The evolution of Putin's regime: Inner circles and outer walls

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 51, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 3-13

  Baev, Pavel K ^a  

^a PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OSLO PRIO   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 10044274122     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2004.11052187     Document Type: Review

References (69)

1. For the first line of argument, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 20-38; the second line combines Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), and Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
2. For the first line of argument, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 20-38; the second line combines Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), and Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
3. For the first line of argument, see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 20-38; the second line combines Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), and Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
4. The notions of modernization and competitiveness are central to Putin's political rhetoric, but it was Grigory Yavlinsky who emphasized the counter-trend in his much-debated article, "Demodernizatsiia" (Demodernization), Novaia gazeta (November 11, 2002).
5. As one astute observer pointed out, "Vladimir Putin's consolidation of power is giving Kremlinologists another chance of getting Russia wrong." See Peter Lavelle, "Kremlinology's Resurrection." Untimely Thoughts 2, no. 40 (March 25, 2004), available at www.untimelythoughts.com.
6. Stephen Holmes warned, "It is easier to display the outward symbols of consolidated power than create the real thing." See his "Simulations of Power in Putin's Russia," in Russia After the Fall, ed. Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 83.
7. Stephen Holmes warned, "It is easier to display the outward symbols of consolidated power than create the real thing." See his "Simulations of Power in Putin's Russia," in Russia After the Fall, ed. Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 83.
8. The official figure of 7.3 percent GDP growth in 2003 was. on average, twice the experts' predictions but in full accordance with Putin's demand to double the GDP in ten years. The World Bank particularly noted the undervaluation of the oil and gas sector in Goskomstat data; see Christoph Ruehl and Mark Schaffer, "Potemkin's GDP," Wall Street Journal (February 19, 2004). For an earlier assessment of economic distortions, see Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 53-67.
9. The official figure of 7.3 percent GDP growth in 2003 was. on average, twice the experts' predictions but in full accordance with Putin's demand to double the GDP in ten years. The World Bank particularly noted the undervaluation of the oil and gas sector in Goskomstat data; see Christoph Ruehl and Mark Schaffer, "Potemkin's GDP," Wall Street Journal (February 19, 2004). For an earlier assessment of economic distortions, see Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 53-67.
10. It was again Grigory Yavlinsky, "Periferiinyi kapitalizm" (Peripheral Capitalism), Moskovskie novosti, no. 18 (2003), who argued against the perception of a highly unstable construct, emphasizing the "iron inner logic" that drives its reproduction and even "progress." For a balanced evaluation, see Stephen Kotkin, "Heir, Apparently," Financial Times (March 67, 2004), W1-W2.
11. It was again Grigory Yavlinsky, "Periferiinyi kapitalizm" (Peripheral Capitalism), Moskovskie novosti, no. 18 (2003), who argued against the perception of a highly unstable construct, emphasizing the "iron inner logic" that drives its reproduction and even "progress." For a balanced evaluation, see Stephen Kotkin, "Heir, Apparently," Financial Times (March 67, 2004), W1-W2.
12. Arkady Ostrovsky, "Is Russian Democracy Becoming an Illusion?" Financial Times (February 24, 2004).
13. See Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "Putin's Regime: A Liberal Militocracy?" Pro et Contra 7. no. 4 (autumn 2002): 158-80.
14. See Nikolai Petrov, "Seven Faces of Putin's Russia: Federal Districts as the New Level of State-Territorial Composition," Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 73-91. More recently he argued: "It's worth bearing in mind that the seven federal districts are not merely an extension of the power agencies - they are the foundation of Putin's regime. They are essential to his vision of a monolithic society organized along more or less military lines." See Nikolai Petrov, "Four Years of Reforming the Federal System." Moscow Times (February 17, 2004).
