated in favour of Argentine imports from third countries, reducing the preference margin for products manufactured in Brazil and the region. See IDB/ INTAL, MERCOSUR Report, no. 7.
69. See, for example, La Nación 10 October 2001.
70. See F. Sturzenegger, 'Nos sigue conviniendo el MERCOSUR?,' in La Nación 8 August 1998.
71. Rozemberg and Svarzman, 'El proceso de integración Argentina-Brasil'.
72. IDB/INTAL MERCOSUR Report, no. 8.
73. See, for example, Manzetti, 'The Political Economy of MERCOSUR'; and P. Da Motta Veiga, 'Brazil in Mercosur: Reciprocal Influence,' in R. Roett (ed.), MERCOSUR: Regional Integration and World Markets (Boulder, 1999), PP. 25-34.
74. Mario Marconini (Brazilian Secretary of Foreign Trade 1999), author interview, November 2000, Rio de Janeiro.
75. See IDB/INTAL, MERCOSUR Report, no. 6.
76. M. Marconini, author interview.
77. Marcos Caramuru de Paiva, (Secretary of International Affairs at the Brazilian Ministry of Finance, 1996-2002), author interview, November 2002, Brasilia.
78. The Treaty of Asunción allowed each partner to exclude a number of 'sensitive' sectors of their choice from the process of intra-regional liberalisation. These sectors were to be gradually included into die agreement during a 'transition period' (1991-94). However, some remained exempt from the free trade area in the Ouro Preto Protocol, signed in December 1994. These sectors came to form part of the'régimen de adecuación'or adaptation regime, which assumed that they needed more time (until the end of 1998) to become competitive enough to participate fully in the process of regional integration.
79. See IDB/INTAL MERCOSUR Report, no. 6.
80. See IDB/INTAL MERCOSUR Report, no. 6
81. See IDB/INTAL MERCOSUR Report, no. 8.
82. See for example, J. Assis de Almeida, 'MERCOSUR's institutions: Present and Future,' Network, vol. 9, no. 3 (July-Sept 2000);
83. M.A. Ekmedjan, 'Sólo Mejores Instituciones Salvarán al Mercosur,'in Clarin 13 September 1999; etc.
84. Luiz Felipe Lampreia (Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, 1995-2001), author interview, December 2002, Rio de Janeiro.
85. See L.O. Baptista, 'O Brasil na encrazilhada das negociaçõs globais,' Política Externa, vol. 10, no. 4 (2002), pp. 47-56;
86. R. Bernal Meza, 'Os dez anos do Mercosul e a crise argentina,' Política Externa, vol. 10, no. 4 (2002), pp. 7-46;
87. P. Da Motta Veiga, 'O Brasil, o Mercosul, e a ALCA,' Carta International, no. 106 (2001), pp. 12-16; etc.
88. R. Barbosa, 'O impacto da ALCA sobre o Mercosul,' Revista Brasileira de Comércio Exterior, no. 67 (2001), pp. 1-6.
89. J. Guillon de Albuquerque,'A ALCA na política externa brasileira,' Politica Externa, vol. 10, no. 2 (2002), pp. 174-88.
90. A. Rodriguez Giavarini, quoted in F. Pena, 'Dos socios en un mundo nuevo,'in La Nación 15 September 2001.
91. See for example, G. Fonseca Jr., A legitimidade e outras questões internacionais (São Paulo, 1998);
92. J. Grugel and M. de Almeida Medeiros, 'Brazil and MERCOSUR,' in J. Grugel and W. Hout (eds.), Regionalism across the North-South Divide (London, 1999), pp. 46-61.
93. According to Lafer, Brazil's identity as an middle power, articulated in the post First World War period, would become a constant feature of the country'ss regional and international orientation. See C. Lafer, A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política external brasileira: passado, presente e futuro (São Paulo, 2001). For another example of Brazil's self perception as a 'potência média',
94. see R. Ubiraci Sennes, As mudanças da politica externa brasileira na década de 1980: uma potência média recém-industrializada (Porto Alegre, 2003).
