Can protectionist trade measures make a country better off? A study of VERs and minimum quality standards

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 227-236

  Zhou, Dongsheng ^a   Vertinsky, Ilan ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

International business; Minimum quality standards; VERs

Indexed keywords

EID: 10344238970     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0148-2963(00)00137-5     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. Adams FG, Gangnes B, Shishido S. Macro and industry implications of voluntary export restraints on US-Japan trade. World Econ 1994;17:737-57.
2. Baldwin RE. Nontariff distortions in international trade Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1970.
3. Caves RE. Multinational enterprise and economic analysis (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996.
4. Chambers RG, Pick DH. Marketing orders as nontariff trade barriers. Am J Agric Econ 1994;76:47-56.
5. Crandall RW. The effects of U.S. trade protection for autos and steel. Brookings Pap Econ Act 1987;1:271-88.
6. Dardies R, Decker S. The welfare loss of the voluntary export restraint for Japanese automobiles. J Consum Aff 1984;181:47-63.
7. Das SP, Donnenfeld S. Oligopolistic competition and international trade: quantity and quality restrictions. J Int Econ 1989;27:299-318.
8. de Melo J, Tarr D. VERs under imperfect competition and foreign direct investment: a case study of the US-Japan auto VER. Japan and the World Economy vol. 8. 1996;8:11-33.
9. Dinopoulos E, Kreinin ME. Effects of the U.S.-Japan auto VER on European prices and on U.S. welfare. Rev Econ Stat 1988;703:484-91.
10. Dixit A. Optimal trade and industrial policy for the U.S. automobile industry. In: Feenstra R, editor. Empirical research in international trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
11. El-Agraa AM. Japan's trade policy: a minim-symposium. World Econ 1995;18:181-91.
12. Feenstra RC. Quality change under trade restraints in Japan autos. Q J Econ 1988;1031131-46.
13. Finger JM, Hall HK, Nelson DR. The political economy of administered protection. Am Econ Rev 1982;723:452-66.
14. Graham EM. Market structure and the multinational enterprise: a game-theoretic approach. J Int Bus Stud 1998;291:67-83.
15. Harris R. Why voluntary export restraints are voluntary? Can J Econ 1985;214:799-809.
16. Herguera I, Lutz S. Oligopoly and quality leapfrogging. World Econ 1998;21:75-94.
17. Hizon EM. The safeguard measure/VER dilemma: the Jekyll and Hyde of trade protection. Northwestern J Int Law Bus 1994;15:105-38.
18. Krishna K. Trade restrictions as facilitating practices. J Int Econ 1989;26251-70.
19. Kostecki MM. Marketing strategies and voluntary export restraints. J World Trade 1991;254:87-100.
20. Mayer RN. Protectionism, intellectual property, and consumer protection: was the Uruguay Round good for consumers? J Consum Policy 1998;21:195-215.
21. Messerlin PA. The long-term evolution of the EC antidumping law: some lessons for the new AD laws for in LDCs. Manuscript, World Bank, 1987.
22. Millington AI, Bayliss BT. Non-tariff barriers and U.K. investment in the European Community. J Int Bus Stud 1991;224:695-710.
23. Nelson DR. The political economy of U.S. automobile protection. In: Krueger AO, editor. The political economy of American trade policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
24. OECD. Competition and trade policies: their interaction. Paris: OECD, 1984.
25. Preusse HG. Voluntary export restraints - an effective means against a spread of neo-protectionism? J World Trade 1991;252:5-17.
26. Ries JC. Windfall profits and vertical relationships: who gained in the Japanese auto industry from VERs? J Ind Econ 1993;413:259-76.
27. Ronnen U. Minimum quality standards, fixed costs, and competition. Rand J Econ 1991;22:490-504.
28. Rosendorff BP. Voluntary export restraints, antidumping procedure, and domestic politics. Am Econ Rev 1996;863:544-61.
29. The Economist. A survey of world trade. 1998;349(8088):1-38.
30. Tirole J. The theory of industrial organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.
31. Winston C and Associates. Blind intersections? Policy and the automobile industry Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987. pp. 64-5.
32. Winters LA. VERs and expectations: extensions and evidence. Econ J 1994;104(Jan.):113-23.
33. WTO. Annual Report, 1997.
34. Yano M. Voluntary export restraints and expectations: an analysis of export quotas in oligopolistic markers. Int Econ Rev 1989;30:707-23.
35. Yoffie DB. Adjustment in the footwear industry: the consequences of orderly marketing agreements. In: Tyson L, Zysman J, editors. American industry in international competition. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983.