15. See Nikolai Petrov, "Seven Faces of Putin's Russia: Federal Districts as the New Level of State-Territorial Composition," Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 73-91. More recently he argued: "It's worth bearing in mind that the seven federal districts are not merely an extension of the power agencies - they are the foundation of Putin's regime. They are essential to his vision of a monolithic society organized along more or less military lines." See Nikolai Petrov, "Four Years of Reforming the Federal System." Moscow Times (February 17, 2004).
16. See Adrian Karatnycky, "Jobs for the Boys: Putin's New 'Militocracy'," Wall Street Journal (June 13, 2003).
17. One of the most insightful publications from that period was Sergei Parhomenko, "Merlin's Tower," Moscow News, no. 16 (April 28-May 4, 1995): 1 6-7.
18. For my evaluation of the competition, see Pavel Baev, "Why Are the Russian 'Power Structures' Falling Apart So Slowly?" Perspectives, no. 13 (winter 1999/2000): 91-104.
19. On Putin's sudden reshuffling of the "power structures" in March 2003. see Ilya Bulavinov, "Silovoi priem" (Power Play), Kommersant (March 12, 2003); on the underlying bureaucratic logic of this strengthening of the FSB, see Mark Kramer, "Oversight of Russia's Intelligence and Security Agencies: The Need for and Prospects of Democratic Control," PONARS Policy Memo no. 281, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2002.
20. On Putin's sudden reshuffling of the "power structures" in March 2003. see Ilya Bulavinov, "Silovoi priem" (Power Play), Kommersant (March 12, 2003); on the underlying bureaucratic logic of this strengthening of the FSB, see Mark Kramer, "Oversight of Russia's Intelligence and Security Agencies: The Need for and Prospects of Democratic Control," PONARS Policy Memo no. 281, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2002.
21. The customs service is formally still independent, but its new chief. General Nikolai Volobuev (the former head of the FSB counter-intelligence department), has a mandate to prepare it for integration with the FSB. See "Tamozhenniki stanut chekistami" (Custom Officers Would Become Chekisty), GraniRu (June 5, 2004), available at www.grani.ru.
22. A Kremlin insider asserted, "That is the way it will be, no leaks, but that does not mean that Putin had taken the decision a few hours prior." See Svetlana Babaeva, "Khristenko vmesto Kasianova" (Khristenko Instead of Kasyanov), Izvestia (February 25, 2004).
23. Gleb Pavlovsky gave an impetus for this analysis with his September 2, 2003, memo "O negativnykh posledstviiakh 'letnego nastupleniia' oppozitsionnogo kyrsy Prezidenta RF menshinstva" (On the Negative Consequences of the "Summer Offensive" by a Minority Opposed to the Course of the President), available at wwjw.russ.ru/politics/20030902_gp.html.
24. Elena Tregubova, the author of the best-selling Baiki kremlevskogo diggera (Tales of a Kremlin Digger) (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2003), claimed, "The intellectual and educational level of the top-level bureaucrats is low beyond imagination. . . . The maximum potential of the authorities today is more or less elegant repressive actions. Everybody has already figured out why Putin's favorite group is called 'Piter [St. Petersberg] siloviki and not 'Piter intellectuals'." The point on [the] structurally low capacity of the regime to handle crises was elaborated in the round-table discussion "Let the horses run and the houses burn" (December 2, 2003), available at www.polit.ru.
25. Vadim Volkov, "Terminating the Yukos Affair," and David Woodruff, "Khodorkovsky's Gamble: From Business to Politics in the Yukos Conflict," PONARS Policy Memos nos. 307 and 308, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2003.
26. Vadim Volkov, "Terminating the Yukos Affair," and David Woodruff, "Khodorkovsky's Gamble: From Business to Politics in the Yukos Conflict," PONARS Policy Memos nos. 307 and 308, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2003.
