The rise and decline of presidential populism

Studies in American Political Development

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 136-159

  Bimes, Terri ^a   Mulroy, Quinn ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 12344287045     PISSN: 0898588X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0898588x04000082     Document Type: Review

References (180)

1. Donald Lambro, "Gore Sends DLC his regrets," The Washington Times, July 31, 2002; Dan Balz, "Democrats Assessing the New Climate," Washington Post, July 29, 2002.
2. Donald Lambro, "Gore Sends DLC his regrets," The Washington Times, July 31, 2002; Dan Balz, "Democrats Assessing the New Climate," Washington Post, July 29, 2002.
3. Democrats continue to draw upon populist appeals in their campaigns. Bill Clinton campaigned against special interest-induced gridlock in 1992, and four years earlier, Michael Dukakis attacked "fast operators" on Wall Street and defended the people "who don't have any special friends at the bank or special interest lobbyists in Washington, D.C." However, we find that Democratic presidents have moved away from using such populist appeals in their major formal governing addresses. (William J. Clinton, speech delivered in Columbus, Ohio, Sept. 29, 1992, Michael Dukakis, speech given in Peoria, Illinois, Sept. 27, 1988; and Michael Dukakis, speech given in Peoria, Illinois, Sept. 27, 1988. All speeches are taken from the Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse CD-ROM.)
4. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
5. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
6. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
7. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
8. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
9. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
10. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
11. For instance, see Theodore Lowi, The Personal President: Power Invested, Promise Unfulfilled (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Fourth-Party Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963). Recent work by Karen Hoffman ("Misunderstanding Executive Representation: Causes and Consequences" Congress & The Presidency 28 [2001]: 185-207): Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership: The Presidency, Political Parties, and Democratic Leadership [Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2004]): Mel Laracey (Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public [College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), and David Zarefsky ('The Presidency Has Always Been a Place for Rhetorical Leadership," in The Presidency and Rhetorical leadership [College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002], 20-41) are important exceptions. See also the important edited volume, Richard J. Ellis, Speaking to the People: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).
12. Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion, 7-8. Keith E. Whittington, "The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and Bill Clinton," in The Presidency Then and Now, ed. Phillip G. Henderson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 202.
13. Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion, 7-8. Keith E. Whittington, "The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and Bill Clinton," in The Presidency Then and Now, ed. Phillip G. Henderson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 202.
14. James W. Ceaser, Glen E. Thurow, Jeffrey Tulis, and Joseph Bessette, 'The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency," in Rethinking the Presidency, ed. Thomas E. Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1982), 238.
15. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 5.
16. Ibid., 132.
17. Arthur Link, "Woodrow Wilson: The Philosophy, Methods, arid Impact of Leadership" in Woodrow Wilson and The World of Today, ed. Arthur P. Dudden (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 9.
18. Ceaser, Presidential Selection, 51, 183, 208.
19. Yet, Ceaser in his latest work ("Doctrine of Presidential- Congressional Relations," Separation of Powers and Good Government, ed. Bradford P. Wilson and Peter W. Schramm [Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefleld Publishers, Inc., 1994], 89-112) recants this position, contending that the idea of presidential popular authority is consistent with the Founding view of the Constitution.
20. See Ralph Ketcham, Presidents Above Party: the First American Presidency 1796-1829 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).
21. Ironically, most of Tulis's evidence for his claims about nineteenth-century informal rhetoric come from James B. Richardson's compilation of formal addresses and messages for that period. As Gerald Gamm and Renée Smith ("Presidents, Parties, and the Public: Evolving Patterns of Interaction, 1877-1929," in Speaking to the People, 88-89) point out, many of the informal speeches made on presidential tours are missing from Richardson's volumes. This casts doubt on Tulis's conclusions about informal presidential rhetoric in the nineteenth century.
22. Tulis examines very briefly the "official rhetoric" of our first presidents in his introductory chapter, covering in a cursory manner the addresses and messages of George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. See Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 47-59.
23. Kenneth Cmiel, Democratic Eloquence: The Fight Over Popular Speech in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1990) traces the transition from a neoclassical tradition to a more "crude and raw" standard of popular speech in the early nineteenth century. This shift in standards was reflected in political oratory as well as in news stories published in the popular press.
24. Mel Laracey, Presidents and the People: The Partisan Story of Going Public (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University, 2002), 80, 87. Laracey points out that Democratic presidents were much more likely than Whig presidents to use the official paper to press their own leadership claims.
25. William Jennings Bryan confronted this reality as late as 1896 when he decided to read his nomination acceptance speech to a large crowd that had gathered at Madison Square Garden in order to ensure that the newspapers had an accurate record. Disappointed by Bryan's dry performance, the crowd filtered out early. Bryan explained his decision to read his speech rather than to speak extemporaneously: "In order to secure the publication of an accurate report of the speech in the daily papers it would be necessary to furnish a copy in advance of delivery.... I concluded that it was... better... to disappoint the few thousands who would be in the hall in order to reach the hundreds of thousands who would read it in print." As quoted in Richard Ellis, "Accepting the Nomination: From Martin Van Buren to Franklin Delano Roosevelt," in Speaking to the People, 120.
