Found! The lost lawyer

Fordham Law Review

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 37-91

  Edwards, Kirsten ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347715609     PISSN: 0015704X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (260)

1. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993).
2. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 73 (1993).
3. For example, Judge Edwards sent out a survey to all of his former law clerks and quotes their responses throughout his article. See id. at 41-42. Kronman's liberal use of newspapers, journals and popular literature about law school can be seen in his notes section. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 383-415.
4. According to his acknowledgments, Judge Edwards attended law school at the Jniversity of Michigan, served as a tenured professor of law at Michigan Law School ind Harvard Law School and "[s]ince joining the D.C. Circuit in 1980, he has continued to teach part-time at various law schools, including Pennsylvania, Harvard, Duke, Georgetown, Michigan and, most recently, New York University." Edwards, supra note 2, at 34 n. *. The named schools are all considered elite top ten schools. The clerks whom Edwards cites frequently were also the very top graduates of elite aw schools: Thirty former law clerks (who served with me during the 1980-1981 through the 1990-1991 court terms) responded, in some detail. They are a varied group, having graduated from ten different law schools: Berkeley, Boston University, Buffalo, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, NYU, Stanford, and Yale. Nearly every one finished law school at or near the top of his or her class; 16 were Supreme Court clerks; six were law review editors-in-chief; and many have received offers to enter (or serious invitations to consider) law teaching. d. at 42 n.15.
5. Kronman, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34.
7. See Symposium, Legal Education, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993).
8. For the duration of the article, I will refer to Dean Kronman and Judge Edwards as "Kronman" and "Edwards." This is purely for brevity and is certainly not intended to imply any lack of respect.
9. While the works of Kronman and Edwards were probably the most influential, a number of works containing similar themes were published at around the same time. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society (1994); Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
10. While the works of Kronman and Edwards were probably the most influential, a number of works containing similar themes were published at around the same time. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society (1994); Sol M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Profession: Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
11. The use of the masculine descriptor here is not accidental-both Edwards and Kronman describe the lawyer statesman in ways which indicate that he is male.
12. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 2-3; Edwards, supra note 2, at 59.
13. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 14-15, 127, 365; Edwards, supra note 2, at 38, 66-74.
14. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 14, 365; Edwards, supra note 2, at 38, 73.
15. Kronman, supra note 1, at 3.
16. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 2, at 38 ("He or she will have gained the impression that law practice is . . . grubby, materialistic, and self-interested and will not understand, in a concrete way, what professional practice means."); see also id. at 68-74.
17. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 4, 167-68; Edwards, supra note 2, at 35, 47-48.
18. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34.
19. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1, at 167 ("Those who embrace the methods of economics as the best ones for thinking about law and who acquire the intellectual habits these methods encourage are therefore likely to be blinded to the value of practical wisdom and to the conditions of moral life that make the need for it imperative."); Edwards, supra note 2, at 47-48 (commenting on the impractical nature of law and economics scholarship).
20. Kronman, supra note 1, at 165.
21. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 167 ("The critical legal studies movement [has] . . . exerted an influence on American law teaching second only to that of law and economics, [and] has also helped establish the atmosphere of mistrust that . . . surrounds the virtue of practical wisdom."); Edwards, supra note 2, at 47 ("At its best, CLS usefully questions and challenges the political premises that serve as the foundation of our system of justice; at its worst, CLS is hopelessly destructive because it aims to disrupt the accepted practice of judges, administrators, and legislators with no prescriptions for reform."). Dean Garth of Indiana Law School has made a similar point: "The best post-realist teachers are often masters at showing students that their most cherished beliefs are simply a matter of opinion or supportable only by some more or less plausible arguments that could be countered by other more or less plausible arguments." Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering Legality or Solving Problems, 64 Ind. L.J. 433, 440 (1990).
22. Edwards, supra note 2, at 73.
23. Kronman, supra note 1, at 109.
24. Edwards, supra note 2, at 34 (citation omitted).
25. There is a difference in nuance between the authors here. Throughout his piece Edwards calls directly for practical doctrinal scholarship. See generally id. Kronman has a broader conception of ideal law teaching and scholarship than just doctrinal work but continually emphasizes the need for all scholarship and teaching to emphasize "practical wisdom." See Kronman, supra note 1, at 265-70, 375-76.
26. Edwards, supra note 2, at 62.
27. Kronman states: "Scholarship . . . aims at the truth . . . . [T]he law teacher's highest responsibility is to convey a scholarly love of truth to his or her students . . . ." Kronman, supra note 1, at vii.
28. See, e.g., id. at 365 ("One should not despair, therefore, about the possibility of reviving the legal profession's ethic of public service."); Edwards, supra note 2, at 78 ("I have no doubt that, if individual lawyers and legal institutions took professionalism to heart, the growing disjunction between legal education and practice would be reversed.").
29. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 1, at 145-46 ("[T]he more a lawyer values the well-being of the law, the more likely he is to be able to summon such courage when needed . . . . This internal anchorage of his devotion to the law in the good lawyer's craft gives it a strength and resilience it would not otherwise have.").
30. For example, in the year 2000 at Yale Law School J.D. students who graduated from Harvard and Yale dominated the population with 86 and 66 students respectively (in an overall J.D. student body of 592). Overall, 242 students attended Ivy League colleges (approximately forty-one percent). Adding elite colleges like Stanford, Berkeley and Duke brings the percentage to fifty-one percent. Few other colleges have even ten representatives and most have fewer than three. 96 Bulletin of Yale University No. 8 (Yale Law School 2000-2001).
31. For evidence of the startling correlation between parental income and SAT results, see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 988 (1996) ("At over 25% of the colleges participating in a 1984 validity study conducted by the ETS, the correlation between SAT scores and family income was larger than the correlation between SAT scores and freshman grades."). Sturm and Guinier also detail the race, class and gender biases underlying the SAT and LSAT tests. For a fascinating history of the class considerations underlying the development of the SAT test, see Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (1999).
32. For evidence of the startling correlation between parental income and SAT results, see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 988 (1996) ("At over 25% of the colleges participating in a 1984 validity study conducted by the ETS, the correlation between SAT scores and family income was larger than the correlation between SAT scores and freshman grades."). Sturm and Guinier also detail the race, class and gender biases underlying the SAT and LSAT tests. For a fascinating history of the class considerations underlying the development of the SAT test, see Nicholas Lemann, The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy (1999).
33. Kronman notes that students from primarily working class backgrounds at Yale Law School have gone as far as forming an organization, First Generation Professionals, "to help their members overcome their lack of professional role models and to promote recruitment at the school." Kronman, supra note 1, at 408 n.57; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1283 (1993) ("Most law school graduates are white and belong to the upper and middle classes."). Ogletree notes, "For the 1992-1993 academic year, the mean adjusted gross income of parents of Harvard Law School students receiving loan assistance was $102,088." Id. at 1283 n.174 (citing Memorandum from the Harvard Law School Financial Aid Office to Charles Ogletree, Assistant Professor 13 (Mar. 11, 1993) (on file at the Harvard Law School Library)).
