Counterfactual reasoning and common knowledge of rationality in normal form games

Topics in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Zambrano, Eduardo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Counterfactual reasoning; Interactive epistemology; Rationalizability

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844365279     PISSN: 1534598X     EISSN: 1534598X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1020     Document Type: Article

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