27. Issuing an order "to stop hysterics," Putin effectively removed the "Yukos affair" from mainstream political discussion, but the mobilizational impact of the "Exterminate oligarchs as a class" slogan essentially determined the outcome of the December 2003 parliamentary elections. Andrei Riabov, "Arest Khodorkovskogo predopredelil dumskii rasklad" (Khodorkovsky's Arrest Determined the Composition of the Duma), GraniRu (December 8, 2003), available at www.grani.ru.
28. As one thoughtful commentator noted: "We continue by inertia to speak about the Yukos affair. What the devil affair? What Yukos? What we have is a full-blown political crisis. Before all elections, the model of the next government is tested. This model might not be very popular, particularly in business: it smells like a brutal limitation of the enterprise freedom, without complications like Gosplan, like the complete dominance of bureaucrats rather then the state or even like a direct diktat of power structures." See Aleksandr Privalov, "O dvukh metodakh raboty s liudmi" (On Two Methods of Working with People), Ekspert, no. 29 (August 11, 2003).
29. One example here is the inept handling by the Kremlin chekisty of several electoral "projects" (like the Party of Life) in autumn 2003 and their misguided control of Rodina, which has turned from the only relatively successful projectinto a political liability: see Maksiin Sokolov, "Glazev - nashe schaste" (Glazev Is Our Happiness), Izvestia (February 4, 2004). Incompetence as an inalienable feature of the Putin regime is emphasized in Aleksandr Golts, "Probuzhdenie organov" (Awakening of the Organs). Ezhenedelny zhurnal (March 15, 2003).
30. One example here is the inept handling by the Kremlin chekisty of several electoral "projects" (like the Party of Life) in autumn 2003 and their misguided control of Rodina, which has turned from the only relatively successful projectinto a political liability: see Maksiin Sokolov, "Glazev - nashe schaste" (Glazev Is Our Happiness), Izvestia (February 4, 2004). Incompetence as an inalienable feature of the Putin regime is emphasized in Aleksandr Golts, "Probuzhdenie organov" (Awakening of the Organs). Ezhenedelny zhurnal (March 15, 2003).
31. Olga Kryshtanovskaya argues that Fradkov's career shows close links to the special services and insists that Putin's choice leads to "further strengthening of the part of the presidential coalition known as siloviki," See "Pidzhak poverkh pogon" (Suits over Epaulets), Moskovskie novosti. no. 8 (March 5, 2004).
32. Putin's pro-forma meeting with the "business leaders" in the Kremlin in early July 2004 was typical in this respect. See Maksim Glikin, "Maski-shou-dialog" (Mask-Show-Dialogue), Nezavisimaia gazeta (July 2, 2004).
33. See Vitaly Portnikov, "Dve bashni" (The Two Towers), GraniRu (November 3, 2003), available at www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/Cabinet/m.49357. html.
34. On the initial design of bureaucratic reformatting, see Aleksandr Golts and Dmitry Pinsker, "Vavilonskaia vertikal" (Babylonian Vertical). Itogi (August 15, 2000).
35. Nikolai Aksyonenko, Yeltsin's former favorite, was demoted from deputy prime minister to transportation minster and later was arrested on charges of corruption (Irina Stolyarova, "Toska dorozhnaia, zheleznaia" (Railroad Gloom], GraniRu [October 13, 2003]).
36. Aleksei Spirin, "MVD meniaet strategiiu" (MVD Changes Its Strategy), Nezavisimaia gazeta (July 2, 2004).
37. Putin showed uncharacteristic hesitation before appointing Vladimir Ustinov to the position of prosecutor general in the spring of 2001: on the massive exodus of experienced professionals after that, see Oleg Khrabry, "Vmesto prigovora - peredel" (Redistribution Instead of Conviction). Ekspert (January 2004).
38. Mikhail Leontev, "Novaia obedinennaia opozitsiia za 'Rossiu bez Putina' " (New United Opposition for "Russia Without Putin"), Izvestia (February 25, 2004), had to add, "Unfortunately, not efficiency but only controllability as yet."
