Why are small firms different? Managers' views

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 106, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 437-452

  Agell, Jonas ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Field survey; Firm size effect; Matched data; Motivation; Relative pay

Indexed keywords

FIRM SIZE; INCENTIVE; INDUSTRIAL PRACTICE; RECIPROCITY;

EID: 10444244890     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00371.x     Document Type: Article

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