Stuck in transition: Electoral processes in Zambia 1991-2001

Democratization

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 85-105

  Rakner, Lise ^a   Svåsand, Lars ^b  

^a CHR MICHELSEN INSTITUTE   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN   (Norway)

Author keywords

Electoral Commission; Electoral process; Zambia

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION; ELECTION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

AFRICA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; SOUTHERN AFRICA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WORLD; ZAMBIA;

EID: 13344270350     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/1351034042000317970     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.243.
2. M. Bratton and D. Posner, 'A First Look at Second Elections in Africa With Illustrations From Zambia', in R. Joseph (ed.), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990, pp.377-409.
3. The electoral process in Ghana since 1996 in Mali and Lesotho in 2002 and Kenya 2002 largely met the contestants and the domestic and international observers' expectations of a democratic process.
4. S. Adejumobi, 'Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?', International Political Science Review, Vol.21, No.1 (2000), pp.59-73.
5. T. Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.1 (2002), pp.1-21.
6. P. Burnell, 'Zambia's 2001 Elections: The Tyranny of Small Decisions, "Non-decisions" and "Not Decisions", Third World Quarterly, Vol.23, No.6 (2002), pp.1103-120;
7. J. Elklit, 'Electoral Institutional Change and Democratization: You Can Lead a Horse to Water but You Can't Make it Drink', Democratization Vol.6, No.4 (1999), pp.28-51.
8. For instance, describing the failure of national Russian parties to penetrate the regional political institutions in most of Russia's provinces, Stoner-Weiss suggests that the underdevelopment of such political institutions is preferable for regional political elites as their weakness enables the elites to keep control of political and economic capital: K. Stoner-Weiss, 'The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System: Underinstitutionalization in Dual Transitions', Politics and Society, Vol.29. No.3 (2001), pp.385-414.
9. The electoral victory of Mwanawasa was challenged by three opposition parties (UPND, HP and FDD) in the Supreme Court and 37 parliamentary elections were petitioned in the High Courts. (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 5 February 2002) ().
10. S Rokkan, A. Campell, P. Torsvik and H. Valen, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), p. 147.
11. A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.40-41.
12. J. Elklit (1999) identifies twelve steps: 1. Establishment of the legal framework for the electoral process, 2. Establishment of adequate organizational management structures, 3. Demarcations of constituencies and polling districts 4. Voter education and voter information, 5. Voter registration, 6. Nomination and registration of political parties and candidates, 7. Regulation of electoral campaign, 8. Polling 9. Counting and tabulating the vote, 10. Resolving electoral disputes and complaints, 11. Election result implementation, 11 Post-election handling of election material.
13. R.A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.109-20.
14. For example, it is unclear what the total voting age population of Ghana is due to lack of updated census figures.
15. See P. Nugent, 'Winners, Losers and also Rans. Money, Moral Authority, and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Elections', African Affairs, No. 100 (2001), pp.405-28.
16. In the aftermath of the 2001 elections it was decided that voter registration will take place continuously. However, the cost for this operation has been estimated at K12 billion, whereas only K4 billion was made available in the 2002 budget. The process has therefore not yet been implemented. Times of Zambia, 23 March 2003 ().
17. B.A. Andreassen, G. Geisler and A. Tostensen, Setting a Standard for Africa? Lessons from the 1991 Zambian Elections, Report R.5 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1992), p.29.
18. T. Lodge, D. Kadima and D. Pottie (eds), Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 2002).
19. J. Gould, 'Contesting Democracy. The 1996 Elections in Zambia', in M. Cowen and L. Laakso (eds), Multi-Party Elections in Africa (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.299-323.
20. Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Report on the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (Lusaka, 1996).
21. It is the prerogative of the president to call the new election by dissolving parliament. This has to be done at the end of the five-year electoral term. However, it remains unclear whether this means five years from the previous election or five years from when the parliament first convened.
22. Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Zambia's 2001 Tripartite Elections (Lusaka, 2002).
23. Central Statistical Office (CSO) had projected the eligible voting population to be 4.7 million before the 1998 local government elections. The projected number of eligible voters before the 1996 general elections had been 4.5 million, As a result, the first projections in 2001 were questioned by local election monitoring groups as well as the donor community.
24. In addition to registration procedures, turnout figures are affected by how accessible the voting stations are for the electorate. On this score, the number of polling stations in 2001 was almost 60 per cent higher than in 1991, increasing from 3.489 to 5.509, a significant improvement.
25. See E. Bjornlund, M. Bratton and C. Gibson, 'Observing Multiparty Elections in Africa: Lessons From Zambia', African Affairs, Vol.91 (1992), pp.405-431;
26. FODEP, Zambia's 2001 Tripartite Elections (note 20).
27. M. Bratton, 'Political Participation in a New Democracy. Institutional Considerations from Zambia', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.32, No.5 (1999), p.570.
28. M. Bratton and B. Liatto-Katundu, Zambia Democratic Governance Project. Monitoring and Evaluation Studies. Baseline Study: Beneficiary Profile (Lusaka, USAid/Zambia, 1993).
29. Ibid., p.574.
30. R. Winger, 'Institutional Obstacles to a Multiparty System', in P.S. Hermson and J.C. Green (eds), Multiparty Politics in America (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 1997), pp. 159-72.
31. The case of Zimbabwe illustrates how formally neutral rules have specific political outcomes. There, only parties that win at least 15 seats in parliament qualify for party subsidies; only the ruling ZANU-PF fits the qualification criteria.
32. Articles 34, 41, 66, 76, 77 ,79, 88. Elections are further regulated in the Electoral Act (1996) and the Electoral (Amendment) Act No.04 (2001). The electoral Code of Conduct is regulated by Statutory Instrument No 176 (1996).
33. Chapter 119 of the Zambian Constitution (1996).
34. L. Rakner and L. Svåsand, 'From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian Experience 1991-2001', Party Politics, Vol.10. No.1 (2004).
35. Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), Report on the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections (Lusaka, 1996).
36. Electoral Act No 2 (1991) Section 9.
37. The Public Order (Amendment) Act (1996), which followed a decision by the Supreme Court stating the requirement for a permit was in violation of the constitution. Lodge et al. (note 16).
38. F. Ng'andu and K. Chanda, 'The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Transparency and Honesty in the Zambian Electoral Process', African Social Research, Vol.47-48 (2003), pp. 119-35.
39. The Electoral Code of Conduct Regulations, Statutory Instrument Number 179 (1996).
40. FODEP, Zambia's 2001 Tripartite Elections (note 20).
41. E. Bjornlund et al. (note 22), p.420.
42. The ongoing court case contesting Mwanawasa's electoral victory suggests that MMD used state resources to pay for MMD television campaigns.
43. See 'MMD Paid for Live Broadcasts - ZNBC' .
44. See also S. Mwalongo and B. Lwando, 'Analysis of the Role of Media in the Political Process: The Case of the 2001 Tripartite Elections in Zambia', Africa Social Research, Vol.47-48 (2003), pp.46-98.
45. Trinity later secured a court order to continue with the debates. The Monitor, 12 December 2001.
46. S. Mwalongo and B. Lwando (note 38).
47. Community radios proved to be an exception to this rule as in many instances local radio stations gave free airtime to members of parliament and local government councillors with support from local non-governmental organizations in that part of the country.
48. The 1990 Act that amended the constitution to allow for the formation of opposition parties also guaranteed the continued role in government of existing party structures, until the next dissolution of Parliament
49. B.A. Andreassen et al. (note 15), p.36.
50. I b i d.
51. M. Bratton and D. Posner (note 2).
52. A. Chanda, National Integrity Systems. Transparency International Study Report, 2003 http://www.transparency.org/activities/ natinteg_systems/country_studies.html
53. For example, during the 26 September 2000 Chifubu by-election Chiluba made donations amounting to K160 million to various churches in the constituency
54. P. Burnell (note 6).
55. I b i d.
56. European Union Electoral Unit (EUEU), 'Support to the Democratic Election Process in Zambia: First, Second and Final Interim Statements', 2002 (); FODEP (note 20).
57. B.A. Andreassen et al. (note 15).
58. Under the 1964 Independence Constitution the Zambian republican president was elected as the leader of the political party in government. Direct presidential elections were introduced with the 1972 Mainza Chona-Constitutional Review Commission (Mutukwa, 1998).
