Firms' choice of regulatory instruments to reduce pollution: A transaction cost approach

Business and Politics

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 1-20

  Delmas, Magali ^a   Marcus, Alfred ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Command and control regulation; Environmental pollution; Environmental regulation; Environmental voluntary agreements; Governance stucture; Negotiated agreements; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844363174     PISSN: 14693569     EISSN: 14693569     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1073     Document Type: Review

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