34. Phillips-Exeter Academy is the alma mater of Christopher Columbus Langdell, the man regarded as the founding father of elite law schools. See Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817-1967, at 165 (1967).
35. Many will be following in their parents' footsteps: "About one in five students at schools such as Harvard and Yale is a child of an alumnus . . . [and] despite weaker GPAs, extracurricular activities, and SAT scores, legacy applicants enjoy twice as great a chance of being admitted to Harvard and Yale and almost three times as great a chance of being admitted to Princeton." Sturm & Guinier, supra note 30, at 995 n.184 (citing Mark Megalli, So Your Dad Went to Harvard: Now What About the Lower Board Scores of White Legacies?, J. Blacks Higher Educ. 71, 72 (Spring, 1995)). Not only does Yale Law School select more students from those colleges than any others but also it explicitly favors children of Yale Law School alumni in the selection process.
36. This is a paraphrase of the address given by Professor Steven Bright to the Yale Law School graduating class of 1999. See also Richard D. Kahlenberg, Broken Contract: A Memoir of Harvard Law School 5 (1992) ("We came to law school talking about using the law as a vehicle for social change, but when it was time to decide what we would do with our lives, we fell over each other to work for those law firms most resistant to change.").
37. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 705, 761 (1998).
38. The link between success at elite law schools and producing scholarship has become almost a truism; Schiltz states: Scholarship - particularly highly theoretical scholarship - is "the hallmark of intellectual worthiness" in the academy. Because "[a]cademic prestige derives almost entirely from one's reputation as a scholar," and because "academic prestige seems to be the only game in town," the "importance of scholarship to the careers of law teachers is difficult to overestimate." Id. at 751 (quoting Paul D. Reingold, Harry Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1998, 2000 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 8 (1986); and John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 348 (1989)). Schiltz goes on to cite nine authorities testifying to the importance of legal scholarship in tenure decisions. Id.
39. The link between success at elite law schools and producing scholarship has become almost a truism; Schiltz states: Scholarship - particularly highly theoretical scholarship - is "the hallmark of intellectual worthiness" in the academy. Because "[a]cademic prestige derives almost entirely from one's reputation as a scholar," and because "academic prestige seems to be the only game in town," the "importance of scholarship to the careers of law teachers is difficult to overestimate." Id. at 751 (quoting Paul D. Reingold, Harry Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1998, 2000 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 8 (1986); and John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 348 (1989)). Schiltz goes on to cite nine authorities testifying to the importance of legal scholarship in tenure decisions. Id.
40. The link between success at elite law schools and producing scholarship has become almost a truism; Schiltz states: Scholarship - particularly highly theoretical scholarship - is "the hallmark of intellectual worthiness" in the academy. Because "[a]cademic prestige derives almost entirely from one's reputation as a scholar," and because "academic prestige seems to be the only game in town," the "importance of scholarship to the careers of law teachers is difficult to overestimate." Id. at 751 (quoting Paul D. Reingold, Harry Edwards' Nostalgia, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1998, 2000 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 8 (1986); and John S. Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. Legal Educ. 343, 348 (1989)). Schiltz goes on to cite nine authorities testifying to the importance of legal scholarship in tenure decisions. Id.
41. Id. at 761 ("[N]ot a single member of the (huge) Harvard Law School faculty has practiced in a law firm at even a senior associate level in the last thirty years.").
42. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2438 (1999). Rhode notes: In the AALS law school survey, only about half of the administrators of pro bono programs agreed that "[m]any of the faculty [at their] school provide good role models to the students by engaging in uncompensated public-service work themselves." About one-fifth disagreed and one-third were unsure. As some administrators added in followup interviews, if they were ignorant about professors' involvement, most students probably were as well. Id. (quoting Richard A. White, Draft: Report on the AALS Survey of Law Schools and Public Service Programs 42 (1998)).
43. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2438 (1999). Rhode notes: In the AALS law school survey, only about half of the administrators of pro bono programs agreed that "[m]any of the faculty [at their] school provide good role models to the students by engaging in uncompensated public- service work themselves." About one-fifth disagreed and one-third were unsure. As some administrators added in followup interviews, if they were ignorant about professors' involvement, most students probably were as well. Id. (quoting Richard A. White, Draft: Report on the AALS Survey of Law Schools and Public Service Programs 42 (1998)).
44. Most law schools are publicly critical of the law school rankings of U.S. News & World Report. The methodology is attacked by law schools which perform badly, and the significance of the rankings is downplayed by those schools which perform well. Despite this, it is well known that the rankings are extremely, and increasingly, influential to both students and law schools. See, e.g., Paula Gaber, "Just Trying to be Human in this Place": The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 10 Yale J.L. & Feminism 165, 173 n.55 (1998); Rhode, supra note 38, at 2440.
45. As Kronman has explained: "[At Yale Law School], the heaviest stress mark is placed on scholarly achievement. . . . There are hundreds and hundreds of quality teachers and only a handful of academic scholars of first rank. This place aims to be a place of leaders." Jody Feder, To Teach Her Own: Why Teaching Skills Don't Seem To Matter At Yale Law, 3 Yale Law School Docket No. 2, at 14 (November 2000).
46. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871, 925 (1999).
47. To use an anecdotal illustration, I never met one J.D. at Yale Law School who spent a summer break on vacation - they all work. Every J.D. I have queried about this phenomenon has replied that loan obligations necessitate summer employment. For a more scholarly discussion of the impact of law school loans, see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry Into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 829 (1995).
48. Some law schools offer loan forgiveness programs whereby students are not required to pay, or have to repay less of, their law school loans if they earn under a certain amount and/or work in certain public interest jobs. In 1991 Yale Law School was forgiving loans to students earning less than $28,000. In the same year, the starting salaries of corporate firms were around $90,000. Although many starting salaries are now in excess of $120,000, the threshold for forgiveness of entire annual loan obligations at Yale Law School has only increased to $39,000. Yale Law School: Tuition, Expenses, Financial Aid, and Loan Forgiveness (2001-02), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/yls/admis-jdtuition.htm. Students earning over $39,000 per year are "expected to contribute 25 per cent of their incomes in excess of that amount toward repayment." Id.
49. See David Leonhardt, Law Firms Rushed to Raise Salaries to Stem an Exodus to Start-ups. Now the Bill is Coming Due, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2000, at C4; see also David Leonhardt, Law Firms Pay Soars to Stem Dot-Corn Defections, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2000, at A1.
50. See David Leonhardt, Law Firms Rushed to Raise Salaries to Stem an Exodus to Start-ups. Now the Bill is Coming Due, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2000, at C4; see also David Leonhardt, Law Firms Pay Soars to Stem Dot-Corn Defections, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2000, at A1.
51. Chris Goodrich, Anarchy and Elegance: Confessions of a Journalist at Yale Law School 125 (1991). A 1999 Yale Law Revue skit joked about the fabrications students used in interview programs to convince firms (and perhaps themselves) that they were interested in West Coast firms, exploiting their interest to get an interview and thus a free trip to the West Coast.