26. Laracey, Presidents and the People, 70-71.
27. Ibid., 71.
28. Michael Korzi (manuscript for "A New Migration of Political Forces: Party Decline and Presidential Leadership in Late Nineteenth Century America," June 2003) and Gerald Gamm and Renée Smith ("Presidents, Parties, and the Public: Patterns of Interaction, 1877-1929," in Speaking to the People, 90-91) suggest that parties, through their control of newspapers, tempered and restrained presidential rhetoric, preventing the emergence of the plebiscitary presidency until after the Civil War, or, in Gamm and Smith's account, the 1890s, when the partisan press and party organization began to decline. However, newspapers' policy of printing the full text of annual messages shows that nineteenth-century presidents were able to use these written communications to disseminate their message-in their own words-to the general public. As discussed below, it is also clear that Democratic presidents used their messages to pursue policies that showed considerable independence of their party. Furthermore, Democratic presidents used their messages to shape their party's stance on key issues, rather than simply being agents constrained by their party's stands.
29. Michael Korzi (manuscript for "A New Migration of Political Forces: Party Decline and Presidential Leadership in Late Nineteenth Century America," June 2003) and Gerald Gamm and Renée Smith ("Presidents, Parties, and the Public: Patterns of Interaction, 1877-1929," in Speaking to the People, 90-91) suggest that parties, through their control of newspapers, tempered and restrained presidential rhetoric, preventing the emergence of the plebiscitary presidency until after the Civil War, or, in Gamm and Smith's account, the 1890s, when the partisan press and party organization began to decline. However, newspapers' policy of printing the full text of annual messages shows that nineteenth-century presidents were able to use these written communications to disseminate their message-in their own words-to the general public. As discussed below, it is also clear that Democratic presidents used their messages to pursue policies that showed considerable independence of their party. Furthermore, Democratic presidents used their messages to shape their party's stance on key issues, rather than simply being agents constrained by their party's stands.
30. When disputes broke out between presidents and partisan editors of the official organ, it was usually the partisan editor who suffered the consequences. When the US Telegraph continued to endorse Calhoun after he had fallen out of favor with Jackson, the sev enth president switched the government's patronage to the Globe, replacing Duff Green with Francis P. Blair as editor. Similarly, Polk sought out a more receptive editor of the official organ because of Blair's opposition to Texas annexation, one of Folk's major policy goals. In a letter to Jackson, Polk complained: "I must be the head of my own administration, and will not be controlled by any newspaper or particular individual whom it serves" (John Tebbel and Sarah Miles Watts, The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan [New York: Oxford University Press], 116-19). Shortly after his inaugural address, Polk selected the Washington Union, edited by Thomas Ritchie, as the administration's official organ. The president's control over the official organ guaranteed that he would have a mouthpiece to present his agenda if needed.
31. The supplement copy was aimed at members of Congress.
32. James K. Polk, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 5, 1848, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897-1922), 4:2511.
33. Bruce Miroff, "Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics," in Rethinking the Presidency, ed. Thomas E. Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 223. Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 67; Willmoore Kendall asserts that defenders of the presidency as popular leader often point out that the Senate filibuster and the seniority principle "make it possible for little bands of willful men to frustrate alleged majority mandates" ('The Two Majorities," Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 [I960]: 321).
34. Bruce Miroff, "Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics," in Rethinking the Presidency, ed. Thomas E. Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 223. Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 67; Willmoore Kendall asserts that defenders of the presidency as popular leader often point out that the Senate filibuster and the seniority principle "make it possible for little bands of willful men to frustrate alleged majority mandates" ('The Two Majorities," Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 [I960]: 321).
35. Bruce Miroff, "Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics," in Rethinking the Presidency, ed. Thomas E. Cronin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 223. Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 67; Willmoore Kendall asserts that defenders of the presidency as popular leader often point out that the Senate filibuster and the seniority principle "make it possible for little bands of willful men to frustrate alleged majority mandates" ('The Two Majorities," Midwest Journal of Political Science 4 [I960]: 321).
36. Miroff, "Monopolizing the Public Space: The President as a Problem for Democratic Politics," 223.
37. Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 1.
38. Thomas Goebel, 'The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal," Studies in American Political Development, 11 (Spring 1997): 109-148. For other definitions of populism, see Richard Hofstadter, The Temper of Populism," in Populism: The Critical Issues, ed. Sheldon Hackney (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 119-38; Michael P. Federici, The Challenge of Populism: The Rise of Right-Wing Democratism in Postwar America (New York: Praeger, 1991), 35-86; and Margaret Canovan, Two Strategies for the Study of Populism," Political Studies 30 (1982): 552.
