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Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 41-54

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

Author keywords

Asymptotic stability; Evolutionarily stable strategies; Multi player games; Replicator dynamics; Risk dominance

Indexed keywords


EID: 12144262737     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400183     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (55)

References (20)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.