Social information processing in strategic decision-making why timing matters

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 28-46

  Abele, Susanne ^a,c   Bless, Herbert ^a   Ehrhart, Karl Martin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

^c ERASMUS UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Coordination games; Experimental game theory; Social information processing; Timing of unobserved moves

Indexed keywords

EID: 1042303109     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2003.08.001     Document Type: Article

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