Aquinas on the nature of human beings

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 333-365

  Eberl, Jason T ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 12144253748     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (177)

1. I do not accomplish such a comparison in this paper but plan to do so in future projects.
2. The terms "rational soul" and "human soul" will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.
3. See Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, chap. 3; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter, "ST") I, q. 29, a. 1. All translations are my own and, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's works: S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882-).
4. See Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, chap. 3; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter, "ST") I, q. 29, a. 1. All translations are my own and, unless otherwise specified, are taken from the Leonine edition of Aquinas's works: S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882-).
5. By this term, Aquinas intends the Greek term hypostasis (Latin: suppositum). The terms hypostasis and suppositum are logically distinct in Aquinas's mind, but they refer to the same thing in reality; hence, I make no distinction between the terms here. See Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (hereafter, "SCG"), bk. 4, chap. 38.
6. Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima (hereafter, "QDA"), q. un., a. 3. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 1, sed contra; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 60; Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (hereafter, "In NE"), bk. 1, lect. 10; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 10.
7. Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima (hereafter, "QDA"), q. un., a. 3. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 1, sed contra; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 60; Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (hereafter, "In NE"), bk. 1, lect. 10; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 10.
8. Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima (hereafter, "QDA"), q. un., a. 3. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 1, sed contra; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 60; Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (hereafter, "In NE"), bk. 1, lect. 10; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 10.
9. Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima (hereafter, "QDA"), q. un., a. 3. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 1, sed contra; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 60; Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (hereafter, "In NE"), bk. 1, lect. 10; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 10.
10. Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima (hereafter, "QDA"), q. un., a. 3. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 1, sed contra; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 60; Aquinas, In decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio (hereafter, "In NE"), bk. 1, lect. 10; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 10.
11. Aquinas recognizes different types of beings as persons. In addition to human beings, Aquinas claims that angels are persons and that God exists as three distinct persons. Since my interest in this paper is solely with human persons, I will not entertain any further discussion of such other types of persons.
12. Aquinas, In Boethii De trinitate expositio (hereafter, "In BDT"), q. 5, a. 3.
13. Aquinas, In duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio (hereafter, "In M"), ed. M. R. Cathala and Raymond M. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1950), bk. 7, lect. 3, 1326.
14. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium (hereafter, "In DA"), bk. 2, lect. 2.
15. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; Aquinas, In Aristotelis librum De anima commentarium (hereafter, "In DA"), bk. 2, lect. 2.
16. SCG, bk. 2, chap. 69.
17. Aquinas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas (hereafter, "DUI"), chap. 3.
18. See ST I, q. 76, a. 1.
19. See QDA, q. un., a. 10; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 57.
20. See Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 88.
21. Aquinas states that two things that are joined by a contact of power (contactus virtutis), that is, one thing is the efficient cause of change in the other, do not result in an unqualified unity. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 56; Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 278-90.
22. Aquinas states that two things that are joined by a contact of power (contactus virtutis), that is, one thing is the efficient cause of change in the other, do not result in an unqualified unity. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 56; Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 278-90.
23. This qualifier is utilized here due to Aquinas's understanding of the Incarnation of Christ, in which the unified substantial existence of both human and divine natures precludes a new ontological entity having come into existence when Christ's soul assumed a human body. See Aquinas, Compendium theologiae (hereafter, "CT"), chap. 211.
24. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
25. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
26. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
27. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
28. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
29. For his account of how elements combine to form a new substance, see Aquinas, De mixtione elementorum; SCG, bk. 4, chap. 35; In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1680; ST I, q. 47, a. 2; ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 9, ad 10.
30. Aquinas, De ente et essentia (hereafter, "DEE"), chap. 2. Compare ST I, q. 75, a. 4.
31. Aquinas, De ente et essentia (hereafter, "DEE"), chap. 2. Compare ST I, q. 75, a. 4.
32. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
33. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
34. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
35. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
36. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
37. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
38. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
39. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
40. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
41. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
42. Aquinas's notion of composition without identity is similar to the contemporary notion of constitution without identity. For elucidation and defense of the latter notion, see Lynne Rudder Baker, "Why Constitution Is Not Identity," Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599-621; Baker, "Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 144-65; Frederick Doepke, "Spatially Coinciding Objects," Ratio 24 (1982): 45-60; Mark Johnston, "Constitution Is Not Identity," Mind 101 (1992): 89-105; E. J. Lowe, "Instantiation, Identity and Constitution," Philosophical Studies 44 (1983): 45-59; J. M. Shorter, "On Coinciding in Space and Time," Philosophy 52 (1977): 399-408; Judith Jarvis Thomson, "Parthood and Identity Across Time," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201-20; Thomson, "The Statue and the Clay," Nous 32 (1998): 149-73; David Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time," The Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90-5. For application of this notion to the issue of human nature, see Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kevin Corcoran, "Persons, Bodies, and the Constitution Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1999): 1-20.
