Dialogic politics and the civilising process

Review of International Studies

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 141-154

  Linklater, Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 12944249256     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210505006340     Document Type: Review

References (57)

1. Norbert Elias. The Germans (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), p. 31.
2. Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation (Cambridge: Polity 1993), ch. 4.
3. Burke, Art of Conversation, p. 113 and p. 140.
4. W. Van Vrees, Meetings, Manners und Civilization: The Development of Modern Meeting Behaviour (London: Leicester University Press, 1999), p. 154.
5. Van Vrees, Meetings, Manners and Civilization, p. 193.
6. Ibid., p. 303.
7. J. Habermas, 'Reply to the Symposium Participants', in M. Rosenfeld and A.Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 388.
8. J. Habermas, 'Paradigms of Law', in M. Rosenfeld and A.Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 25.
9. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), pp. 143-4.
10. See the discussion in C. Rustin, 'Habermas, Discourse Ethics and International Justice', Alternatives, 24 (1999), pp. 167-92. Rustin (p. 185) argues that Habermas 'has formulated a discourse ethic that is clearly situated within the liberal-democratic and state-centered experience'. Although 'his work arguably represents an ideal philosophical development as to the way in which individuals in liberal democracies might conduct their affairs, Habermas's discourse ethics may be quite simply incomprehensible to those unaccustomed to liberal-democratic ideas' (Rustin, p. 186). Discourse ethics is only meaningful 'when societies have made the transition from a "mythical" conception of politics to rational liberal democracy' (Rustin, p. 186).
11. C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 17.
12. See also N. Dietelhoff and H. Muller, Theoretical Paradise - Empirically Lost'?, this issue.
13. J. Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 337ff.
14. T. Risse, 'Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics', International Organisation, 54 (2000), p. 22.
15. Risse, 'Let's Argue!', p. 33.
16. See I. Kapoor, 'Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism? The Relevance of the Habermas-Mouffe Debate for Third World Politics', Alternatives, 27 (2002), pp. 459-87.
17. Rustin, 'Habermas'.
18. R. Shapcott, 'Cosmopolitan Conversations: Justice, Dialogue and the Cosmopolitan Community', Global Society, 16 (2002), pp. 221-43.
19. Shapcott, 'Cosmopolitan Conversations', p. 230.
20. Ibid., p. 231.
21. Ibid., p. 228.
22. S. Hopgood, 'Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable Hegemony of the Liberal Self, Millennium, 29 (2000), p. 10.
23. Hopgood, 'Reading the Small Print', p. 11.
24. Ibid., p. 23.
25. J. Habermas, Justification and Application (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 24. See his related point that '. . . in moral discussions the circle of those possibly affected is not even limited to members of one's own collectivity . . . (but) . . . transcends the boundaries of every concrete legal community, giving one some distance from the ethnocentrism of one's immediate surroundings', as quoted in T. McCarthy, 'Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytic Distinctions', in M. Rosenfeld and A.Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 134-5.
26. J. Habermas, Justification and Application (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 24. See his related point that '. . . in moral discussions the circle of those possibly affected is not even limited to members of one's own collectivity . . . (but) . . . transcends the boundaries of every concrete legal community, giving one some distance from the ethnocentrism of one's immediate surroundings', as quoted in T. McCarthy, 'Legitimacy and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytic Distinctions', in M. Rosenfeld and A.Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 134-5.
27. M. Lynch, 'The Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres', Millennium, 29 (2000), pp. 307-30.
28. Lynch, 'The Dialogue of Civilisations', p. 330.
29. For this critique, see R. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 3.
30. McCarthy, 'Legitimacy and Diversity', p. 148.
31. J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
32. See N. M. Williams, The Yolngu and their Land: A System of Land Tenure and the Fight for its Recognition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).
33. Kapoor, 'Deliberative Democracy', p. 469 raises the question of whether the very demand that claims should be tested in public debate will disadvantage persons who lack assertiveness in public discussion, a question addressed by Nancy Fraser's notion of 'subaltern' conversations to which Kapoor refers.
34. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue maintains that discourse ethics and philosophical hermeneutics are not 'necessarily conflicting approaches' since both are committed to universalism. But Shapcott is critical of what he see as the 'assimilatory potential' in discourse ethics (ibid., p. 105). This potential arises from its gendered character which privileges 'the generalised over the concrete other' (ibid., p. 111) and which excludes 'the interests, and concerns of particular concrete others' (ibid., p. 167). I come back to this later.
35. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue maintains that discourse ethics and philosophical hermeneutics are not 'necessarily conflicting approaches' since both are committed to universalism. But Shapcott is critical of what he see as the 'assimilatory potential' in discourse ethics (ibid., p. 105). This potential arises from its gendered character which privileges 'the generalised over the concrete other' (ibid., p. 111) and which excludes 'the interests, and concerns of particular concrete others' (ibid., p. 167). I come back to this later.
36. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue maintains that discourse ethics and philosophical hermeneutics are not 'necessarily conflicting approaches' since both are committed to universalism. But Shapcott is critical of what he see as the 'assimilatory potential' in discourse ethics (ibid., p. 105). This potential arises from its gendered character which privileges 'the generalised over the concrete other' (ibid., p. 111) and which excludes 'the interests, and concerns of particular concrete others' (ibid., p. 167). I come back to this later.
37. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue maintains that discourse ethics and philosophical hermeneutics are not 'necessarily conflicting approaches' since both are committed to universalism. But Shapcott is critical of what he see as the 'assimilatory potential' in discourse ethics (ibid., p. 105). This potential arises from its gendered character which privileges 'the generalised over the concrete other' (ibid., p. 111) and which excludes 'the interests, and concerns of particular concrete others' (ibid., p. 167). I come back to this later.
38. J. Butler, 'Universality in Culture', in M. Nussbaum, For Love of Country?, edited by J. Cohen for the Boston Review (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2002), p. 46.
39. Butler, 'Universality', p. 47.
40. Ibid., p. 51 and p. 49.
41. Ibid., p. 52.
42. J. Lichtenberg, 'National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan View', in P. G. Brown and H. Shue (eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Toyota: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p. 94. See also J. Habermas, 'Reply to the Symposium Participants', p. 393.
43. J. Lichtenberg, 'National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan View', in P. G. Brown and H. Shue (eds.), Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits (Toyota: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p. 94. See also J. Habermas, 'Reply to the Symposium Participants', p. 393.
44. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue, p. 128.
45. K. Hutchings, 'Moral Deliberation and Political Judgment: Reflections on Benhabib's Interactive Universalism', Theory, Culture and Society, 14 (1997), p. 141.
46. Hutchings, 'Moral Deliberation', p. 137.
47. S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).
48. See also Habermas, 'Paradigms of Law', p. 21.
49. Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue, p. 114.
50. Benhabib, Situating the Self.
51. See, however, M. Rosenfeld, 'Can Rights, Democracy and Justice be Reconciled through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas's Proceduralist Paradigm of Law', in M. Rosenfeld and A. Arato (eds.), Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 107.
52. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 323.
53. For a related discussion which focuses on 'the overlap of lifeworlds', see Dietelhoff and Muller, Theoretical Paradise.
54. See Shapcott, Justice, Community and Dialogue, p. 171.
55. M. Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1992), ch.5. For a discussion of feminist debates about 'normative universalism', see K. Hutchings, Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism and IR., this issue.
56. M. Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 1992), ch.5. For a discussion of feminist debates about 'normative universalism', see K. Hutchings, Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism and IR., this issue.
57. See D. Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 151.