Finding a Nash equilibrium in spatial games is an NP-complete problem

Economic Theory

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 445-454

  Baron, Richard ^a   Durieu, Jacques ^a   Haller, Hans ^b   Solal, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ JEAN MONNET   (France)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Graph k colorability; NP completeness; Spatial games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0742271190     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0376-1     Document Type: Article

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