43. In M, bk. 7, lect. 17, 1674.
44. See Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis (hereafter, "QDSC"), q. un., a. 11, ad 20. Referring to a human being's soul and body as parts requires a more extended notion of "part" than the standard conception of parts as integral to a substance, in the way a roof, walls, and floor are parts of a house. Such parts are composites of matter and form that exist even when they do not compose something else. Soul and body, on the other hand, can be understood as metaphysical parts that do not exist without composing a human being. For more on this distinction, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 42, 209-10; Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi (hereafter, "In Sent"), bk. 2, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4.
45. See Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis (hereafter, "QDSC"), q. un., a. 11, ad 20. Referring to a human being's soul and body as parts requires a more extended notion of "part" than the standard conception of parts as integral to a substance, in the way a roof, walls, and floor are parts of a house. Such parts are composites of matter and form that exist even when they do not compose something else. Soul and body, on the other hand, can be understood as metaphysical parts that do not exist without composing a human being. For more on this distinction, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 42, 209-10; Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi (hereafter, "In Sent"), bk. 2, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4.
46. See Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis (hereafter, "QDSC"), q. un., a. 11, ad 20. Referring to a human being's soul and body as parts requires a more extended notion of "part" than the standard conception of parts as integral to a substance, in the way a roof, walls, and floor are parts of a house. Such parts are composites of matter and form that exist even when they do not compose something else. Soul and body, on the other hand, can be understood as metaphysical parts that do not exist without composing a human being. For more on this distinction, see Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 42, 209-10; Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi (hereafter, "In Sent"), bk. 2, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4.
47. SCG, bk. 2, chap. 50. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 6, ad 14.
48. SCG, bk. 2, chap. 50. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 6, ad 14.
49. See ST I, q. 77, aa. 5-8; QDA, q. un., a. 12, ad 16.
50. See ST I, q. 77, aa. 5-8; QDA, q. un., a. 12, ad 16.
51. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
52. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
53. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
54. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
55. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
56. Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 512. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 2; ST I, q. 77, a. 5; DUI, chap. 4; In NE, bk. 10, lect. 6; QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 2; CT, chap. 85.
57. See DUI, chap. 3.
58. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 389. See ST II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 5; Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros de caelo et mundo, bk. 1, lect. 24.
59. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 389. See ST II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 5; Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros de caelo et mundo, bk. 1, lect. 24.
60. Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 389. See ST II-II, q. 83, a. 11, ad 5; Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros de caelo et mundo, bk. 1, lect. 24.
61. Stump, Aquinas, 52-3. See ST, supp., q. 69, aa. 2-5; q. 70, aa. 2-3 ; q. 72, a. 2.
62. Stump, Aquinas, 52-3. See ST, supp., q. 69, aa. 2-5; q. 70, aa. 2-3 ; q. 72, a. 2.
63. Stump, Aquinas, 52-3. See ST, supp., q. 69, aa. 2-5; q. 70, aa. 2-3 ; q. 72, a. 2.
64. Stump, Aquinas, 52-3. See ST, supp., q. 69, aa. 2-5; q. 70, aa. 2-3 ; q. 72, a. 2.
65. See Aquinas, Super Primam Epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, chap. 15, lect. 2.
66. See Stump, Aquinas, 51-2.
67. See ST I, q. 77, a. 8.
68. See In Sent, bk. 1, dist. 8, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.
69. Aquinas, In librum de causis expositio (hereafter, "In LDC"), ed. Ceslao Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1955), prop. 5. Compare ST I, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118, a. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 87-8.
70. Aquinas, In librum de causis expositio (hereafter, "In LDC"), ed. Ceslao Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1955), prop. 5. Compare ST I, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118, a. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 87-8.
71. Aquinas, In librum de causis expositio (hereafter, "In LDC"), ed. Ceslao Pera (Turin: Marietti, 1955), prop. 5. Compare ST I, q. 90, a. 2; q. 118, a. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 87-8.
