Reinterpreting the demise of hierarchy: A case study in information technology, empowerment and incomplete contracts

Information Systems Journal

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 257-272

  Wareham, Jonathan ^a   Bjørn Andersen, Niels ^a,b,c   Neergaard, Peter ^a,d,e  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

^b Association for Information Systems

^c CBS   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^e NYS University   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic theory; Empowerment; Hierarchies; Incentive structures; Incomplete contracts; Organization theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347966471     PISSN: 13501917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1046/j.1365-2575.1998.00039.x     Document Type: Article

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