Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability

Research in Economics

Volumn 53, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 247-273

  Battigalli, Pierpaolo ^a   Siniscalchi, Marciano ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Explicability; Forward induction; Independence; Interactive epistemology; Rationalizability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347758770     PISSN: 10909443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/reec.1999.0201     Document Type: Article

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