THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE GOVERNANCE OF RELATIONS IN MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Research in the Sociology of Organizations

Volumn 20, Issue , 2003, Pages 1-18

  Buskens, Vincent ^a   Raub, Werner ^a   Snijders, Chris ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10944259364     PISSN: 0733558X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0733-558X(02)20001-4     Document Type: Review

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