39. Thomas Goebel, 'The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal," Studies in American Political Development, 11 (Spring 1997): 109-148. For other definitions of populism, see Richard Hofstadter, The Temper of Populism," in Populism: The Critical Issues, ed. Sheldon Hackney (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 119-38; Michael P. Federici, The Challenge of Populism: The Rise of Right-Wing Democratism in Postwar America (New York: Praeger, 1991), 35-86; and Margaret Canovan, Two Strategies for the Study of Populism," Political Studies 30 (1982): 552.
40. Thomas Goebel, 'The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal," Studies in American Political Development, 11 (Spring 1997): 109-148. For other definitions of populism, see Richard Hofstadter, The Temper of Populism," in Populism: The Critical Issues, ed. Sheldon Hackney (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 119-38; Michael P. Federici, The Challenge of Populism: The Rise of Right-Wing Democratism in Postwar America (New York: Praeger, 1991), 35-86; and Margaret Canovan, Two Strategies for the Study of Populism," Political Studies 30 (1982): 552.
41. Thomas Goebel, 'The Political Economy of American Populism from Jackson to the New Deal," Studies in American Political Development, 11 (Spring 1997): 109-148. For other definitions of populism, see Richard Hofstadter, The Temper of Populism," in Populism: The Critical Issues, ed. Sheldon Hackney (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 119-38; Michael P. Federici, The Challenge of Populism: The Rise of Right-Wing Democratism in Postwar America (New York: Praeger, 1991), 35-86; and Margaret Canovan, Two Strategies for the Study of Populism," Political Studies 30 (1982): 552.
42. John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America 1828-1996 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 187-231.
43. See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931); Lawrence D. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865-1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
44. See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931); Lawrence D. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865-1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
45. See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931); Lawrence D. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865-1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
46. See John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931); Lawrence D. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Gretchen Ritter, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865-1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
47. For example, see Jeff Fishel, Presidents and Promises: From Campaign Pledges to Presidential Performance (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1985), 9-12.
48. On this point, see Keith E. Whittington, The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and Bill Clinton," in The Presidency Then and Now, 201-18.
49. Philip Abbott, The Exemplary Presidency:Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990), 6-14.
50. I b i d.
51. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 76.
52. The American Freedom Library CD-ROM (Orem, UT: Western Standard Publishing Company, 1998). The AFL CD-ROM is missing the last two years of Taft's administration and the entire Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge administrations. To fill in the gaps on the CD-ROM, we have coded digital copies of the text of the inaugural addresses and state of the union messages for the omitted administrations. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents for George W. Bush is available at: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ publications/weekly_compilation.html (accessed Sept. 24, 2003). The Public Papers of President Bill Clinton are available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ pubpapers/index.html (accessed Sept. 24, 2003).
53. The American Freedom Library CD-ROM (Orem, UT: Western Standard Publishing Company, 1998). The AFL CD-ROM is missing the last two years of Taft's administration and the entire Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge administrations. To fill in the gaps on the CD-ROM, we have coded digital copies of the text of the inaugural addresses and state of the union messages for the omitted administrations. The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents for George W. Bush is available at: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ publications/weekly_compilation.html (accessed Sept. 24, 2003). The Public Papers of President Bill Clinton are available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ pubpapers/index.html (accessed Sept. 24, 2003).
54. In the case of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents and the electronic version of Bill Clinton's presidential papers, it involved examining all documents for a specific search term.
55. We then read the paragraph, as well as the preceding and following paragraph, to determine whether it constituted an actual claim of popular authority and to pinpoint what program or policy the president was advocating with the popular appeal. The same process was done in the detection of antagonistic appeals.
56. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address at the Dedication the New Chemistry Building, Howard University, Washington, D.C.," Oct. 26, 1936, AFL CD-ROM; Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Veto of a Revenue Bill," Feb. 22, 1944, AFL CD-ROM.
57. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Address at the Dedication the New Chemistry Building, Howard University, Washington, D.C.," Oct. 26, 1936, AFL CD-ROM; Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Veto of a Revenue Bill," Feb. 22, 1944, AFL CD-ROM.
58. During the election campaign, the Whig party and sometimes the presidential candidate himself would claim a closeness to the people. These campaign claims, however, did not translate into popular leadership once in the White House.
59. Douglas Jaenicke, The Jacksonian Integration of Parties into the Constitutional System." Political Science Quarterly 101 (1986): 89.
60. See also Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership: From Washington through Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 112-13.
61. Susan Herbst, "Public Opinion from the Presidents' Perspective: What Can We Learn from their Speeches?" paper presented at the Midwest American Political Science Association meeting, April 19-22, 2001.
62. One might suspect that Democrats' partisan commitment to a limited state was a major constraint on Democratic presidents' power. This is not necessarily the case, however, since attacking the state can entail substantial independent presidential action. Jackson claimed to be the agent of the popular will and then proceeded with one of the most aggressive acts by a president in American history: the routing of funds from the National Bank to several stale banks across the United States. The removal of deposits case shows how presidential power and a commitment to a limited state could be linked.
63. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 161. Tebbel and Watts, The Press and the Presidency, 118.
64. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 161. Tebbel and Watts, The Press and the Presidency, 118.
65. Andrew Jackson, "First Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1829, Messages and Papers, 2:1001.
66. Andrew Jackson, "Second Annual Message," Dec. 6, 1830, Messages and Papers, 2:1081. Despite these popular leadership claims, Stephen Kirk and Richard Ellis label the 1828 election "the mandate not taken" ("Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century: Conceptual Change and Institutional Development," Studies in American Political Development 9 [1995]: 127-33). They point out that Jackson neither campaigned on nor claimed a mandate for his position on tariff policy, banking issues, or federally sponsored internal improvement projects, Although Ellis and Kirk are right that Jackson did not claim a mandate on these policy issues, Jackson unequivocally broke new ground in claiming a clear mandate for electoral reform. If the House of Representatives was capable of distorting the popular will in the run-off election of the president, what was to prevent it from ignoring the popular will on policy? Jackson's inaugural address, in combination with his first two annual messages, provided a bold expression of Jackson's theory of popular leadership that would guide his subsequent actions as president.
67. Andrew Jackson, "Second Annual Message," Dec. 6, 1830, Messages and Papers, 2:1081. Despite these popular leadership claims, Stephen Kirk and Richard Ellis label the 1828 election "the mandate not taken" ("Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century: Conceptual Change and Institutional Development," Studies in American Political Development 9 [1995]: 127-33). They point out that Jackson neither campaigned on nor claimed a mandate for his position on tariff policy, banking issues, or federally sponsored internal improvement projects, Although Ellis and Kirk are right that Jackson did not claim a mandate on these policy issues, Jackson unequivocally broke new ground in claiming a clear mandate for electoral reform. If the House of Representatives was capable of distorting the popular will in the run-off election of the president, what was to prevent it from ignoring the popular will on policy? Jackson's inaugural address, in combination with his first two annual messages, provided a bold expression of Jackson's theory of popular leadership that would guide his subsequent actions as president.
68. Andrew Jackson, "Removal of the Public Deposits," Sept. 18, 1833, Messages and Papers, 2:1226.
69. Quoted in Robert Remini, "Election of 1832," in History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 1:516.
70. Facts about the Presidents: A Compilation of Biographical and Historical Information, ed. Joseph Nathan Kane, Janet Podell, and Steven Anzovin (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 2001), 89.
71. The Senate passed the censure on Mar. 28, 1834, by a vote of 26 to 20. The breakdown of the vote was as follows: Jacksonians voted 18 to 1 against the censure; the nullifiers voted 2 to 0 in favor of the censure; and the Anti-Jacksonians voted 23 to 2 in favor of censuring Jackson (Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 1789-1996, ICPSR File No. 0004). Party affiliations were derived from Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's data set on members' partisanship and ideology. On this, see Poole and Rosenthal, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991): 228-78.
72. Andrew Jackson, "Protest, "Apr. 15, 1834, Messages and Papers, 2:1310, 1309.
73. Ibid., 2:1296.
74. In the House, the Jacksonian party had a large majority numbering 150 members out of a total of 222. For more information on the resolutions that the House passed in December 1833, see Donald B. Cole, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 207.
75. See Andrew Jackson, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 4, 1832, Messages and Papers, 2:1165.
76. The Senate voted 24 to 19 to expunge the censure from the Senate Journal on Jan. 16, 1837: Jacksonians voted 24 to 0 for removal of the resolution; the nullifiers voted 2 to 0 against removal; and the Anti-Jacksonians voted 17 to 0 against removal.
77. Martin Van Buren, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1837, Messages and Papers, 2:1535.
78. Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the United States (New York: Kurd and Houghton, 1867), 330.
79. Van Buren is citing Judge White, whom Van Buren believed had expressed "in a perspicuous and satisfactory manner" the views of President Jackson (Inquiry, 329-30).
80. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 43. Robert Dahl makes a similar point in "Myth of the Presidential Mandate," Political Science Quarterly 105 (1990): 357.
81. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 43. Robert Dahl makes a similar point in "Myth of the Presidential Mandate," Political Science Quarterly 105 (1990): 357.
82. James K. Polk, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1845, Messages and Papers, 3:2231.
83. James K. Polk, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 5, 1848, Messages and Papers, 4:2514-15.
84. Still, as a Democratic senator from Tennessee in 1844, Johnson heartily endorsed the idea that Folk's election represented a mandate to annex both Texas and Oregon. He proclaimed, The country has settled this question [of the reannexation of Texas and Oregon]; the people have pronounced in decisive tones in favor of the principles of the Baltimore convention, and of the President whom they nominated; and it is the duty of Congress to carry out the wishes of the people. (Ellis and Kirk, "Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century," 162)
85. Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 295.
86. Andrew Johnson, "Third Annual Message," Dec. 3, 1867, Messages and Papers, 5:3769.
87. Andrew Johnson, 'Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau," Feb. 19, 1866, Messages and Papers, 5:3603.
88. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 87-93.
89. "Articles of Impeachment," Messages and Papers, 5:3912-15.
90. It should be noted that there is no consensus about the importance of the tenth article. Benjamin Butler, the congress member who drafted the tenth article, remarked that this article was of "merited insignificance" compared to the other articles of impeachment. See Lloyd Paul Stoker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 626. For modern authors that belittle the tenth article, see Hans L. Trefousse, Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1975), 147; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928) : and Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). In contrast, Keith Whittington ("Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning," Ph.D. disc., Yale University, 1995) points out the tenth article's importance in signaling the political construction of the impeachment hearings.
91. It should be noted that there is no consensus about the importance of the tenth article. Benjamin Butler, the congress member who drafted the tenth article, remarked that this article was of "merited insignificance" compared to the other articles of impeachment. See Lloyd Paul Stoker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 626. For modern authors that belittle the tenth article, see Hans L. Trefousse, Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1975), 147; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928) : and Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). In contrast, Keith Whittington ("Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning," Ph.D. disc., Yale University, 1995) points out the tenth article's importance in signaling the political construction of the impeachment hearings.
92. It should be noted that there is no consensus about the importance of the tenth article. Benjamin Butler, the congress member who drafted the tenth article, remarked that this article was of "merited insignificance" compared to the other articles of impeachment. See Lloyd Paul Stoker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 626. For modern authors that belittle the tenth article, see Hans L. Trefousse, Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1975), 147; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928) : and Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). In contrast, Keith Whittington ("Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning," Ph.D. disc., Yale University, 1995) points out the tenth article's importance in signaling the political construction of the impeachment hearings.
93. It should be noted that there is no consensus about the importance of the tenth article. Benjamin Butler, the congress member who drafted the tenth article, remarked that this article was of "merited insignificance" compared to the other articles of impeachment. See Lloyd Paul Stoker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 626. For modern authors that belittle the tenth article, see Hans L. Trefousse, Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1975), 147; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928) : and Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). In contrast, Keith Whittington ("Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning," Ph.D. disc., Yale University, 1995) points out the tenth article's importance in signaling the political construction of the impeachment hearings.
94. It should be noted that there is no consensus about the importance of the tenth article. Benjamin Butler, the congress member who drafted the tenth article, remarked that this article was of "merited insignificance" compared to the other articles of impeachment. See Lloyd Paul Stoker, Andrew Johnson: A Study in Courage (New York: Macmillan, 1929), 626. For modern authors that belittle the tenth article, see Hans L. Trefousse, Impeachment of a President: Andrew Johnson, the Blacks, and Reconstruction (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1975), 147; Robert W. Winston, Andrew Johnson: Plebian and Patriot (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928) : and Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Reconstruction. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). In contrast, Keith Whittington ("Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning," Ph.D. disc., Yale University, 1995) points out the tenth article's importance in signaling the political construction of the impeachment hearings.
95. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 93.
96. "Articles of Impeachment," 5:3915.
97. Franklin Pierce, "Inaugural Address," Mar, 4, 1853, Messages and Papers, 4:2735; James Buchanan, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1857, Messages and Papers, 4:2962.
98. Franklin Pierce, "Inaugural Address," Mar, 4, 1853, Messages and Papers, 4:2735; James Buchanan, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1857, Messages and Papers, 4:2962.
99. Grover Cleveland, "First Annual Message," Dec. 4, 1893, Messages and Papers, 8:5891.
100. Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), 51.
101. William Henry Harrison, "[Sept. 10, 1840] Speech in Dayton, Ohio," in History of American Presidential Elections 1789-1984, 2:737-44.
102. William Henry Harrison, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1841, Messages and Papers, 3:1860. Both Patricia Heidoting-Conley (Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001], 54) and Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership, chap. 5) classify this claim as an example of a mandate. While Conley does not explain her coding decision, Korzi argues that Harrison was a popular leader and with this statement was responding to opposition attacks that he was simply making empty pledges in the 1840 campaign. Harrison, however, articulates the antithesis of a theory of popular leadership repeatedly in his campaign by refusing to make campaign pledges and promises. In a campaign speech, Harrison states that he "cannot consent to make mere promises the condition of obtaining the office which you kindly wish to bestow on me." He adds that "his long and arduous life" is a pledge of my future course ("Speech in Dayton, Ohio," 2:738). Although Harrison discusses issues in his campaign and in his inaugural address, he never links these issue positions to his election or his party's election victory, and thus remains faithful to Whig Party doctrine.
103. William Henry Harrison, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1841, Messages and Papers, 3:1860. Both Patricia Heidoting-Conley (Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001], 54) and Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership, chap. 5) classify this claim as an example of a mandate. While Conley does not explain her coding decision, Korzi argues that Harrison was a popular leader and with this statement was responding to opposition attacks that he was simply making empty pledges in the 1840 campaign. Harrison, however, articulates the antithesis of a theory of popular leadership repeatedly in his campaign by refusing to make campaign pledges and promises. In a campaign speech, Harrison states that he "cannot consent to make mere promises the condition of obtaining the office which you kindly wish to bestow on me." He adds that "his long and arduous life" is a pledge of my future course ("Speech in Dayton, Ohio," 2:738). Although Harrison discusses issues in his campaign and in his inaugural address, he never links these issue positions to his election or his party's election victory, and thus remains faithful to Whig Party doctrine.