39. It took an extraordinary effort to convince Rein Viakhirev, who had built the Gazprom empire with the friendly support of former prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, to vacate that throne. Ivan Goryaev, "Osennee pirshestvo v 'Gazprome' " (The Autumn Feast in Gazprom), GraniRu (September 27, 2001).
40. See Yulia Latynina, "A Vodka Shot in the Arm of Power Vertical," Moscow Times (August 7, 2002).
41. Maksim Blant, "Volshebnaia lampa Millera" (Miller's Magic Lamp), Ezhenedelny zhurnal (December 11, 2002); Dmitry Koptev, "Investory ozhidali bolshego ot Gazproma" (Investors Expected More from Gazprom), GazetaRu (June 26, 2004).
42. Maksim Blant, "Volshebnaia lampa Millera" (Miller's Magic Lamp), Ezhenedelny zhurnal (December 11, 2002); Dmitry Koptev, "Investory ozhidali bolshego ot Gazproma" (Investors Expected More from Gazprom), GazetaRu (June 26, 2004).
43. See Maksim Glikin, "Novy kardinal" (A New Cardinal), Nezavisimaia guzeta (November 3, 2003).
44. Pavlovsky placed Pugachev in the "anti-president group," but then lost a libel lawsuit filed by the latter and duly lost. An appeals court reduced the fine from $3 million to $1 million. Gleb Pavlovsky, "Zagovor ekspertov i zhurnalistov protiv senatora i cheloveka" (Conspiracy of Experts and Journalists Against a Senator and a Human Being), RussRu (October 17, 2003), available at www.russ.ru/politics/20031017-pav.html.
45. Ian Bremmer argues: "In the wake of Voloshin's departure, many expected that the shadowy siloviki faction within the Kremlin officials with backgrounds in law enforcement or in the KGB would have the upper hand. Instead, Putin promoted two liberal-minded technocrats from St. Petersburg, Dmitry Medvedev and Dmitry Kozak, to the top two positions on his staff, a clear signal to Russia's oligarchs, and to the West, that they could expect business to go on as usual." See "The Russian Roller Coaster," World Policy Journal 20, no. 4 (winter 2003/2004): 22-29.
46. See Dmitry Oreshkin, "Virtualnyi absolutizm" (Virtual Absolutism). GazetaRu (March 22, 2004).
47. Yulia Latynina argued that with the appointment of Mikhail Fradkov, Putin emphasized his attitude toward United Russia, which would have been equally enthusiastic if he had nominated his dog as prime minister. See "Shestoi punkt premera Fradkova" (The Sixth Point of Prime Minister Fradkov), Novaia gazeta, no. 15 (March 4, 2004).
48. This bank was known for close ties with Prime Minister Kasianov. Elena Kiseleva, "Uvolnenie v bankovskii zapas" (Retirement into a Bank Reserve), Kommersant (March 2, 2004).
49. Steven Miller and Dmitri Trenin, ed., The Russian Military: Power and Policy (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2004).
50. See Pavel Baev, "Instrumentalizing Counter-Terrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 337-52.
51. A thoughtful comment is Vitaly Tsimbal, "Reforma - eto ogovorka" (Reform Was a Misnomer), PolitRu (February 12, 2004).
52. In January 2003, Anatolii Kvashnin, the chief of the General Staff, stated, "It would be unethical to call the ongoing transformations in the Armed Forces a military reform." See "Anatolii Kvashnin: nazyvat preobrazovaniia v armii 'voennoi reformoi neetichno' " (Anatolii Kvashnin: It Would Be Unethical to Call the Ongoing Transformations in the Armed Forces "a Military Reform"). GraniRu (February 10, 2003).
53. See, for instance, Alexei Arbatov, "What Kind of Army Does Russia Need?" Russia in Global Affairs (January/March 2003): 60-77, where a proposal for deep structural reforms is built based on increasing military expenditures to the moderate level of 3 percent of GDP.
