The end of revolution?

Review of Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 5-28

  Snyder, Robert S ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0348158842     PISSN: 00346705     EISSN: 17486858     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0034670500028114     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Order of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
2. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
3. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18.
4. Charles Tilly, European Revolutions, 1492 - 1992 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 7-8.
5. Forrest D. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 6.
6. On "revolutions from above" see Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978). This excludes most fascist movements.
7. John Foran, who argues against my thesis, agrees that Zaire/Congo is not a social revolution in "The Future of Revolutions at the fin-de-Siecle," Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 803-804.
8. Some are problematic because of their lack of violence, others because of the lack of change since 1989.
9. See Tilly, European Revolutions, pp. 233-236
10. On social revolutions, see in particular Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions and Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). I do not, however, exclusively rely on Skocpol's conception of social revolution. My conception includes Samuel Huntington's two types of revolution-Western and Eastern-in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)
11. Robert H. Dix's types-Eastern, Western, patrimonial, and Latin American-in "Varieties of Revolution," Comparative Politics 15 (1983): 281-294
12. See also Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Patterns of Revolution," Theory and Society 18 (1989): 249-71
13. John Foran, ed., Theorizing Revolutions (London: Routledge, 1997).
14. Revolutionary ideologies frequently emerge as the revolution progresses. On the difficulties of using ideology as a guide to the course a revolution takes see Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence" Theory and Society 8 (1979): 46.
15. Like Alexis deTocqueville, I consider the French Revolution to be a social revolution that began as a liberal one.
16. See Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1955), Part One.
17. Alexander Gercshenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1962), pp. 5-30.
18. Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics 32 (1980): 425-453
19. See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Norton, 1938).
20. See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982);
21. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (London: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
22. See Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions; Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969)
23. Jeffrey Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York: Free Press, 1975). I argue below that there has been a fourth wave, focusing on ideas.
24. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," Political and Society 17 (1989): 489-507
25. Jeff Goodwin, "State and Revolution in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1988)
26. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)
27. Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neoparrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics (1992): 379-99
28. Robert H. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," Polity 16 (1983): 423-46
29. Farideh Farhi, "State Disintegration and Urban-based Revolutionary Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of Iran and Nicaragua," Comparative Political Studies (1988): 231-256
30. Theodore Hamerow, From the Finland Station: The Graying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 5.
31. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolution in the Contemporary Third World." I consider China to have been a colonized or occupied state by Japan before the successful revolution in 1949 and Afghanistan to have been a Soviet client state before the fall of its leader Najibullah and the victory of the Talibans.
32. Goodwin discusses the first three points in "State and Revolution in the Third World/' pp. 224-39.
33. Ibid., p. 238.
34. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolution in the Contemporary Third World", pp. 498-501
35. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, esp. pp. 5-9.
36. On neopatrimonialism or "sultanism" also see S. N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations (New York: Free Press, 1979).
37. Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," p. 384.
38. Dix, "Why Revolutions Succeed and Fail," pp. 432-438
39. Skocpol, Social Revolutions and the Modern World, p. 313. Skocpol admits that the Iranian Revolution was urban, but perhaps Cuba and Nicaragua should also be seen as "urban revolutions." See Farhi, "State Disintegration and Urbanbased Revolutionary Crisis."
40. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 32-5.
41. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 19-24.
42. Theda Skocpol, "Social Revolution and Mass Military Mobilization," World Politics 40 (1988): 147-168
43. For the democratic peace theory, see in particular Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democractic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
44. Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (1993): 44-79
45. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 216.
46. Also see John Mueller, The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
47. For a realist account that argues that great power war will continue in international politics, see John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security 15 (1990): 5-56.
48. Mark Katz, Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).
49. Phillip G. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action," International Organization 49 (1995): 595-625
50. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
51. Michael C. Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States/' International Organization 50 (1996): 237-69.
52. For a summary of his ideas see Tilly, European Revolutions, pp. 1-20.
53. Timur Kuran, "Sparks and Prairie Fires: A Theory of Unanticipated Revolution," Public Choice 61 (1989): 41-74.
54. Misagh Parsa, "Economic Development and Political Transformation," Theory and Society 14 (1985): 623-675
55. Ibid..
56. Anthony W. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 114-141
57. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 288-290
58. William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
59. Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
60. Philip G. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action"; Strange, The Retreat of the State.
61. Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? lections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," World Politics 50 (1997): 62-87.
62. William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Touchstone Books, 1997), esp. pp. 35-56.
63. Tilly, European Revolutions, pp. 231-232
64. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries; Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)
65. Eric A. Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).
66. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, pp. 189-210
67. Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" American Journal of Sociology 88 (1983): 888-914.
68. Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964)
69. Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
70. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, chap. 10, pp. 189-210.
71. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries, pp. 20-35
72. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: The Seaburg Press, 1979), pp. 53-56
73. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, pp. 23-25,30-37.
74. Also see Karl Mennheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), pp. 153-64
75. Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 36-47.
76. Other writers who emphasize the role of intellectuals include Jorge Castaneda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin America Left after the Cold War (New York: Random, 1993)
77. Daniel Chirot, Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age (New York: Free Press, 1994)
78. Bruce Mazlish, The Revolutionary Ascetic: Evolution of a Political Type (New York: Basic Books, 1976)
79. Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips, World Revolutionary Leaders (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983).
80. Colburn, The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries, pp. 20-35.
81. Timothly P. Wickham-Crowley, "Structural Theories of Revolution," in Foran, Theorizing Revolutions, p. 51.
82. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals, p. 55.
83. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
84. Ibid., p. 59.
85. Ibid..
86. Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change, p. 41.
87. Ibid., p. 42.
88. Ibid., p. 47.
89. Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, Part One.
90. Ibid..
91. Ibid.; Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, pp. 189-210
92. Tim McDaniel, Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp.14-47.
93. Hamerow, From the Finland Station, chap. 9.
94. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
95. Hamerow, From the Finland Station, p. 353.
96. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
97. Lisa Anderson, "Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East," Political Science Quarterly 106 (1991): 1-16. If there is one region that is still prone to revolution, it is the Middle East. The brittleness of the communist regimes lends credence to this point that more broad-based authoritarian regimes may not now differ significantly from neopatrimonial regimes.
98. Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
99. Ibid., p. 459.
100. Daniel Chirot, "After Socialism, What? The Global Implications of the Revolutions in 1989 in Eastern Europe," in Debating Revolutions, ed. Nikkie R. Keddie (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 268.
101. Ibid., p. 267.
102. The Islamic movement in Algeria and other countries in the Middle East probably has less to do with transnationalism and more to do with the failures of "left-wing" dictatorships.
103. Foran, "The Future of Revolutions," pp. 804-807.
104. John Foran, ed., A Century of Revolution: Social Movements in Iran (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).