104. William Henry Harrison, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1841, Messages and Papers, 3:1860. Both Patricia Heidoting-Conley (Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001], 54) and Michael Korzi (A Seat of Popular Leadership, chap. 5) classify this claim as an example of a mandate. While Conley does not explain her coding decision, Korzi argues that Harrison was a popular leader and with this statement was responding to opposition attacks that he was simply making empty pledges in the 1840 campaign. Harrison, however, articulates the antithesis of a theory of popular leadership repeatedly in his campaign by refusing to make campaign pledges and promises. In a campaign speech, Harrison states that he "cannot consent to make mere promises the condition of obtaining the office which you kindly wish to bestow on me." He adds that "his long and arduous life" is a pledge of my future course ("Speech in Dayton, Ohio," 2:738). Although Harrison discusses issues in his campaign and in his inaugural address, he never links these issue positions to his election or his party's election victory, and thus remains faithful to Whig Party doctrine.
105. John Ashworth, Agrarians & Aristocrats: Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1983), 58.
106. Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress, 3d ed., (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 166.
107. On the creation of the Whig party, see Edward L. Mayo, "Republicanism, Antipartyism, and Jacksonian Party Politics: A View From the Nation's Capital, American Quarterly 31 (1979): 3-20.
108. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
109. Harrison, "Inaugural Address," Messages and Papers, 3:1865.
110. Zachary Taylor, "First Annual Message," Dec. 4, 1849, Messages and Papers, 4:2561. The only partial exception was the mongrel Whig/Democrat John Tyler, who took over as president after Whig president Harrison died. In his fourth annual message, given after Folk's 1844 election victory, Tyler acknowledged a mandate for the annexation of Texas, noting that "the isolated question of annexation ... has been submitted to the ordeal of public sentiment." However, Tyler viewed the mandate as being directed primarily at members of Congress not the incoming president: "Instructions have thus come up to both branches of Congress from their respective constituents in terms the most emphatic" supporting the reannexation of Texas (Dec. 3, 1844, Messages and Papers, 3:2197). It is also important to remember that Tyler was not a candidate in the 1844 presidential election and that Tyler had been rejected as a heretic by his fellow Whigs following his vetoes of a series of Whig policy initiatives. Thus, Tyler's claim of a mandate does not undermine the theory of popular leadership being based on party traditions.
111. Zachary Taylor, "First Annual Message," Dec. 4, 1849, Messages and Papers, 4:2561. The only partial exception was the mongrel Whig/Democrat John Tyler, who took over as president after Whig president Harrison died. In his fourth annual message, given after Folk's 1844 election victory, Tyler acknowledged a mandate for the annexation of Texas, noting that "the isolated question of annexation ... has been submitted to the ordeal of public sentiment." However, Tyler viewed the mandate as being directed primarily at members of Congress not the incoming president: "Instructions have thus come up to both branches of Congress from their respective constituents in terms the most emphatic" supporting the reannexation of Texas (Dec. 3, 1844, Messages and Papers, 3:2197). It is also important to remember that Tyler was not a candidate in the 1844 presidential election and that Tyler had been rejected as a heretic by his fellow Whigs following his vetoes of a series of Whig policy initiatives. Thus, Tyler's claim of a mandate does not undermine the theory of popular leadership being based on party traditions.
112. The only exception was John Tyler, who cast six vetoes. William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore cast no vetoes.
113. Richard J. Ellis and Stephen Kirk point to these messages as crucial moments in the development of Republican popular leadership ("Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century: Conceptual Change and Institutional Development," Studies in American Political Development 9 [1995]: 117-86).
114. Abraham Lincoln, "First Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1861, Messages and Papers, 5:3206.
115. Abraham Lincoln, "Proclamation," July 8, 1864, Messages and Papers, 5:3423-24.
116. Ibid. Despite Lincoln's circumspection, his pocket veto and proclamation generated outrage from the congressional sponsors of the bill, Republicans Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Henry Winter Davis of Maryland. In the Wade-Davis Manifesto, they blasted Lincoln's "grave Executive usurpation" in pocket-vetoing their Reconstruction bill, and they denounced his proclamation as a "studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people" ('The Wade-Davis Manifesto," in History of American Presidential Elections, 2:1195-96).
117. Ibid. Despite Lincoln's circumspection, his pocket veto and proclamation generated outrage from the congressional sponsors of the bill, Republicans Benjamin Wade of Ohio and Henry Winter Davis of Maryland. In the Wade-Davis Manifesto, they blasted Lincoln's "grave Executive usurpation" in pocket-vetoing their Reconstruction bill, and they denounced his proclamation as a "studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people" ('The Wade-Davis Manifesto," in History of American Presidential Elections, 2:1195-96).