59. The 1991 Mvunga Constitutional Review Commission limited the presidential term of office to two five-year terms; it reduced the number of nominated members of parliament from 10 to 8, and affirmed the re-introduction of multiparty democracy that came into force with the abolition of Article 4 that had forbidden the formation of political parties.
60. J. Donge, 'Reflections on Donors, Opposition and Popular Will in the 1996 Zambian General Elections', Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.36, No.1 (1998).
61. The uncertainty on the status of the constitution has persisted into the Mwanawasa presidential period with controversies over how constitutional reform should be pursued, by a commission or a constitutional assembly.
62. P. Burnell (note 6), p. 1111.
63. J. Elklit and A. Reynolds, The Impact of Election Administration on the Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Research Agenda, Working Paper No.281 (Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2000).
64. See Zambia Elections Monitoring Committee, Setting a Standard for Africa: Free and Fair Elections (Lusaka, 1991);
65. J. Gould (note 17);
66. Carter Center, 'Final Statement of the Zambia 2001 Elections', 7 March 2002;
67. AFRONET, Elections in Zambia: A Question of People, Law and Governance (Lusaka, Afronet Position Paper Series, January/February 2002;
68. T. Lodge et al. (note 16).
69. Local election observers and opposition parties claimed that the election materials were delivered late in areas where the ruling party was not popular. It has also been pointed out that whether there were 500 or 5000 registered voters, the ECZ allocated every polling station with the same clearly inadequate staff.
70. Transparency of the process was hindered by the fact that the law does not require party agents to sign and receive copies of polling station results. As a result, polling station results were vulnerable to manipulation. R.S. Mulwanda, 'Corruption and the Abuse of Office in Zambia's 2001 General Eections', The Corruption Eye, Vol. 1, No.2 (February, 2002).
71. E. Bjornlund et al. (note 22), p.414.
72. When the third member of the commission resigned and was not replaced, the opposition's trust and confidence in the electoral commission decreased even further.
73. B. A. Andreassen et al. (note 15).
74. Amendment 18 (1996). The composition and operations of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) are found in the Electoral Commissions Act 24 (1996). The creation of an independent, permanent electoral commission was put forth by the Mwanakatwe Constitutional Review Commission but the MMD government had previously rejected this recommendation.
75. M. Bratton and D. Posner (note 2), p.396.
76. Electoral Commission Act No 24 specifies the composition as consisting of 'a Chairperson and not more than four other members'.
77. Electoral Commission Act No.24 Part II.6.
78. Parliament's ability to block a presidential nomination is in any case limited to doing so only twice; the third time a person is nominated the appointment takes effect no matter what parliament says.
79. B.M. Bwalya, 'The Role and Challenges of the Electoral Commission of Zambia', paper presented at the conference 'Electoral Reform in Zambia' organised by FODEP, Lusaka, 25-26 July (2002).
80. I b i d.
81. A parliamentary vote in favour of a budget does not imply that the allocated funds will actually be released.
82. See B.M. Bwalya, Preparations by the Electoral Commission of Zambia for the 2001 Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections. Mimeo (Lusaka, Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2001).
83. Zambia's constitution formally sanctions a high concentration of power in the presidency. The president can summon the assembly at any time, opens the start of the session and may prorogue or dissolve it as he/she so pleases. Parliament may alter the constitution (by a two thirds majority) except for the part on fundamental rights. The constitution vests the legislative power in the assembly, but bills require the President's assent in order to become law. Except on recommendation of the president the assembly shall not proceed on any bill that makes provision for the imposition of taxation or a charge or payment from the general revenues.
84. See P. Burnell (note 6).
85. A. Schedler, 'Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation', Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, No.2 (2002), pp.36-50.
86. P. Burnell (note 6).
87. S. Gloppen, 'The Accountability Function of the Courts in Tanzania and Zambia', Democratization Vol.10, No.4 (2003), pp.112-37.
88. Peter.K. Lolojih, 'Community Mobilisation and Sensitisation: The Role of Sub-District Structures in Elections', African Social Research, Vol.45-46 (2003), pp.24-6.
89. L. Rakner and L. Svi̊sand (note 30).
90. Electoral Reform Technical Committee (ERTC) submitted its report in August 2004.