72. See ST I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 79-81; Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 151-2.
73. See ST I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 79-81; Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 151-2.
74. See ST I, q. 75, a. 6; SCG, bk. 2, chaps. 79-81; Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 151-2.
75. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter, "QDV"), q. 13, a. 4. Compare CT, chap. 84; ST I, q. 75, a. 6. In In LDC, prop. 15, Aquinas argues that a human soul's ability to know itself reflexively also requires that it be separable from its body.
76. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter, "QDV"), q. 13, a. 4. Compare CT, chap. 84; ST I, q. 75, a. 6. In In LDC, prop. 15, Aquinas argues that a human soul's ability to know itself reflexively also requires that it be separable from its body.
77. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter, "QDV"), q. 13, a. 4. Compare CT, chap. 84; ST I, q. 75, a. 6. In In LDC, prop. 15, Aquinas argues that a human soul's ability to know itself reflexively also requires that it be separable from its body.
78. Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter, "QDV"), q. 13, a. 4. Compare CT, chap. 84; ST I, q. 75, a. 6. In In LDC, prop. 15, Aquinas argues that a human soul's ability to know itself reflexively also requires that it be separable from its body.
79. See QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 1; Kevin White, "Aquinas on the Immediacy of the Union of Soul and Body," in Studies in Thomistic Theology, ed. Paul Lockey (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1995), 209-80.
80. See QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 1; Kevin White, "Aquinas on the Immediacy of the Union of Soul and Body," in Studies in Thomistic Theology, ed. Paul Lockey (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1995), 209-80.
81. The term phantasmata, transliterated as phantasms, is sometimes translated as sense impressions or sensory images. Such translations, however, are problematic. As Pasnau describes it, "phantasms are not simply our ordinary sensory images. Rather, phantasms are the leftover impressions from those sensory images" (Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 279; see 278-95). Norman Kretzmann describes them as "cognitive likenesses of particular external things reinstated in physical configurations of the organ of phantasia [that is, the brain]" (The Metaphysics of Creation, 355; see 350-64). The purpose of phantasms is to be available for the intellect to use in abstracting the intelligible form of perceived things. Hence, phantasms are between the immediate mental impression of an object perceived by sensation and the intellectual understanding of that object's nature as abstracted from any individuating characteristics.
82. The term phantasmata, transliterated as phantasms, is sometimes translated as sense impressions or sensory images. Such translations, however, are problematic. As Pasnau describes it, "phantasms are not simply our ordinary sensory images. Rather, phantasms are the leftover impressions from those sensory images" (Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 279; see 278-95). Norman Kretzmann describes them as "cognitive likenesses of particular external things reinstated in physical configurations of the organ of phantasia [that is, the brain]" (The Metaphysics of Creation, 355; see 350-64). The purpose of phantasms is to be available for the intellect to use in abstracting the intelligible form of perceived things. Hence, phantasms are between the immediate mental impression of an object perceived by sensation and the intellectual understanding of that object's nature as abstracted from any individuating characteristics.
83. See QDA, q. un., a. 2; ST I, q. 101, a. 2.
84. See QDA, q. un., a. 3, ad 16.
85. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 76; In DA, bk. 3, lect. 7; QDA, q. un., a. 4, ad 8; DUI, chaps. 2, 4.
86. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 76; In DA, bk. 3, lect. 7; QDA, q. un., a. 4, ad 8; DUI, chaps. 2, 4.
87. See SCG, bk. 2, chap. 76; In DA, bk. 3, lect. 7; QDA, q. un., a. 4, ad 8; DUI, chaps. 2, 4.
88. See QDSC, q. un., a. 11, ad 14; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; ST I, q. 76, a. 1. Note that to speak of a human soul as having capacities means only that it is the foundation, that is, the actualizing principle, for such capacities; as discussed above, the human being composed of a human soul is the proper subject of ascription for the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective capacities proper to human nature.
89. See QDSC, q. un., a. 11, ad 14; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; ST I, q. 76, a. 1. Note that to speak of a human soul as having capacities means only that it is the foundation, that is, the actualizing principle, for such capacities; as discussed above, the human being composed of a human soul is the proper subject of ascription for the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective capacities proper to human nature.