118. Abraham Lincoln, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 6, 1864, Messages and Papers, 5:3453. See Ellis and Kirk, "Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century," 168-70 for a more detailed analysis of the 1864 election.
119. Abraham Lincoln, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 6, 1864, Messages and Papers, 5:3453. See Ellis and Kirk, "Presidential Mandates in the Nineteenth Century," 168-70 for a more detailed analysis of the 1864 election.
120. Lincoln, "Fourth Annual Message," 5:3453.
121. Although Lincoln pushed for inclusion of the anti-slavery plank in the GOP platform, it is unclear whether his support was critical to its inclusion. See J. G. Randall and Richard N. Current, Lincoln the President; Last Full Measure (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1955).
122. James M. Ashley (R-OH) changed his vote from yea to nay so that, in accordance with the House rules, he could move for a reconsideration of the resolution at the next session of Congress.
123. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., History of American Presidential Elections, 2:1169.
124. Rutherford B. Hayes, "First Inaugural Address," Mar. 5, 1877, Messages and Papers, 6:4397. The Republican Party had managed to place a weak civil service reform plank in its platform despite deep divisions within the party over this issue. Hayes, in contrast, was committed to passing civil service reform. Thus, of nineteenth-century post-Civil War Republican presidents, Hayes comes closest to claiming a mandate for a personal, rather than a party, policy goal.
125. William McKinley, "First Inaugural Message, Mar. 4, 1897, Messages
126. [Mar. 4, 1901, Messages and Papers, 9:6465] where he proclaimed that 'The national verdict of 1896 has for the most part been executed. Whatever remains unfulfilled is a continuing obligation resting with undiminished force upon the Executive and the Congress."
127. McKinley, "First Inaugural Address," 8:6242.
128. While McKinley was a strong believer in his party's protectionist policies. He was the chief author of the 1890 McKinley Tariff, which raised rates substantially, it would be a stretch to claim that McKinley led his party to its pro-tariff position. Indeed, his leading rival for the GOP nomination, Thomas Reed of Maine, was also committed to high tariffs.
129. William Howard Taft, "First Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1909, Messages and Papers, 10:7749
130. Warren G. Harding, "First Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1921, Messages and Papers, 18:8924.
131. James W. Ceaser, "Political Parties and Presidential Ambition," The Journal of Politics 40 (1978): 730.
132. Calvin Coolidge, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1925, in The Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents (New York: Gramercy Books, 1995), 355.
133. Hoover, "Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1929, in The Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents, 372.
134. Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 249.
135. See Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 106-10.
136. Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 196.
137. Conley, Presidential Mandates, 6-7.
138. Ibid., 53-54.
139. Conley also omits party mandate claims by Rutherford B. Hayes ("First Inaugural Address," 6:4397; "First Annual Message," Dec. 3, 1877 Messages and Papers, 6:4413, 4417) pledging support for civil service reform and the resumption of specie payments, and James Garfield ("Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1881, Messages and Papers, 6:4597) promising to enact the party platform at the behest of the people who "passed judgment upon the conduct and opinions of political parties" in the last election.
140. Conley also omits party mandate claims by Rutherford B. Hayes ("First Inaugural Address," 6:4397; "First Annual Message," Dec. 3, 1877 Messages and Papers, 6:4413, 4417) pledging support for civil service reform and the resumption of specie payments, and James Garfield ("Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1881, Messages and Papers, 6:4597) promising to enact the party platform at the behest of the people who "passed judgment upon the conduct and opinions of political parties" in the last election.
141. Conley also omits party mandate claims by Rutherford B. Hayes ("First Inaugural Address," 6:4397; "First Annual Message," Dec. 3, 1877 Messages and Papers, 6:4413, 4417) pledging support for civil service reform and the resumption of specie payments, and James Garfield ("Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1881, Messages and Papers, 6:4597) promising to enact the party platform at the behest of the people who "passed judgment upon the conduct and opinions of political parties" in the last election.
142. Jackson, "Fourth Annual Address," 2:1162.
143. Andrew Jackson, "Veto of the Maysville Road," May 27, 1830, Messages and Papers, 2:1053.
144. Andrew Jackson, "Bank Veto Message," Messages and Papers, 2:1153.
145. This calculation is based on the total number of populist appeals for each president. Examining the average number of populist appeals per speech, the Whig Harrison actually scores higher than Polk. Harrison, who died after one month in office, employed two populist appeals in his inaugural address. One of these, however, was directed at demagogues and the spirit of faction (i.e. Jackson and his followers), and thus might be considered a populist salvo against populism. Decades later, Teddy Roosevelt made such attacks on populists one of the staples of his antagonistic appeals.
