Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games

Journal of Mathematical Sociology

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 201-240

  Weesie, Jeroen ^a   Raub, Werner ^b  

^a UTRECHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN NUREMBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001645894     PISSN: 0022250X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.1996.9990182     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. Akerlof, G. A., and Katz, L. F. (1989) Worker's trust funds and the logic of wage profiles. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 525-536.
2. Allen, D. W. (1992) Marriage and divorce: A comment, with a reply by H. E. Peters. American Economic Review 82: 679-693.
3. Aumann, R. J. (1974) Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1: 67-96.
4. Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books.
5. Becker, G. S. (1991) A Treatise on the Family, Enlarged ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
6. Becker, G. S., and Stigler, G. J. (1974) Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies 3: 1-18.
7. Becker, H. S. (1960) Notes on the concept of commitment, American Journal of Sociology 66: 32-40.
8. Buchanan, J. (1990) Europe's Constitutional Opportunity, Mimeo, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA.
9. Calvert, R. L. (1992) Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions, Mimeo, University of Rochester.
10. Coleman, J. S. (1988) Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology 94: S95-S120.
11. Coleman, J. S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge: Belknap Press.
12. Dasgupta, P. (1988) Trust as a commodity, in Gambetta, D. (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Oxford: Blackwell, 49-72.
13. Dixit, A. (1982) Recent developments in oligopoly theory. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 72: 12-17.
14. Durkheim, E. (1893) De la division du travail social, 9th ed., Paris: PUF 1973.
15. Eggertsson, T. (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Elster, J. (1979) Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
17. Elster, J. (1989) Solomonic Judgments. Studies in the Limitations of Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18. Fershtman, C., Judd, K. L., and Kalai, E. (1991) Observable contracts. Strategic delegation and cooperation. International Economic Review 32 (3): 551-559.
19. Flap, H. D. (1988) Conflict, Loyalty, and Violence, Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
20. Frank, R. H. (1988) Passions Within Reason. The Strategic Role of the Emotions, New York: Norton.
21. Fudenberg, D., and Maskin, E. (1986) The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54: 533-554.
22. Galanter, M. (1974) Why the 'Haves' come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal change. Law and Society Review 9: 95-160.
23. Granovetter, M. S. (1985) Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510.
24. Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. Heckathorn, D. D. (1990) Collective sanctions and compliance norms: A formal theory. American Sociological Review 55: 366-384.
26. Hirschman, A. O. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
27. Hirshleifer, D., and Rasmusen, E. (1989) Cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with ostracism. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12: 87-106.
28. Kanter, R. M. (1972) Commitment and Community, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
29. Klein, D. B., and O'Flaherty, B. (1991) A Game-Theoretic Rendering of Promises and Threats, Mimeo, University of California at Irvine.
30. Kreps, D. M. (1990a) A Course in Microeconomic Theory, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
31. Kreps, D. M. (1990b) Corporate culture and economic theory, in Alt, J. E., and Shepsle, K. A. (eds.) Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-143.
32. Kreps, D. M., and Wilson, R. (1982) Sequential equilibria. Econometrica 50: 863-894.
33. Lin, N. (1982) Social resources and instrumental action, in Marsden, P. V., and Lin, N. (eds.) Social Structure and Network Analysis, Beverly Hills: Sage, 131-146.
34. Macaulay, S. (1986) Private government, in Lipson, L., and Wheeler, S. (eds.) Law and the Social Sciences, New York: Russell Sage, 445-518.
35. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. (1992) Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
36. Miller, G. J. (1992) Managerial Dilemmas. The Political Economy of Hierarchy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
37. Myerson, R. B. (1991) Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
38. Nash, J. F. (1951) Noncooperative games. Annals of Mathematics 54: 289-295.
39. North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A. (1990) Bargaining and Markets, San Diego: Academic Press.
41. Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42. Panagopoulos, A. (1978) Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War, Athens: Grigoris.
43. Parsons, T. (1937) The Structure of Social Action, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, Paperback ed., New York: Free Press.
44. Peters, H. E. (1986) Marriage and divorce: Informational constraints and private contracting. American Economic Review 76: 437-454.
45. Raub, W., and Keren, G. (1993) Hostages as a commitment device. A game-theoretic model and an empirical test of some scenarios. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 21: 43-67.
46. Raub, W., and Weesie, J. (1990) Reputation and efficiency in social interactions: An example of network effects. American Journal of Sociology 96: 626-654.
47. Raub, W., and Weesie, J. (1993) Symbiotic arrangements: A sociological perspective. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149: 716-724.
48. Schelling, Th. C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, London: Oxford University Press.
49. Schelling, Th. C. (1984) Choice and Consequence. Perspectives of an Errant Economist, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
50. Schotter, A. (1981) The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
51. Schrüfer, K. (1988) Ökonomische Analyse individueller Arbeitsverhältnisse, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus.
52. Schuessler, R. (1989) Exit threats and cooperation under anonymity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 33: 728-749.
53. Schwarz, R. D. (1954) Social factors in the development of legal control: A case study of two Israeli settlements. Yale Law Journal 63: 471-491.
54. Selten, R. (1965) Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragcträghcit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121: 301-324, 667-689.
55. Shepsle, K. A. (1991) Discretion, institutions, and the problem of government commitment, in Bourdieu, P., and Coleman, J. S. (eds.) Social Theory for a Changing Society, Boulder: Westview Press, 245-263.
56. Snijders, C. (1996) Trust and Commitments, Ph.D. dissertation, Utrecht University.
57. Stinchcombe, A. L. (1974) Creating Efficient Industrial Administrations, New York: Academic Press.
58. Taylor, M. (1976/1987) The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Rev. ed. of Anarchy and Cooperation, London: Wiley.)
59. Tullock, G. (1981) Efficient rent seeking, in Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., and Tullock, G. (eds.) Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 97-112.
60. Van Cayseele, P., and Schreuder, H. (1988) Strategiebepaling door Ondernemingen: een Overzicht. Economisch Statistische Berichten 73: 1152-1159.
61. Vanberg, V., and Congleton, R. (1992) Rationality, morality, and exit. American Political Science Review 86: 418-431.
62. Voss, Th. (1985) Rationale Akteure und soziale Institutionen. Beitrag zu einer endogenen Theorie des sozialen Tauschs, München: Oldenbourg.
63. Walker, C. L. (1980) Hostages in Republican Rome, Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
64. Weber, M. (1921) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5th ed., Tübingen: Mohr, 1976.
65. Wechsberg, J. (1966) The Merchant Bankers, Boston: Little, Brown.
66. Weesie, J. (1992) Disciplining via Exit and Voice. Paper presented at the Convention of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 1992.
67. Weesie, J., Buskens, V., and Raub, W. (1995) The management of trust relations via institutional and structural embeddedness. Forthcoming in the special issue of Journal of Mathematical Sociology on Solidarity Theory.
68. Weitzman, L. J. (1981) The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law, New York: Free Press.
69. Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.
70. Wright, G., and Stetson, D. (1978) The impact of no-fault divorce law reform on divorce in american states. Journal of Marriage and the Family 40: 475-584.