The economics of private sector training: A survey of the literature

Journal of Economic Surveys

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 91-111

  Leuven, Edwin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Human capital; Investment; Training

Indexed keywords

HUMAN CAPITAL; INVESTMENT; PRIVATE SECTOR; TRAINING;

EID: 14644420180     PISSN: 09500804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0950-0804.2005.00240.x     Document Type: Article

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