146. Ceaser, Presidential Selection, 167.
147. Ellis and Wildavsky, Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership, 131-34.
148. Martin Van Buren, 'Third Annual Message," Dec. 2, 1839, Messages and Paper 3:1771.
149. Polk, "Fourth Annual Message," Messages and Papers, 3:2511.
150. I b i d.
151. Johnson, "Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau," 5:3599.
152. Andrew Johnson, "Fourth Annual Message," Dec. 9, 1868, Messages and Papers, 5:3870.
153. Andrew Johnson, 'Veto of Civil Rights Bill," Mar, 27, 1866, Messages and Papers, 5:3611.
154. Johnson, "Third Annual Message," Messages and Papers, 5:3764.
155. Cleveland, "Second Inaugural Address," Mar. 4, 1893, Messages and Papers, 8:5822.
156. This passage is found in Cleveland's Fourth Annual Message [Messages and Papers, 8:5364] and in Andrew Jackson's "Protest to the Senate of the United States" [Messages and Papers, 2:1312].
157. This passage is found in Cleveland's Fourth Annual Message [Messages and Papers, 8:5364] and in Andrew Jackson's "Protest to the Senate of the United States" [Messages and Papers, 2:1312].
158. Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 381. For an opposing assessment, see Richard McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 323. McCormick argues that the theme of political-business corruption that was so central to Jackson's attack on the Bank was absent in Cleveland's fight for tariff reform. The quotes drawn from Cleveland's annual messages above, however, show that Cleveland more than once connected the tariff to political-business corruption. For corroborating evidence, see Robert R. Kelley, The Transatlantic Persuasion, 325-26.
159. Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 381. For an opposing assessment, see Richard McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 323. McCormick argues that the theme of political-business corruption that was so central to Jackson's attack on the Bank was absent in Cleveland's fight for tariff reform. The quotes drawn from Cleveland's annual messages above, however, show that Cleveland more than once connected the tariff to political-business corruption. For corroborating evidence, see Robert R. Kelley, The Transatlantic Persuasion, 325-26.
160. Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 381. For an opposing assessment, see Richard McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 323. McCormick argues that the theme of political-business corruption that was so central to Jackson's attack on the Bank was absent in Cleveland's fight for tariff reform. The quotes drawn from Cleveland's annual messages above, however, show that Cleveland more than once connected the tariff to political-business corruption. For corroborating evidence, see Robert R. Kelley, The Transatlantic Persuasion, 325-26.
161. John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181.
162. John Gerring, "A Chapter in the History of American Party Ideology: The Nineteenth-Century Democratic Party (1828-1892),"Polity, 26 (1994): 753.
163. Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, 521-23; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1:289-90, 302-15.
164. Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, 521-23; John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1:289-90, 302-15.
165. William Jennings Bryan, "Cross of Gold" speech given at the Democratic National Convention, July 9, 1896, para. 8 (Douglass Archives of American Public Address), http://douglass.speech.nwu.edu/brya_a26.htm (accessed Aug. 8, 2002).
166. "Acceptance Speech by William Jennings Bryan," Aug. 12, 1908, in History of American Presidential Elections, 1798-1968, 3:2125.
167. Robert W. Cherny, Introduction to Cross of Gold: Speech De livered Before the National Democratic Convention at Chicago, July 9, 1896 by William Jennings Bryan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 13.
168. On Pierce's use of the phrase "equal and exact justice," see Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 183. On Buchanan's insistence that nothing was wrong, see Buchanan, "Inaugural Address," 4:2963.
169. On Pierce's use of the phrase "equal and exact justice," see Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make, 183. On Buchanan's insistence that nothing was wrong, see Buchanan, "Inaugural Address," 4:2963.
170. For more on the Whig party's ideology, see Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 21; Ashworth, Agrarians & Aristocrats, 69-70.
171. For more on the Whig party's ideology, see Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 21; Ashworth, Agrarians & Aristocrats, 69-70.
172. Harrison, "Inaugural Address," 3:1873.
173. Ashworth, Agrarians & Aristocrats, chaps. 1-2.
174. Ibid., 69.
175. See Terri Bimes, The Metamorphosis of Presidential Populism, Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1999.
176. As quoted in Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 16.
177. It is also worth noting that although Clinton discussed campaign finance reform repeatedly in his formal addresses, the issue was not, by most accounts, a high priority of his administration. See William Saletan, "What Gore Doesn't Get: Al Gore's Bogus Defense of His Populist Message, " Slate [online accessed August 5, 2002: available on the internet at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2069005] for a useful comparison of Clinton and Gore's populism.
178. Julian E. Zelizer argues that popular resentment of taxation has generally been at odds with statebuilding. This suggests a potential wellspring of popular support for presidents' populist attacks on the state. See Zelizer, The Uneasy Relationship: Democracy, Taxation, and State Building Since the New Deal," in The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political History, ed. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 276-300.
179. Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 137.
180. See Terri Bimes, "Reagan: The Soft-Sell Populist" in The Reagan Presidency: Pragmatic Conservatism and Its Legacies, eds. W. Elliot Brownlee and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 61-81.