Bilateral bargaining, unverifiable quality, and options to return

Economic Theory

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 395-410

  Kessler, Anke S ^a   Lülfesmann, Christoph ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

Bilateral bargaining; Unverifiable quality warranties

Indexed keywords

EID: 0742271194     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0387-y     Document Type: Article

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