Market structure and the multinational enterprise: A game-theoretic approach

Journal of International Business Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 67-83

  Graham, Edward M ^a  

^a Institute for International Economics   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032379425     PISSN: 00472506     EISSN: 14786990     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490025     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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