52. Scott Turow, One L (1977), quoted in "Atticus Falcon," Planet Law School: What You Need to Know (Before You Go) . . . but Didn't Know to Ask 286 (1998).
53. Scott Turow, One L (1977), quoted in "Atticus Falcon," Planet Law School: What You Need to Know (Before You Go) . . . but Didn't Know to Ask 286 (1998).
54. Schiltz notes: First they competed to get into a prestigious college. Then they competed for college grades. Then they competed for LSAT scores. Then they competed to get into a prestigious law school. Then they competed for law school grades. Then they competed to make the law review. Then they competed for clerkships. Then they competed to get hired by a big law firm. Schiltz, supra note 41, at 905.
55. See Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 7 ("I came to learn that in the legal profession it was infinitely more important to be respectable than to be admirable and that salary replaced grades as the badge of merit and achievement.").
56. Students also complain of the practical difficulty in trying to forge another path: Identifying job opportunities with small firms, the government, and public interest groups is difficult, as they do not interview on law school campuses or advertise in major trade journals. Also, unlike big firms, they usually cannot hire a year in advance. It takes a lot of guts to hold out for a small firm, government, or public interest job during the third year of law school, as one of your friends after another signs up with a big firm. Schiltz, supra note 41, at 941.
57. Dennis Curtis, Can Law Schools and Big Law Firms Be Friends?, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 65, 74 n.14 (2000) ("At the biggest firms in the biggest cities, associates and partners commonly bill 2,000 to 2,500 hours per year").
58. Professor Harold Koh of Yale Law School argues that most elite law students choose their career by the following questions: "What job will most impress others; what job will help me pay off my loans; and what jobs will keep my options open." Obviously a summer associateship at a blue chip firm is three for three.
59. Most law firms will pick up the bill for lunch or dinner if a summer associate attends the meal. "Summers" are thus highly sought after dining companions by firm associates during their stay.
60. Schiltz provides a wonderfully detailed example of this: During your first month working [as a summer associate] at the big firm, some senior partner will invite you and the other new associates to a barbeque at his home. This 'barbeque' will bear absolutely no relationship to what your father used to do on a Weber grill in your driveway. You will drive up to the senior partner's home in your rusted Escort and park at the end of a long line of Mercedeses and BMWs and sports utility vehicles. You will walk up to the front door of the house. The house will be enormous. The lawn will look like a putting green; it will be bordered by perfectly manicured trees and flowers. Somebody wearing a white shirt and black bow tie will answer the door and direct you to the backyard. You will walk through one room after another, each of which will be decorated with expensive carpeting and expensive wallpaper and expensive antiques. Scattered throughout the home will be large professional photographs of beautiful children with tousled, sun-bleached hair. As you enter the partner's immaculately landscaped backyard, someone wearing a white shirt and black bow tie carrying a silver platter will approach you and offer you an appetizer. Don't look for cocktail weenies in barbeque sauce; you will more likely be offered pâté or miniature quiches or shrimp. A bar will be set up near the house; the bartender (who will be wearing a white shirt and black bow tie, of course) will pour you a drink of the most expensive brand of whatever liquor you like. In the corner of the yard, a caterer will be grilling swordfish. In another corner will stand the senior partner, sipping a glass of white wine, holding court with a worshipful group of junior partners and senior associates. The senior partner will be wearing designer sunglasses and designer clothes; the logo on his shirt will signal its exorbitant cost; his shorts will be pressed. He will have a tan-albeit a slightly orange, tanning salon enhanced tan-and the nicest haircut you've ever seen. Eventually, the partner will introduce you to his wife. She will be beautiful, very thin, and a lot younger than her husband. She, too, will have a great tan, and not nearly as orange as her husband's. You and the other lawyers will talk about golf. Or about tennis. After a couple hours, you will walk out the front door, slightly tipsy from the free liquor, and say to yourself, "This is the life." Schiltz, supra note 41, at 912-13.
61. See Henry Rose, Law Schools are Failing to Teach Students to Do Good, Chi. Trib., Jul. 11, 1990, at 17 ("The subliminal message of [law school] training is clear to most students: 'Real' lawyers work in large firms representing corporate and affluent clients.").
62. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, Keynote Address, in The MacCrate Report: Building the Educational Continuum 4, 13 (Joan S. Rowland & William H. Lindberg eds., 1994).
63. Cameron Stracher, Double Billing (1998).
64. Robert Kurson, Who's Killing the Great Lawyers of Harvard, Esquire, Aug. 2000, at 82.
65. See, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers and their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 Ind. L.J. 735, 757 (1999) ("Law professors may find comfort in believing that practicing lawyers are unhappy [because they may] feel better about their perceived (if not real) financial sacrifice.").
66. These quotes are from conversations the author has participated in, overheard, or seen posted on The Wall (a public discussion space) at Yale Law School.
67. See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not To Like About Being a Lawyer? 109 Yale L.J. 1443, 1449-66 (2000) (reviewing Arthur L. Liman, Lawyer: A Life of Counsel and Controversy (1998)).
68. See Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not To Like About Being a Lawyer? 109 Yale L.J. 1443, 1449-66 (2000) (reviewing Arthur L. Liman, Lawyer: A Life of Counsel and Controversy (1998)).
69. A number of firms will even pay a student's salary for the entire summer period although the student will spend only half the summer working for the firm and the other half for a public interest organization.
70. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983); Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1492.
71. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm (1991); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983); Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1492.
72. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1476 n.197.
73. Falcon, supra note 46, at 301. Other estimates are more conservative but still alarming. See, e.g., Getting Better, L Magazine: Life-Liberty-Law School, Feb. 2001, at 12 ("The American Bar Association Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs . . . estimates that while 10 percent of the general population has problems with alcohol abuse, anywhere from 15 to 18 percent of the lawyer population suffers from the same problem.").
74. Schiltz, supra note 41, at 880.
75. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Kaushik Mukhopadhaya, The Fruits of Our Labors: An Empirical Study of the Distribution of Income and Job Satisfaction Across the Legal Profession, 49 J. Legal Educ. 342, 362 (1999).
76. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like A Lawyer, Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School And Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1231-32 (1991) (describing young associates' complaints of dissatisfaction at law firms); Schiltz, supra note 41, at 888 ("Indeed '[h]appy law partners are a small minority these days.'" (quoting Is it Possible to Put Passion Back into Practice of Law?, Partner's Rep., Nov. 1994, at 1)); Seth Oltman, Attrition Condition, L Magazine: Life- Liberty-Law School, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 37 (noting that a National Association for Law Placement study of nearly 5500 lawyers from the classes of 1991 to 1998 found that 38.3% of associates leave by their third year and 59.6% by the end of their fifth year).
77. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like A Lawyer, Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School And Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1231- 32 (1991) (describing young associates' complaints of dissatisfaction at law firms); Schiltz, supra note 41, at 888 ("Indeed '[h]appy law partners are a small minority these days.'" (quoting Is it Possible to Put Passion Back into Practice of Law?, Partner's Rep., Nov. 1994, at 1)); Seth Oltman, Attrition Condition, L Magazine: Life- Liberty-Law School, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 37 (noting that a National Association for Law Placement study of nearly 5500 lawyers from the classes of 1991 to 1998 found that 38.3% of associates leave by their third year and 59.6% by the end of their fifth year).
78. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like A Lawyer, Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School And Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1231- 32 (1991) (describing young associates' complaints of dissatisfaction at law firms); Schiltz, supra note 41, at 888 ("Indeed '[h]appy law partners are a small minority these days.'" (quoting Is it Possible to Put Passion Back into Practice of Law?, Partner's Rep., Nov. 1994, at 1)); Seth Oltman, Attrition Condition, L Magazine: Life-Liberty-Law School, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 37 (noting that a National Association for Law Placement study of nearly 5500 lawyers from the classes of 1991 to 1998 found that 38.3% of associates leave by their third year and 59.6% by the end of their fifth year).
79. Kronman, supra note 1, at 281-82.
80. Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor, N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2000, at Al; see also, Stracher, supra note 56, at 51 ("[S]ince 1992, according to The American Lawyer's latest survey, pro bono hours have plunged from about 56 hours per lawyer to 36 hours.").
81. Esther F. Lardent, Pro Bono Work is Good for Business, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19, 2001, at B20 ("Although there have been no national surveys to date of changes in attitudes among younger lawyers, anecdotal information and related developments, such as the increase in law school public service projects and the growth of fellowship and rotation programs, confirm the heightened interest in pro bono among the younger generation of attorneys."); see also Stracher, supra note 56, at 51 (noting that while some law firms had reduced the credit given to associates for pro bono work and had instigated pro bono minimums, firm associates seem more aware of their pro bono obligations, and that some firms have reversed restricted policies after an outcry by associates); Edwards, supra note 2, at 69-71 (noting opinions of former law clerks on pro bono work).
82. Curtis, supra note 50, at 74 & n.14; Stracher, supra note 56, at 51.
83. Stracher, supra note 56, at 51.
84. Curtis, supra note 50, at 69.
85. Glendon, supra note 9, at 28; see Schiltz, supra note 41, at 908.
86. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 62; Glendon, supra note 9; Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1475.
87. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 949, 950 (1995).
88. Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 23 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
89. In fact, the stigma may work the other way. I have been told by some public interest employers that they are wary of hiring lawyers who have spent time practicing at a private firm because they are skeptical that the lawyer will cope with the lifestyle change and salary plunge and doubt if they have sufficient commitment and dedication to public interest work.
90. Kahlenberg, supra note 34 (testimonial of Professor Richard Neustadt on book jacket).
91. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1476.
92. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
93. This article does assume some knowledge of what clinical legal education is: a program which allows law students to work with real clients as junior lawyers under the supervision of experienced clinical faculty. This article also confines its discussion to the traditional domain of clinics: poverty lawyering and related work in areas such as disabilities, criminal legal assistance, capital punishment, landlord and tenant, immigration and family law. It does not discuss the other types of clinics which exist such as those where students work on international human rights projects or in more commercial fields designing business plans, corporate structures and even taxation strategies for businesses and non-profit organizations. Many of the article's arguments, however, are enhanced by the existence of these more diverse clinics.
94. See supra Part II.B.
95. See supra note 49.
96. See supra Part II.A.
97. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2431 (quoting Arthur Koestler).
98. Id. at 2435 (quoting former Tulane Law School Dean John Kramer); see also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, 2105 (1989).
99. Silver and Cross warn of the risks of exposing students to the life and values of those on the wrong side of the tracks: Some pro bono representations involve accused murderers, thieves, rapists, wife-beaters, child molesters, drug dealers, and gang-bangers - bad people who do bad things. After getting to know these individuals, some lawyers may favor the death penalty more strongly than before. . . . Many poor people have problems because they make bad choices. Unemployment sometimes occurs because employees have engaged in illegal or irresponsible behavior at work. Alcoholism and drug addiction sometimes persist because abusers have refused treatment or surrounded themselves with temptations. Diseases sometimes occur because people are ignorant, superstitious, obese, inert, promiscuous, unclean, or unreliable with medications. Excessive debt sometimes reflects immoderate spending. Will lawyers who are required to represent clients who make poor choices move to the left politically? Or will the experience of representing people whose values are unlike theirs and who fail to help themselves harden them against the poor? We will not pretend to know. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1492 (emphasis added). Silver and Cross are right -we don't know how many students will be turned off. But we also don't know how many students will be turned on to public interest lawyering as a result of their clinic experiences. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. In general, most clinic students I have met emerge with a more nuanced understanding of the causes of crime and poverty and are less prone to simplistic ideas such as "criminals are bad people who do bad things" or "poor people make bad choices and fail to help themselves." Many may begin to see crime and poverty as the outgrowth of a totality of circumstances: they may find a child molester or abuser who himself endured horrendous abuse; they may find that addiction has a genetic link or a strong basis in neglect, abuse and trauma; they also may find that the values of "those people" are in fact remarkably similar to their own. See also infra note 107 and accompanying text.
100. Silver & Cross, supra note 60.
101. Id. at 1494.
102. Id. at 1449.
103. Id. at 1482.
104. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Millions Eligible for Food Stamps Aren't Applying, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1; Nina Bernstein, Homeless Shelters in New York Fill to Highest Level Since 80's, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at A1.
105. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Millions Eligible for Food Stamps Aren't Applying, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2001, at A1; Nina Bernstein, Homeless Shelters in New York Fill to Highest Level Since 80's, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2001, at A1.
106. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1478.
107. In fact, Gates and Soros are good examples of the power of actual exposure. Bill Gates has undergone a transformation in his philanthropy. Initially his grants and donations concentrated on providing access to computing technology to the underprivileged - a tactic dismissed by many as a cynical public relations exercise that insidiously promoted the monopoly of Microsoft operating systems. Gates tells the story of how, one day in an impoverished shanty town in Soweto, South Africa, he realized that the town had only one power outlet and thought to himself, "Hey, wait a minute . . . computers may not be the highest priority in this particular place." Jean Strouse, How to Give Away $21.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, (Magazine) at 56. Gates subsequently donated considerably more attention to global health issues and has donated over $750 million to health initiatives run by WHO, UNICEF and other charitable foundations. Id. Gates's recent grant of $40 million to homeless shelters could equally have been the result of a transformative experience while standing inside a shelter. George Soros is clearly convinced of the value of legal services - a large proportion of public law initiatives in America are at least partly funded by the Soros Foundation. See, e.g., Lawyers for the Poor Earn Little Money, Lots of Satisfaction; Philanthropist's Grants Pay Salaries, School Loans, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1998, at D10; Philanthropist Challenges Others to Invest in Justice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sept. 1998, at 33; Henry Weinstein, Billionaire's Matching Grant Program to Benefit Legal Aid Services, L.A. Times, June 3, 1998, at A28 (describing Soros's generosity in funding organizations and programs that provide legal services for the poor).
