Internal monitoring, regulation, and compensation of top executives in banks

International Review of Economics and Finance

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 325-335

  Ang, James S ^a   Lauterbach, Beni ^b   Schreiber, Ben Z ^c  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BAR ILAN UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c Financial Stability Division   (Israel)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; Executive compensation; Non CEO top executives

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347708937     PISSN: 10590560     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1059-0560(01)00094-6     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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