"Fiduciary capitalism," the "political model of corporate governance," and the prospect of stakeholder capitalism in the United States

Review of Radical Political Economics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 39-62

  Brennan, David M ^a  

^a FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Pension funds

Indexed keywords

EID: 14844346087     PISSN: 04866134     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0486613404272327     Document Type: Article

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