90. See QDSC, q. un., a. 11, ad 14; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; ST I, q. 76, a. 1. Note that to speak of a human soul as having capacities means only that it is the foundation, that is, the actualizing principle, for such capacities; as discussed above, the human being composed of a human soul is the proper subject of ascription for the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective capacities proper to human nature.
91. See QDSC, q. un., a. 11, ad 14; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 2; SCG, bk. 2, chap. 68; ST I, q. 76, a. 1. Note that to speak of a human soul as having capacities means only that it is the foundation, that is, the actualizing principle, for such capacities; as discussed above, the human being composed of a human soul is the proper subject of ascription for the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective capacities proper to human nature.
92. QDA, q. un., a. 8, ad 15. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 10, ad 1-2; In DA, bk. 2, lects. 1, 19; ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; q. 91, a. 3.
93. QDA, q. un., a. 8, ad 15. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 10, ad 1-2; In DA, bk. 2, lects. 1, 19; ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; q. 91, a. 3.
94. QDA, q. un., a. 8, ad 15. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 10, ad 1-2; In DA, bk. 2, lects. 1, 19; ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; q. 91, a. 3.
95. QDA, q. un., a. 8, ad 15. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 10, ad 1-2; In DA, bk. 2, lects. 1, 19; ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; q. 91, a. 3.
96. QDA, q. un., a. 8, ad 15. Compare QDA, q. un., a. 10, ad 1-2; In DA, bk. 2, lects. 1, 19; ST I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 3; q. 91, a. 3.
97. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 514-5.
98. By these examples, I am not asserting that a human soul has these qualities in itself; rather, a human soul has these qualities by its capacity to actualize a material body to have them.
99. ST I, q. 90, a. 4, ad 1. Compare SCG, bk. 2, chap. 83.
100. ST I, q. 90, a. 4, ad 1. Compare SCG, bk. 2, chap. 83.
101. ST I, q. 76, a. l, ad 6. I specifically use the definite article - "the" body - in my translation, because it is not to any body with which a separated soul has a natural inclination to be united, but to that particular body of which it is the substantial form. See my "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74, supp. (2000): 215-30.
102. ST I, q. 76, a. l, ad 6. I specifically use the definite article - "the" body - in my translation, because it is not to any body with which a separated soul has a natural inclination to be united, but to that particular body of which it is the substantial form. See my "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74, supp. (2000): 215-30.
103. QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 5. Compare Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia dei (hereafter, "QDP") q. 5, a. 10; ST supp., q. 93, a. 1.
104. QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 5. Compare Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia dei (hereafter, "QDP") q. 5, a. 10; ST supp., q. 93, a. 1.
105. ST I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 2. Compare ST I, q. 29, a. l, ad 5.
106. ST I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 2. Compare ST I, q. 29, a. l, ad 5.
107. This is especially true in the early treatise De ente et essentia.
108. A subsistent being cannot be an accidental quality of a substance. It subsists on its own. Aquinas highlights this quality of persons in an alternative definition he gives: "subsistent in a rational nature" (ST I, q. 29, a. 3).
109. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
110. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
111. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
112. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
113. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
114. ST I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 2, ad 16; QDP, q. 9, a. 1, ad 4; QDA, q. un., a. 1, ad 4; In DA, bk. 2, lect. 1. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517.
115. See ST I, q. 75, a. 2, sed contra.
116. In M, bk. 5, lect. 10, 905.
117. DEE, chap. 2. See Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 75-80.
118. DEE, chap. 2. See Bobik, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 75-80.
119. Compare QDV, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1; q. 10, a. 5.
120. In translating dimensiones interminatis thus, I disagree with John Wippel, who offers the translation "indeterminate dimensions." Wippel's translation creates a tension in Aquinas's thought, if not an outright contradiction, that I contend is not present. See John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 358, 362.
121. In BDT, q. 4, a. 2 (emphasis added).
122. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 371.
123. Ibid., 372.
124. ST I, q. 76, a. 6, ad 2. Compare QDP, q. 9, a. 1.
125. Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle," Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 289.
126. In BDT, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3.
127. Both quotations are from In BDT, q. 4, a. 2, sed contra.
128. In BDT, q. 4, a. 3. Compare Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales (hereafter, "QQ") 7, q. 4, a. 3; QQ 9, q. 6, a. 1; ST supp., q. 83, aa. 2-3.