108. In fact, Gates and Soros are good examples of the power of actual exposure. Bill Gates has undergone a transformation in his philanthropy. Initially his grants and donations concentrated on providing access to computing technology to the underprivileged - a tactic dismissed by many as a cynical public relations exercise that insidiously promoted the monopoly of Microsoft operating systems. Gates tells the story of how, one day in an impoverished shanty town in Soweto, South Africa, he realized that the town had only one power outlet and thought to himself, "Hey, wait a minute . . . computers may not be the highest priority in this particular place." Jean Strouse, How to Give Away $21.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, (Magazine) at 56. Gates subsequently donated considerably more attention to global health issues and has donated over $750 million to health initiatives run by WHO, UNICEF and other charitable foundations. Id. Gates's recent grant of $40 million to homeless shelters could equally have been the result of a transformative experience while standing inside a shelter. George Soros is clearly convinced of the value of legal services - a large proportion of public law initiatives in America are at least partly funded by the Soros Foundation. See, e.g., Lawyers for the Poor Earn Little Money, Lots of Satisfaction; Philanthropist's Grants Pay Salaries, School Loans, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1998, at D10; Philanthropist Challenges Others to Invest in Justice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sept. 1998, at 33; Henry Weinstein, Billionaire's Matching Grant Program to Benefit Legal Aid Services, L.A. Times, June 3, 1998, at A28 (describing Soros's generosity in funding organizations and programs that provide legal services for the poor).
109. In fact, Gates and Soros are good examples of the power of actual exposure. Bill Gates has undergone a transformation in his philanthropy. Initially his grants and donations concentrated on providing access to computing technology to the underprivileged - a tactic dismissed by many as a cynical public relations exercise that insidiously promoted the monopoly of Microsoft operating systems. Gates tells the story of how, one day in an impoverished shanty town in Soweto, South Africa, he realized that the town had only one power outlet and thought to himself, "Hey, wait a minute . . . computers may not be the highest priority in this particular place." Jean Strouse, How to Give Away $21.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, (Magazine) at 56. Gates subsequently donated considerably more attention to global health issues and has donated over $750 million to health initiatives run by WHO, UNICEF and other charitable foundations. Id. Gates's recent grant of $40 million to homeless shelters could equally have been the result of a transformative experience while standing inside a shelter. George Soros is clearly convinced of the value of legal services - a large proportion of public law initiatives in America are at least partly funded by the Soros Foundation. See, e.g., Lawyers for the Poor Earn Little Money, Lots of Satisfaction; Philanthropist's Grants Pay Salaries, School Loans, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1998, at D10; Philanthropist Challenges Others to Invest in Justice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sept. 1998, at 33; Henry Weinstein, Billionaire's Matching Grant Program to Benefit Legal Aid Services, L.A. Times, June 3, 1998, at A28 (describing Soros's generosity in funding organizations and programs that provide legal services for the poor).
110. In fact, Gates and Soros are good examples of the power of actual exposure. Bill Gates has undergone a transformation in his philanthropy. Initially his grants and donations concentrated on providing access to computing technology to the underprivileged - a tactic dismissed by many as a cynical public relations exercise that insidiously promoted the monopoly of Microsoft operating systems. Gates tells the story of how, one day in an impoverished shanty town in Soweto, South Africa, he realized that the town had only one power outlet and thought to himself, "Hey, wait a minute . . . computers may not be the highest priority in this particular place." Jean Strouse, How to Give Away $21.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2000, (Magazine) at 56. Gates subsequently donated considerably more attention to global health issues and has donated over $750 million to health initiatives run by WHO, UNICEF and other charitable foundations. Id. Gates's recent grant of $40 million to homeless shelters could equally have been the result of a transformative experience while standing inside a shelter. George Soros is clearly convinced of the value of legal services - a large proportion of public law initiatives in America are at least partly funded by the Soros Foundation. See, e.g., Lawyers for the Poor Earn Little Money, Lots of Satisfaction; Philanthropist's Grants Pay Salaries, School Loans, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 18, 1998, at D10; Philanthropist Challenges Others to Invest in Justice, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Sept. 1998, at 33; Henry Weinstein, Billionaire's Matching Grant Program to Benefit Legal Aid Services, L.A. Times, June 3, 1998, at A28 (describing Soros's generosity in funding organizations and programs that provide legal services for the poor).
111. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1483-84.
112. Harold V. Cordry, The Multicultural Dictionary of Proverbs 258 (1997).
113. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1484.
114. This figure is based on an eligible client obtaining a federal Social Security Insurance ("SSI") pension. In the year 2000 a base monthly payment of SSI was $500. Over thirty years (without accounting for inflation) this would amount to $180,000. Over sixty years (children are eligible for SSI) the figure would be $360,000. SSI recipients are also eligible for food stamps, Medicaid and state subsidized income and subsidized housing. In Connecticut, in the year 2001 an SSI recipient would receive approximately $800 per month in combined federal and state income and food stamps. Over thirty years (without accounting for inflation) this would amount to $288,000. The value of medical services and subsidized housing would of course greatly increase the value. Interview with Mary-Christy Fisher, staff attorney, New Haven Legal Assistance (June 5, 2001); see also Linda Landry, An Advocate's Guide to Surviving the SSI System: Financial and Other Nondisability Criteria 1 (2000). Of course Silver and Cross may object to the provision of these government services, but an evaluation of such objections is beyond the scope of this article.
115. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2434-35.
116. Arguably it is a mistake to think that a clinic has "failed" if it puts students off a career in public interest work. See Abbe Smith, Carrying on in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense is not so Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 723, 724 (1995). Smith responds to an article by a student who was deterred from a career in criminal defense after a semester of clinical experience: [L]ike many students who explore criminal defense practice in a law school clinic, Rader struggled hard with what it means to be a criminal lawyer and whether the fit was a good one for him. He learned a lot about how the American criminal justice system works - or doesn't - in the setting in which most people experience the criminal law. He experienced and grappled with a wide range of ethical and tactical dilemmas. Notwithstanding enormous institutional constraints, he represented his clients well. What clinical teacher could ask for more? Id. at 724-25 (responding to Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Student's Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 299, 302 (1994)).
117. Arguably it is a mistake to think that a clinic has "failed" if it puts students off a career in public interest work. See Abbe Smith, Carrying on in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense is not so Sexy and Other Grievances, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 723, 724 (1995). Smith responds to an article by a student who was deterred from a career in criminal defense after a semester of clinical experience: [L]ike many students who explore criminal defense practice in a law school clinic, Rader struggled hard with what it means to be a criminal lawyer and whether the fit was a good one for him. He learned a lot about how the American criminal justice system works - or doesn't - in the setting in which most people experience the criminal law. He experienced and grappled with a wide range of ethical and tactical dilemmas. Notwithstanding enormous institutional constraints, he represented his clients well. What clinical teacher could ask for more? Id. at 724-25 (responding to Robert Rader, Confessions of Guilt: A Clinic Student's Reflections on Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 299, 302 (1994)).
118. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 37-38 (1995).
119. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society and Anthony T. Kronman's The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 707, 726-728 (1996).
120. Id. at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See Schiltz, supra note 35.
122. Id. at 709-10, 718-20.
123. Id. at 718-20 (quoting Glendon, supra note 9, at 78).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 736.
127. Schiltz uses a similar analogy: "Just as there are 'posted' and 'real' speed limits in each community - and just as 'real' speed limits vary among communities that observe the same 'posted' limits - so too are there 'posted' and 'real' rules when it comes to sanctioning unethical conduct." Id. at 718.
128. Schiltz writes: If the academy is to provide effective mentoring, at least three conditions are necessary (although not sufficient): First, the academy must accept that one of its functions is to prepare students to practice law-and to practice law ethically. . . . Second, every faculty must include a number of people who have substantial experience practicing law or a genuine interest in the work of practitioners and judges. . . . Finally, professors must be willing to spend time with students. Id. at 747. These characteristics stand in direct contrast to the composition of the faculty of elite law schools. The lack of time and practical experience is self-evident and has been discussed above. The attitude of most elite law professors toward the goals of law schools is aptly summarized by Owen Fiss: "Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover." See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1, 26 (1985) (letter from Owen Fiss to Paul D. Carrington among exchange of letters in response to Paul D. Carrington's article Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984)).
129. Schiltz writes: If the academy is to provide effective mentoring, at least three conditions are necessary (although not sufficient): First, the academy must accept that one of its functions is to prepare students to practice law-and to practice law ethically. . . . Second, every faculty must include a number of people who have substantial experience practicing law or a genuine interest in the work of practitioners and judges. . . . Finally, professors must be willing to spend time with students. Id. at 747. These characteristics stand in direct contrast to the composition of the faculty of elite law schools. The lack of time and practical experience is self-evident and has been discussed above. The attitude of most elite law professors toward the goals of law schools is aptly summarized by Owen Fiss: "Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover." See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1, 26 (1985) (letter from Owen Fiss to Paul D. Carrington among exchange of letters in response to Paul D. Carrington's article Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984)).
130. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 709 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
131. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2446 (quoting Stewart Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside the Doors II 25 (1982)).
132. Stephen Wizner, Speech delivered to Association of American Law Schools, Section on Clinical Legal Education (Jan. 6, 1994).
133. Kronman, supra note 1, at 2.
134. See id. at 145-46; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
135. Turow, supra note 46.
136. John Jay Osborn, The Paper Chase (1971); The Paper Chase (20th Century Fox 1973).
137. John Jay Osborn, The Paper Chase (1971); The Paper Chase (20th Century Fox 1973).
138. Falcon, supra note 46.
139. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Studies 116 (1960).
140. George J. Roth, Slaying the Law School Dragon: A Primer on How to Survive and Combat Law School Intimidation (1981), quoted in Falcon, supra note 46, at 285.
141. Mark H. McCormack, The Terrible Truth About Lawyers (1987), quoted in Falcon, supra note 46, at 285.
142. Turow, supra note 46, quoted in Falcon, supra note 46, at 286.
143. Goodrich, supra note 45, at 115.
144. Falcon, supra note 46, at 290.
145. Gaber, supra note 39, at 181 (alteration in original).
146. See, e.g., Falcon, supra note 46, at 285 ("The inordinate competition is engendered by a system of daily recitation which is designed to make you look stupid, cause traumatic embarrassment, and make you feel like you were never cut out to be a lawyer in the first place."); Jennifer Howard, Learning To "Think Like A Lawyer" Through Experience, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 167, 172 (1995) ("The traditional Socratic method emphasizes client-less analysis in a situation of competition and isolation, and in the process seriously undermines students' confidence and self-esteem.").
147. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 69.
148. The first six dates are those of the respective author's attendance at law school, not publication dates.
149. Professor Bright is consistently nominated for student-voted teaching awards and was selected by students to deliver the 1999 Yale Law School Graduating Address.
150. Professor Eskridge was awarded the 2000 Yale Law Women Teaching Award and selected by students to deliver the 2001 Graduating Address. Professor Eskridge teaches mainstream classes like Civil Procedure and Constitutional Law, but his teaching award for the year 2000 was primarily based on his successful teaching of the course: "Sexuality, Gender and the Law".
151. Both Edwards and Kronman identify Professor Fiss as a spokesperson for the kind of teaching and scholarship towards which they direct their concern.
152. Gaber, supra note 39, at 213.
153. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Dressed For Excess: How Hollywood Affects The Professional Behavior Of Lawyers, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 49, 70 (2000); see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review Of Empirical Research On Attorney Attributes Bearing On Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337 (1997).
154. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Dressed For Excess: How Hollywood Affects The Professional Behavior Of Lawyers, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 49, 70 (2000); see also Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review Of Empirical Research On Attorney Attributes Bearing On Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337 (1997).
155. Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 547, 594 (1998).
156. See generally Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in The Movies, 24 Nova L. Rev. 533 (2000); Rapoport, supra note 135.
157. Falcon, supra note 46, at 122-24; see also James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 Yale L.J. 1679, 1688 (1991). Gordon relates the following story: A law professor's greatest aspiration is to be like Professor Kingsfield in the movie The Paper Chase. One professor who saw the movie decided (this is a true story) to act out one of the scenes from the film in his class. He called on a student, who replied that he was unprepared. The professor said, "Mr. Jones, come down here." The student walked all the way down to the front of the class. The professor gave the student a dime, and said, "Take this dime. Call your mother. Tell her that there is very little chance of your ever becoming a lawyer." Ashamed, the student turned and walked slowly toward the door. Suddenly, however, he had a flash of inspiration. He turned around, and in a loud voice, said, "NO, Clyde." (He called the professor by his first name.) "I have a BETTER idea! YOU take this dime, and you go call ALL YOUR FRIENDS!!!" The class broke into pandemonium. The professor broke the student into little bitty pieces. Id. at 1688.
158. Kennedy has commented: "Law school . . . teaches students that they are weak, lazy, incompetent and insecure. And it also teaches them that . . . large institutions will take care of them almost no matter what." Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System (1983), quoted in Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 163.
159. See supra Part II.C.
160. Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 144; Turow, supra note 46, at 6.
161. For example many law students and professors (and not just those at Yale) have told me that Yale students are more likely to participate in public interest work than those at the famously competitive Harvard or Chicago law schools.
162. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 145-46; Schiltz, supra note 35, at 732. Schiltz comments: An attorney who is integrated internally uses the same moral compass in all aspects of her life. She does not have one set of ethics for home and another for the office. . . . A person with a strong enough moral compass may very well resist the pressures of the legal profession on her own . . . . Id.
163. See Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1289-90.
164. See Deborah L. Arron, Running from the Law: Why Good Lawyers are Getting Out of the Legal Profession 2-3 (1989); Barry A. Farber, Crisis in Education: Stress and Burnout in the American Teacher 24 (1991); Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1289-90; Rader, supra note 101, at 302.