54. See Pavel Baev, "President Putin and His Generals: Bureaucratic Control and War-Fighting Culture," PONARS Policy Memo no. 205, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2001.
55. Pavel Baev, "The Plight of the Russian Military: Shallow Identity and Self-Defeating Culture," Armed Forces and Society 29, no. 1 (December 2002): 129-46.
56. Ivan Safronov, "Sergei Ivanov otkryl ogon po Genshtabu" (Sergei Ivanov Has Opened Fire on the Genshtab), Kommersant (January 26, 2004); Dmitri Litovkin, "Genshtab lishili vlasti nad armiei" (Genshtab Has Lost Control over the Army], Izvestia (June 11, 2004).
57. Ivan Safronov, "Sergei Ivanov otkryl ogon po Genshtabu" (Sergei Ivanov Has Opened Fire on the Genshtab), Kommersant (January 26, 2004); Dmitri Litovkin, "Genshtab lishili vlasti nad armiei" (Genshtab Has Lost Control over the Army], Izvestia (June 11, 2004).
58. Marshall T. Poe identified four key elements of in this pattern: "autocracy, control of the public sphere, command economics, and state-sponsored militarism" (The Russian Moment in World History [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003], p. 87).
59. A noteworthy attempt at formulating this ideology is Leontiev, "Novaia obedinennaia opozitsiia." A more ambitious program was developed in the report "Fortress Russia," which circulated in the presidential administration before publication (Novaia gazeta, March 15-17, 2004).
60. Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste B. Wallander, "Russia: Power in Weakness?" Washington Quarterly 27. no. 1 (winter 2003-4): 57-73.
61. Mikhail Delyagin argues that a new round of reforms will be driven by " the interests of those groups that are directly fused with the state and comprise the new oligarchy in the epaulets, which tries to portray its attack on Yeltsin era civilian oligarchs as a drive to eradicate oligarchy, period. Most likely, we are in for capitalism in epaulets, rather than state capitalism, in which the new epauletted oligarchs will assume the role of the old oligarchs in the Yeltsin epoch, unwaveringly utilizing the state's capacity for force and coercion." See his "From Purge to Consolidation," Moscow Times (March 5, 2003), available in Johnson's Russia List no. 8102.
62. In the 2004 annual threat assessment, George Tenet, then director of the CIA, noted, "The Kremlin's increasing assertiveness is partly grounded in its improved military capabilities." His March 9, 2004, testimony is available at www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/ tenet_testimony_03092004/.
63. A recent interpretation of classical deterrence in the new era is Alexei Arbatov, "Tonkii politicheskii instrument" (Delicate Political Instrument), Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (December 5, 2003).
64. See Aleksandr Babakin and Igor Plugatarev, "'Perestrel' za 2,000,000,000 rublei" (Another Launch for 2.000,000,000 Rubles), Nezavisimaia gazeta (March 3, 2003).
65. Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment (London: Brassey's, 2003).
66. Besides checking the usability of aging tactical nuclear weapons, Russia needs testing for a number of new nuclear research projects. This problem was actively discussed in mid-2002; see Charles Digges, "Moscow Denies U.S. Reports That Russia Is Planning Nuclear Tests." Bellona News (May 13, 2002).
67. A rare case for Russia-U.S. security cooperation is made in Dmitri Trenin, "Southern Watch: Russia's Policy in Central Asia," Journal of International Affairs (spring 2003): 119-31; insightful and updated analysis can be found in Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 2004): 277-93.
68. A rare case for Russia-U.S. security cooperation is made in Dmitri Trenin, "Southern Watch: Russia's Policy in Central Asia," Journal of International Affairs (spring 2003): 119-31; insightful and updated analysis can be found in Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," International Affairs 80, no. 2 (March 2004): 277-93.
69. Pavel Baev, "Russia's Policies in the North and South Caucasus," in The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, ed. Dov Lynch, Chaillot Paper no. 65 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003).