129. See Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 553-5. Compare Roderick Chisholm, "Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers," Grazer Philosophische Studien l (1975): 38; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 363.
130. See Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 553-5. Compare Roderick Chisholm, "Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers," Grazer Philosophische Studien l (1975): 38; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 363.
131. See Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 553-5. Compare Roderick Chisholm, "Individuation: Some Thomistic Questions and Answers," Grazer Philosophische Studien l (1975): 38; Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 363.
132. One point of debate concerns the cause of individuation for human beings. Joseph Owens argues that the esse possessed by a human soul that is created individually by God is responsible for the individuated existence of a human being. Lawrence Dewan counters that esse is not a causal factor of individuation, but that the combination of formal, material, and efficient causes brings about both a human being's existence and his existence as an individual substance. See Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas (B. CA. 1225; D. 1274)," in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Latter Middle Ages and the Counter Reformation, 1150-1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 173-94; Lawrence Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist 63 (1999): 403-24. Space does not permit me to address this debate here.
133. One point of debate concerns the cause of individuation for human beings. Joseph Owens argues that the esse possessed by a human soul that is created individually by God is responsible for the individuated existence of a human being. Lawrence Dewan counters that esse is not a causal factor of individuation, but that the combination of formal, material, and efficient causes brings about both a human being's existence and his existence as an individual substance. See Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas (B. CA. 1225; D. 1274)," in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Latter Middle Ages and the Counter Reformation, 1150-1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 173-94; Lawrence Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist 63 (1999): 403-24. Space does not permit me to address this debate here.
134. SCG, bk. 2, chap. 80.
135. ST I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2. Compare In Sent, bk. 8, dist. l, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6; DEE, chap. 5; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 2; QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 3.
136. ST I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2. Compare In Sent, bk. 8, dist. l, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6; DEE, chap. 5; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 2; QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 3.
137. ST I, q. 76, a. 2, ad 2. Compare In Sent, bk. 8, dist. l, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6; DEE, chap. 5; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 2; QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 3.
138. QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 4. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 15; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 10; ST I, q. 76, a. l, ad 6.
139. QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 4. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 15; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 10; ST I, q. 76, a. l, ad 6.
140. QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 4. Compare QDSC, q. un., a. 9, ad 15; QDA, q. un., a. l, ad 10; ST I, q. 76, a. l, ad 6.
141. See Eberl, "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," 221.
142. Stump, Aquinas, 54, italics Stump's. Compare W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 105; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 182-5.
143. Stump, Aquinas, 54, italics Stump's. Compare W. Norris Clarke, The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 105; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 182-5.
144. See Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas," 416.
145. Sandra Edwards, "Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man,'" South-western Journal of Philosophy 10 (1979): 94.
146. SCG, bk. 4, chap. 81.
147. ST I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 5.
148. See ST I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 1; CT, chap. 159; John Chandlish, "St. Thomas and the Dynamic State of Body Constituents," Journal of the History of Medicine and Applied Sciences 23 (1968): 272-5. Though Aquinas did not have the scientific resources to recognize the existence of cells as constituents of living bodies, he did understand that living bodies decay, that is, lose some material constituents, and are rejuvenated through nutrition, that is, gain new material constituents by digesting food.
149. See ST I, q. 119, a. 1, ad 1; CT, chap. 159; John Chandlish, "St. Thomas and the Dynamic State of Body Constituents," Journal of the History of Medicine and Applied Sciences 23 (1968): 272-5. Though Aquinas did not have the scientific resources to recognize the existence of cells as constituents of living bodies, he did understand that living bodies decay, that is, lose some material constituents, and are rejuvenated through nutrition, that is, gain new material constituents by digesting food.
150. Edwards, "Saint Thomas Aquinas on 'The Same Man,'" 93.
151. See ibid., 95.
152. Stump, Aquinas, 46.
153. I will not discuss how significant a material change must be in order for a formal change to occur in an artifact. At one end of the spectrum, a statue of a man may have one of its arms chopped off by vandals and yet remain the same statue. At the other end of the spectrum, a statue may be chopped into a thousand or more pieces by vandals and thereby cease to exist.
154. I am utilizing this term to refer to a material substance that occurs in nature, as opposed to an artifact. I am not referring to any created substance, which would include angels who are not material.
