Optimal contracts in a dynamic costly state verification model

Economic Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 867-885

  Monnet, Cyril ^a   Quintin, Erwan ^b  

^a EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Costly state verification; Dynamic contracts; Monitoring; Theory of uncertainty and information

Indexed keywords

EID: 12744271542     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0535-z     Document Type: Article

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