165. See Deborah L. Arron, Running from the Law: Why Good Lawyers are Getting Out of the Legal Profession 2-3 (1989); Barry A. Farber, Crisis in Education: Stress and Burnout in the American Teacher 24 (1991); Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1289-90; Rader, supra note 101, at 302.
166. See Daicoff, supra note 135, at 1407 (providing a comprehensive examination of the literature that demonstrates that law students find law school psychologically and emotionally difficult); Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing Constructive Approaches to Lawyer and Law Student Distress, 10 J.L. & Health 69, 69 (1995-96) (explaining that law students report high levels of distress in law school); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 66 (1995-96) (noting that many first-year law students become overwhelmed by "failure anxiety"); Suzanne C. Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 Willamette L. Rev. 593, 595 (1996) ("[L]aw students consistently reported significantly higher levels of stress than did medical students . . . .").
167. See Daicoff, supra note 135, at 1407 (providing a comprehensive examination of the literature that demonstrates that law students find law school psychologically and emotionally difficult); Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing Constructive Approaches to Lawyer and Law Student Distress, 10 J.L. & Health 69, 69 (1995-96) (explaining that law students report high levels of distress in law school); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 66 (1995-96) (noting that many first-year law students become overwhelmed by "failure anxiety"); Suzanne C. Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 Willamette L. Rev. 593, 595 (1996) ("[L]aw students consistently reported significantly higher levels of stress than did medical students . . . .").
168. See Daicoff, supra note 135, at 1407 (providing a comprehensive examination of the literature that demonstrates that law students find law school psychologically and emotionally difficult); Peter G. Glenn, Some Thoughts About Developing Constructive Approaches to Lawyer and Law Student Distress, 10 J.L. & Health 69, 69 (1995-96) (explaining that law students report high levels of distress in law school); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 66 (1995-96) (noting that many first-year law students become overwhelmed by "failure anxiety"); Suzanne C. Segerstrom, Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 Willamette L. Rev. 593, 595 (1996) ("[L]aw students consistently reported significantly higher levels of stress than did medical students . . . .").
169. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
170. Gaber, supra note 39.
171. See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 34, at 19 ("If we'd wanted soft, we would have gone to Yale, where people are said to like law school").
172. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1 (1998); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1 (1989-90); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547 (1993); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
173. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1 (1998); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1 (1989-90); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547 (1993); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
174. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1 (1998); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1 (1989-90); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547 (1993); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
175. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1 (1998); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 Berkeley Women's L.J. 1 (1989-90); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1547 (1993); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299 (1988).
176. Gaber, supra note 39, at 167 (citing Lani Guanier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1994)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 182 (alteration in original).
179. See id. at 211.
180. Id. at 212.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 211.
183. Many students report that elimination or reduced emphasis on grades does not eliminate competition as they are most intimidated by the assessments of faculty and other students when they speak in class.
184. David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker: Student Collaboration in Clinical Programs, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 199, 204 (1994); Howard, supra note 128, at 192-97.
185. See Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1695, 1707 (1993) (commenting that students who do pro bono work, "perhaps for the first time, learn to identify with the powerless, and find gratification serving these clients"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1994) (noting that "lawyers must learn how to 'feel with' others" and that '"empathy training' is an essential part of the client-lawyer relationship").
186. See Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1695, 1707 (1993) (commenting that students who do pro bono work, "perhaps for the first time, learn to identify with the powerless, and find gratification serving these clients"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing from the MacCrate Report - Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1994) (noting that "lawyers must learn how to 'feel with' others" and that '"empathy training' is an essential part of the client-lawyer relationship").
187. See Ogletree, supra note 31, at 1271; Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 392, 429-30 (1971).
188. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987).
189. This illustration is based on the author's own experience. See also Homer C. La Rue, Developing an Identity of Responsible Lawyering Through Experiential Learning, 43 Hastings L.J. 1147 (1992). La Rue comments: [T]he student . . . remarked that the judge never really saw who his client was. The judge only saw a poor person of color and assumed that she was trying to get more than that to which she was entitled. He was genuinely outraged at the judge's inability or unwillingness to see past her racial and class biases. The student noticed how his own desire to 'win' pushed him to identify with his client in way that permitted him to experience, if only for a moment, the powerlessness of a person who lives her life in a state of subordination. Id. at 1154-55. Compare this experience with Kronman's assertion that practical wisdom requires that "a lawyer must be able to lose himself in that other person's situation, to see it from within in a way that makes it possible for him not just to name but appreciate the interests, values, and ambitions that inform it." Kronman, supra note 1, at 299.
190. See, e.g., Philip M. Genty, Clients Don't Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House Clinic and the Teaching of Empathy, 1 Clinical L. Rev. 273, 274 (2000) (describing how representing needy clients in two family court cases helped the author "to realize that in both cases the clients were looking to me to help them be understood and, more importantly, respected" by social service agencies and the legal system).
191. See, e.g., Gerald P. López, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049 (1970).
192. See, e.g., Gerald P. López, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049 (1970).
193. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
194. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st-century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
195. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
196. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
197. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
198. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
199. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
200. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education - A 21st- century Perspective, 34 J. Legal Educ. 612, 616-17 (1984); Theresa Glennon, Lawyers and Caring: Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 Hastings L.J. 1175, 1180-86 (1992); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 1617-19, 1654-56 (1991); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1256-59 (1991); Peter Margulies, Re-Framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 606-07 (1999); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes To Law School: The Clinical Education Of The Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1993); Harvey M. Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. Legal Educ. 87, 90-92 (1982).
201. See Kronman, supra note 1, at 145-46; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
202. Kronman, supra note 1, at 365.
203. Edwards, supra note 2, at 38.
204. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 734 (citations omitted).
205. Edwards, supra note 2, at 73.
206. Id. at 36.
207. Id. at 36-37.
208. Id. at 66.
209. Id. at 77 ("I see no reason why a tenured professor cannot simply choose to engage in 'practical' scholarship and pedagogy.").
210. Kronman, supra note 1, at viii.
211. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1502.
212. Kronman, supra note 1, at 264-70, 265 ("Most law students do not expect to work in universities. In teaching law, one must accept this fact and help to prepare students for a life lived in the world of affairs and not, like the teacher's, at a contemplative distance from it."); see Edwards, supra note 2, at 35-42.
213. Kronman, supra note 1, at 375.
214. Michael A. Fitts, The Complicated Ingredients of Wisdom and Leadership, 16 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 17, 21 (2000).
215. Stracher, supra note 56, at 50.
216. Kronman, supra note 1, at 271.
217. See id. at 165-271.
218. Id. at 167 ("The critical legal studies movement . . . [has] exerted an influence on American law teaching second only to that of law and economics, [and] has also helped establish the atmosphere of mistrust that now surrounds the virtue of practical wisdom.").