95. Bernal Meza, 'Os dez anos do Mercosul e a crise argentina'.
96. J. Campbell, R. Rozemberg and G. Svarzman,'El Mercosur en los años 90: de la apertura a la globalización,' in J. Campbell (ed.), MERCOSUR, entre la realidad y la utopía (Buenos Aires, 1999), pp. 123-226.
97. See for example, R. Russell, La política exterior argentina en el nuevo orden mundial (Buenos Aires, 1992), and Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman, 'Quince años de integración'.
98. For a good summary see R. Bouzas, 'MERCOSUR o ALCA,' in Clarin, 26 March 2001.
99. J. Tokatlian, Política exterior argentina de Menem a de la Rúa: diplomacia del ajuste,' Política Externa, vol. 9, no. 2 (2000).
100. Jorge Campbell (Argentine Secretary of International Economic Relations, 1991-99), author interview, April 2003, Buenos Aires; Felix Peña (Argentine Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade, 1998-99), author interview, October 2003, Buenos Aires.
101. At that time Secretary of International Economic Relations Jorge Campbell stated that the customs union versus FTA debate regarding the future of MERCOSUR was absurd (in colloquial Spanish, 'un dirparate : J. Campbell, 'El MERCOSUR después de la crisis,' Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Argentine Banking Association (ABA), Buenos Aires (July 5, 1999).
102. F. Pena, 'Mercosul: análise de uma década e tendências para o futuro,' Política Externa, vol. 10, no. I (2001), pp. 5 -23.
103. Tokatlian, 'Política exterior argentina de Menem a de la Rúa'.
104. Tokatlian, 'Política exterior argentina de Menem a de la Rúa'. Emphasis mine.
105. See for example 'Dos ministros en puja permanente,' La Nación 8 May 2001.
106. As Rapoport has put it: 'this policy (of automatic alignment with the US) has not translated into any significant advantage for Argentina, as the scant or even null international negotiating power we have had in the past few years has shown ... Abandoning Realismo Periférico and strengthening relations with Brazil is key for re-establishing a national project ...Both negotiations with the US regarding the FTAA and with the EU require a previous strengthening of rapprochement with Brazil...' O. Rapoport, 'Un nuevo rumbo en la política exterior argentina,' in Clarin 27 June 2003.
107. See for example J. Carrera, H. Lacunza and M. Redrado, 'Amenazas y oportunidades de la integración Argentina Estados Unidos: efectos comerciales y sectoriales para nuestro país,' Boletin Techint, no. 309 (2002), pp. 21-45.
108. A. Rodríguez Giavarini, 'La política exterior argentina,' Archivos del Presente, no. 20 (2000), pp. 13-25.
109. According to Checkel, social learning is more likely when actors have common professional backgrounds, and when the process of interaction takes place in isolation from political pressure. See Checkel, 'Social Construction and Integration'.
110. According to Mario Marconini: 'My relationship with everyone was always very good ... On that issue, with Felix Pena, there was a lot of personal contact ... that happens all the time,' M. Marconini, author interview.
111. Marcelo Avogadro (Under-Secretary of International Commercial Relations, 1991-99), author interview, November 2002, Buenos Aires.
112. See J. Beyers, 'Embeddedness and Socialisation in Europe: The Case of Council Officials,' ARENA Working Papers WP 02/33 (2002).
113. See Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State'; and Checkel, 'Social Construction and Integration'.
114. Norberto Ianelli (Under-Secretary of Inter-American Economic Integration and MERCOSUR, 1999-2001), author interview, October 2002, Buenos Aires.
115. M. Caramuru de Paiva, author interview.
116. N. Ianelli, author interview.
117. R. Russell and J.G. Tokatlian, El lugar de Brasil en la política exteior argentina (Buenos Aires, 2003).
118. For a theoretical discussion on the potential complementarity between rationalist and 'weak cognitivist' approaches, on which the argument here draws, see A. Hasenclaver, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 216-24.