155. ST supp., q. 79, a. 2, ad 4.
156. See ST supp., q. 79, a. 2, ad 1.
157. SCG, bk. 4, chap. 84.
158. See SCG, bk. 4, chap. 80
159. CT, chap. 153.
160. ST supp., q. 79, a. 2.
161. CT, chap. 154. Compare SCG, bk. 4, chap. 81.
162. SCG, bk. 4, chap. 81.
163. In certain passages, such as CT, chap. 154 and ST supp., q. 79, a. 1, ad 3, Aquinas appears to hold the opposite view that the exact same material constituents that composed a human being's body prior to death must compose his resurrected body. However, in CT, chap. 154 and ST supp., q. 80, a. 5, sed contra, Aquinas makes contrary assertions in agreement with the view I outline here. For reasons why I think Aquinas does better to hold the view that any material constituent can compose a human being's resurrected body, see Eberl, "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," 219-22.
164. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517; Eberl, "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," 223-4.
165. See Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism," 517; Eberl, "The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas," 223-4.
166. The term "mind" does not precisely correspond to Aquinas's term "intellect." As will be shown, the mind includes certain capacities, such as the estimative capacity, that are distinct from the intellective capacity to understand universal concepts. Thus, the intellect is but one capacity of the mind. Contemporary philosophers, though, often understand the concept of mind in a fashion similar to Aquinas's concept of intellect and thus I propose the above substitution of terms.
167. There may be many other qualities of a human mind that are also irreducible to the functioning of the brain, but I simply list here two of the most obvious examples that are cited in Aquinas's account as given above.
168. See ST I, q. 78, a. 4. That Aquinas recognizes such a cognitive function to be a function of the brain fits with his mechanistic understanding of non-human animals as determined. Animals have the cognitive capacity to recognize goods versus harms, and they must act based upon such recognition. If an animal recognizes something as good, the animal must move toward it. An animal's brain is the origin of motivation for its body. Human beings share the estimative capacity, and it too is localized in the brain. Nevertheless, human beings are not determined by it due to their having higher cognitive capacities that are not defined by what physically occurs in the brain. Human beings are free.
169. See ST I, q. 84, a. 3. Aquinas recognizes that a human mind may gain knowledge by other means. God may directly infuse knowledge into it, similar to Augustine's account of divine illumination, and it can gain insight and new knowledge by reaching conclusions through discursive reasoning. However, the former is not a natural means of a human mind's acquisition of knowledge, and Aquinas employs it only for the sake of explaining how a separated human soul can gain new knowledge. The latter is part of a human mind's natural intellective processes but is dependent upon sense experience for the formation of the concepts utilized in discursive reasoning.
170. See ST I, q. 76, a. 5; q. 84, a. 7.
171. See ST I, q. 76, a. 5; q. 84, a. 7.
172. For a similar assertion, referring to the relationship of a human being and his brain, see Roderick Chisholm, "On the Simplicity of the Soul," in Philosophical Perspectives 5, ed. James Tomberlin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 171.
173. As Peter van Inwagen puts it, such things cannot be proper parts of a human body, because they are not "caught up in [its] life." See Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 94.
174. Kit Fine, "Things and Their Parts," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23, ed. Howard Wettstein (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 65.
175. I b i d.
176. Fing postulates the following identity criterion for rigid embodiments: "The rigid embodiments a, b, c, . . . /R and a,' b,' c,' . . . /R' are the same iff the state of a, b, c, . . . standing in the relation R is the same as that of a,' b,' c,' . . . standing in the relation R'" (ibid., 66).
177. I am most indebted to Eleonore Stump, John Kavanaugh, S.J., and Theodore Vitali, C.P. for invaluable comments and helpful discussions throughout the development of this paper, and to Michael Burke for his review of the latest draft. Research for this paper began while I participated in an exchange program between Saint Louis University and the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. I am grateful to the Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen for their hospitality, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann for his comments and an invitation to present an early draft of this paper in his graduate colloquium, and to Andreas Niederberger and Stephanie Vesper for helpful discussions. I completed this paper while visiting the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame. I wish to thank the members of the Center's weekly reading group, particularly Brian Leftow, Fred Crosson, Michael Rea, Thomas Flint, and Michael Rota for their insightful suggestions. Finally, portions of this paper benefited from being presented at the 2003 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association and the 38th International Congress on Medieval Studies at Western Michigan University. My gratitude to the audience members at each conference, and in particular to James South for his delivered commentary at the APA.