219. See id. at 185-94.
220. Id. at 264.
221. Id.
222. For a discussion of the pedagogical benefit of a practical approach, see Edith R. Warkentine, Kingsfield Doesn't Teach My Contracts Class: Using Contracts to Teach Contracts, 50 J. Legal Educ. 112 (2000).
223. Edwards, supra note 2, at 62.
224. Id. at 62 n.78.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 72 n.104.
227. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 789-90 (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 38 (1936); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 677-78 n. 7 (1995); Roger Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986); and Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 928 (1990)).
228. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 789-90 (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 38 (1936); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 677-78 n. 7 (1995); Roger Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986); and Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 928 (1990)).
229. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 789-90 (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 38 (1936); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 677-78 n. 7 (1995); Roger Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986); and Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 928 (1990)).
230. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 789-90 (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 38 (1936); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 677-78 n. 7 (1995); Roger Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 Geo. L.J. 1, 14 (1986); and Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 928 (1990)).
231. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 34-37.
232. Id. at 62. It is perhaps misleading to say it is Edwards's only comment. He does quote a clerk who endorses this approach and he does note that many commentators have proposed more clinical offerings. See id. at 62 & n.78. He also states, however, that while not dissenting from the view, he has a different focus. He never states why his focus is not on clinics. Id. at 62.
233. See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Legal Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 577 (1987) (comparing law school to a circus where the theoretical issues are studied in the "main tent" and practical issues are merely a "sideshow").
234. Wizner, supra note 115.
235. See Robert MacCrate (chairperson), Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission B. 141-207; see also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1099 (1997). Originally clinicians used skills-based arguments to justify the presence of clinics in law schools. See, e.g., Steven Wizner and Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980). Now clinicians are wary of skills-based arguments, not only because they view their pedagogical role far more broadly (for the reasons discussed above) but because law schools can easily replace clinics with more cost- effective skills-building activities like practice simulations, losing the professional and personal advantages of live-client clinics. See Genty, supra note 164, at 282-83; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (1993).
236. See Robert MacCrate (chairperson), Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission B. 141-207; see also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1099 (1997). Originally clinicians used skills-based arguments to justify the presence of clinics in law schools. See, e.g., Steven Wizner and Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980). Now clinicians are wary of skills-based arguments, not only because they view their pedagogical role far more broadly (for the reasons discussed above) but because law schools can easily replace clinics with more cost- effective skills-building activities like practice simulations, losing the professional and personal advantages of live-client clinics. See Genty, supra note 164, at 282-83; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (1993).
237. See Robert MacCrate (chairperson), Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission B. 141-207; see also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1099 (1997). Originally clinicians used skills-based arguments to justify the presence of clinics in law schools. See, e.g., Steven Wizner and Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980). Now clinicians are wary of skills-based arguments, not only because they view their pedagogical role far more broadly (for the reasons discussed above) but because law schools can easily replace clinics with more cost-effective skills-building activities like practice simulations, losing the professional and personal advantages of live-client clinics. See Genty, supra note 164, at 282-83; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (1993).
238. See Robert MacCrate (chairperson), Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 ABA Sec. Legal Educ. & Admission B. 141-207; see also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 1099 (1997). Originally clinicians used skills-based arguments to justify the presence of clinics in law schools. See, e.g., Steven Wizner and Dennis Curtis, "Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 Clev. St. L. Rev. 673 (1980). Now clinicians are wary of skills-based arguments, not only because they view their pedagogical role far more broadly (for the reasons discussed above) but because law schools can easily replace clinics with more cost- effective skills-building activities like practice simulations, losing the professional and personal advantages of live-client clinics. See Genty, supra note 164, at 282-83; Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (1993).
239. Jerome N. Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 916 (1933).
240. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 102-29 (1976); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism In The Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts At Resuscitation, And Alternate Sources Of Virtue, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305, 306-08 (2000); Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror On The Wall: Histories Of American Law Schools, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 844 (1982).
241. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 102-29 (1976); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism In The Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts At Resuscitation, And Alternate Sources Of Virtue, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305, 306-08 (2000); Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror On The Wall: Histories Of American Law Schools, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 844 (1982).
242. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 102-29 (1976); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism In The Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts At Resuscitation, And Alternate Sources Of Virtue, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 305, 306-08 (2000); Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror On The Wall: Histories Of American Law Schools, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 844 (1982).
243. Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 549, 552 (1996) (quoting Hanna Holborn Gray, The Leaning Tower of Academe, 49 Bull. Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 34, 35-36 (1996)).
244. Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 549, 552 (1996) (quoting Hanna Holborn Gray, The Leaning Tower of Academe, 49 Bull. Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 34, 35-36 (1996)).
245. Id. at 559.
246. Id. at 558 (citations omitted).
247. See Auerbach, supra note 200, at 102-29; Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School 463-64 (1971); Konefsky & Schlegel, supra note 200, at 844.
248. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Impact of History on Contemporary Prestige Images of Boston's Law Schools, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 621 (1990).
249. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom For Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals From Ideology In Legal Ethics, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 458, 464 (1994) (reviewing Kronman, supra note 1) ("Yet as many commentators have documented, these lawyers routinely deployed arguments about the importance of maintaining professional ideals as a means of excluding women and minorities, erecting protectionist barriers to competition from laymen, and shielding incompetent colleagues from public sanction." (citations omitted)).
250. Kronman, supra note 1, at 5.
251. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession 230, 235 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) ("It is important to take full account, not only of the failure of professionals to live up to their ideals, but of the extent to which the ideals themselves have been bound up with the rationalization of hierarchy inside and outside the profession.").
252. Cochran, supra note 200, at 308-11.
253. Silver & Cross, supra note 60, at 1477 (citations omitted).
254. Jill Ker Conway, True North 22 (1994).
255. Galanter, supra note 201, at 561 n.52.
256. Falcon, supra note 46, at 161 ("[T]He more reputable the law school, the more likely its clinics will be of low quality. Prestigious schools tend to think that anything having to do with the real world, as part of the curriculum, is beneath that school's dignity.").
257. Edwards, supra note 2, at 62 n.78. The expense of clinics as an obstacle should not be underestimated. Rhode writes: For many law school and central university administrators, public-service initiatives seem less pressing than other budget items more directly linked to daily needs and national reputations. For example, U.S. News & World Report rankings of law schools have become increasingly important. Not only are pro bono opportunities excluded from the factors that determine a school's rank, they compete for resources with programs that do affect its position. Rhode, supra note 38, at 2440 (citations omitted). The primary attraction of law schools to university administrators is that they can charge high tuition to students without incurring the equipment costs of schools of science and medicine. Furthermore, the classic elite school teaching style using the Socratic case method allows for a high student/faculty ratio. Even the full-time academic model is advantageous-lawyers leaving practice are inevitably going to expect salary parity with their previous professions.
258. Schiltz, supra note 35, at 706.
259. Interview with Professor Stephen Wizner (Aug. 18, 2000); see also Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical Education at Yale Law School, 49 J. Legal Educ. 504, 533 (1999).
260. Kronman, supra note 1, at 145.